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Abstract 
 
My study of Renan and his Vie de Jésus is an attempt to answer the question of 
how the “quest of the historical Jesus” contributed to the formation of Fascist 
political theology.  It is a study of why and how the “Academic Jesus” of 
scientifically trained scholars became the “Fascist Jesus” of politicians like Benito 
Mussolini and Adolf Hitler.  Through a detailed examination of Renan’s Vie and 
his other writings, I propose that fascism was not the result of an excess of 
irrationality, but rather an excess of Modern rationalism resulting from the late 
Medieval and early modern rejection of the ancient mystical epistemology and 
ontology expressed in both Socratic philosophy and Judeo-Christian theology.  
Second, I argue that Renan’s and other modern scholars’ (e.g., Jakob Hauer and 
Walter Grundmann) anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism did not stem from any 
orthodox Christian affiliation, but rather from their embracing of a revival of the 
Marcionite heresy and Enlightenment idealism.  Taken as a whole, my work is an 
argument for viewing the problem of Christian theology, the “historical Jesus,” 
and the origins of fascism as the resurgence of a non-liturgical, neo-Sophism and 
its rejection of ancient mystical, participatory rationality centered in the Church’s 
worship of Jesus Christ.  Positively, I am arguing that the orthodox ecclesial-
mystical Jesus is the “historical” Jesus—and the only Jesus capable of restraining 
the monsters of Modern Western political science—whether of Fascism, or any 
yet to come; this is the only Jesus upon which a sustainable life-giving polity can 
be founded.     
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                            The Fascist Jesus:  Ernest Renan’s Vie de Jésus                                         
                          and the Theological Origins of Fascism 
Ralph E. Lentz II 
University of Wales, Trinity St. David 
                                               Introduction:      
 “A Great Mystery”:  Christo-Ecclesiology and Political Theology 
 
I.1.  Ernest Renan, the Fascist Jesus, and the Mystery of Participation 
Recollecting his decision in 1845 to abandon a vocation as a Catholic priest, 
Ernest Renan wrote in 1883 that he had been seized by the idea that by 
abandoning the Church, he could restore faith in Jesus.  He added that had he 
been able to believe in apparitions, he would have seen Jesus say to him, “Forsake 
me to be my disciple.”1  At the same time, Renan stated that he was still a 
Christian—but as “a professor of theology of Halle or of Tübingen.”2  In the end, 
a daimonion (“une voix secrète”) commanded him, saying, “‘You are no longer 
Catholic; your habit is a lie: Leave it.’”3 
 Eighteen years later Renan would prove his devotion to the Jesus of his 
imagination with the publication of the Vie de Jésus, the most popular, 
scandalous, and important of the 19th century lives in the “historical quest of 
Jesus”.4  In the post-Enlightenment war to liberate the “historical Jesus” from the 
                                                          
1Ernest Renan, Souvenirs d’enfance et de jeunesse, 28e éd. (Paris:  Calmann Levy, 1897), 312.    
2Renan, Souvenirs d’enfance, 312.    
3Renan, Souvenirs d’enfance, 312.    
4Albert Schweitzer noted that the Vie went through eight editions in three months, generated 
within France an academic and theological cottage industry of refutations, and was, in 
Schweitzer’s estimation, “an event in world literature” which exposed the cultured masses to a 
generation of scientific theological criticism of Jesus and the Gospels.  Significantly for this thesis, 
the Vie was quite successful in Germany both popularly and in academic circles (more so with 
Protestant critics); within a year of its publication there were five German translations.  See Albert 
Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, First Complete Edition, ed. John Bowden; trans. W. 
Montgomery, J. R. Coates, Susan Cupitt, and John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN:  Fortress Press, 
2001), 159, 165-67.   H. W. Wardman likened the publication of the Vie to a grenade, rather than a 
bottle, tossed into the sea.  In 1864 Renan published a popular version of the book for “the 
edification of the humble.”  Wardman noted that many of the “humble” were not edified by the 
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“tyranny of dogma,” Albert Schweitzer identified two sources of inspiration:  
hatred and love, with the “greatest lives” having originated from hatred (e.g. 
Reimarus’, the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist’s, and David Friedrich Strauss’).5  Yet 
Renan’s work of love—(“But love works without faith”—as Renan asserted in the 
Introduction to the Vie)—cast long shadows, well into the 20th century.6  And 
some of the shadows cast by Renan’s intellectual work were dark indeed:  Benito 
Mussolini once referred to Renan as “one of the inspired pre-fascists”7 and “a 
great man.”8  In Renan, Mussolini found a fellow avant-garde intellectual who 
after the acute crises of war, (the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 for Renan and 
the Great War for Mussolini), called for all-encompassing “moral and intellectual 
reform”.9  Renan’s aristocratic ethics,10 disdain for “le vulgaire” masses11 and 
“matérialisme bourgeois”12 anticipated the same antipathies in Mussolini’s fascist 
political ideology and his desire to “combat every retrograde idea, technical or 
spiritual.”13  And these ideas were not only to be found in Renan’s many 
                                                                                                                                                              
book at all, and for the rest of his life Renan received a steady stream of letters of dis-affection 
from these faithful.  See H. W. Wardman,  Ernest Renan:  A Critical Biography (London:  
University of London, Athlone Press, 1964), 80-81.    
5Schweitzer, Quest, 5-6.   
6“Mais l’amour va sans la foi.”  Ernest Renan, Vie de Jésus, neuvième edition, Histoire des 
origines du christianisme, livre premier (Paris:  Michel Lévy Frères, 1863), lix.    
7Benito Mussolini, “The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism,” in My Autobiography with 
“The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism,” former trans. Richard Washburn Child; latter 
trans.  Jane Soames; (former New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1928; latter London, W.C.:  
Leonard and Virginia Woolf, Hogarth Press, 1933; reprint, New York: Dover, 2006), 233.  
8Benito Mussolini, Mussolini as Revealed in His Political Speeches 1914-1923, trans. and ed. 
Barone Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino (New York:  Howard Fertig, 1976), 55.    
9See Ernest Renan, La Réform intellectual et morale (Paris:  Michel Lévy Frères, 1871) and 
Mussolini, Mussolini as Revealed, xiv.  See also the entirety of Mussolini’s  “The Political and 
Social Doctrine of Fascism”.    
10Cf. Renan, La Réform, 106-107.    
11Renan, Vie, 453, cf., 449.    
12Renan, La Réform, 2; see also Part I, “Le Mal,” pgs. 1-57.    
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“secular” philosophical reflections (e.g. La Réform intellectual et morale of 
1871), but also in the Vie itself.  How could Renan’s work of “love” dedicated to 
a scientific understanding of Jesus of Nazareth contribute to a political ideology 
founded in so many hatreds?  How could Renan’s portrayal of Jesus as the Jewish 
version of Socrates14 help, nearly 70 years later, to create the “Fascist Jesus”?   
 Some aid in answering this perplexing question may be found in turning to 
Socrates himself and the mid to late Platonic dialogue, the Phaedrus, for Renan’s 
1845 confession and the Vie can be seen as a historical continuation of the debate 
between Socrates and Lysias concerning the nature of Love, Beauty, Truth, and 
Ethics as recorded in the Phaedrus.15  In the dialogue Phaedrus reads a speech by 
Lysias to Socrates in which Lysias argues that “beautiful ones” should confer 
their “favors” to “non-lovers” [mē erōnti] rather than to lovers [erōnti].16  After 
Socrates gently mocks the speech, Phaedrus challenges him to make the same 
argument better than Lysias.   Socrates consents (on pain of Phaedrus never again 
sharing discourses with him if he does not), and calling on the Muses, makes the 
same argument as Lysias:  non-lovers are more worthy of the favors of their 
beloved because they are more reasonable [phronimon] than lovers.17  This is 
because, as Socrates defines it, love [erōs] itself is irrational and leads to 
immorality—slavery to pleasure, selfishness, physical and moral destruction of 
both the lover and the beloved.18  Thus like Lysias, Renan’s turn away from 
                                                                                                                                                              
13Mussolini, “The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism,” 228, with my emphasis.  See also 
Mussolini as Revealed, xix, and Ernst Nolte’s discussion of Mussolini in Three Faces of Fascism:  
Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York:  Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1966),  158-159; 161-162.   
14Cf. Renan, Vie, 49, 451-452, 455.    
15See the subtitle to the dialogue—Η ΠΕΡΙ ΚΑΛΟΥˑ ΗΘΙΚΟΣ—“Concerning Beauty, Ethics.”  I 
am using  Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library, trans. 
Harold North Fowler (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1966), 412.  Here I am inspired 
by Catherine Pickstock’s After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford, 
UK; Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishers, 1998).  
16Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 227, C; English, 415.    
17Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 236; English, 439.  
18Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 237-241; English, 443-457.  
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Christ and the orthodoxy of the Church in the service of reason and truth—and an 
ironic/oxymoronic erotic non-love—would seem to be on the side of Socrates, on 
the side of Philosophy.19  In actuality, Renan, like the misguided Phaedrus, had 
only made a turn to the non-truth of Sophism.     
 After reinforcing Phaedrus’ acceptance of Lysias’ argument, Socrates 
repents.  He is convicted by his familiar daimonion that both his and Lysias’ 
speeches were impious sins against the god Love [ton Erōta]—for both speeches 
asserted that Love is evil.20  To atone for his sin, Socrates gives another discourse 
on the rationality and goodness of desire [erōs] and the divine madness that it 
produces.21  Now speaking rightly, Socrates in a mythic dialogue between a 
pederast and a young lover declares that as with everything that is divine, the god 
Erōs is “beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities.”22  Being immortal, all 
souls once participated in this divine Erōs, but owing to the order of the universe, 
the souls fell into physical bodies (whether animal or human) which obscured 
their vision of the divine and turned them to physical lusts.  But the souls never 
forgot their original vision of Erōs, Beauty, Wisdom, and Goodness.  And some 
souls, who have been blessed to have fallen into wise and good men, whenever 
seeing an earthly beauty, are reminded of the heavenly Beauty.  Socrates relates 
that the memory of the divine Beauty so agitates the soul that to external 
observers this man appears mad; and in reality he is seized by “a fourth madness” 
[tetartēs manias] sent by the gods to those who separate themselves from human 
concerns and who pursue the divine.23  This is an un-qualified blessing according 
to Socrates:  “. . .madness which comes from god, is superior to sanity, which is 
                                                          
19See Renan, Souvenirs, 319-320, and Wardman, Ernest Renan, 16-25.    
20Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 242-243; English 459, 461.    
21Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 244; English 465.  
22Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 246, D; English 473.  
23Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 249-250; English 483.    
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of human origin.”24  Indeed, participation in the divine madness is supremely 
rational because it is indicative of the soul’s participation in Beauty and God.  
“My discourse has shown that this is, of all inspirations, the best and of the 
highest origin to him who has it or who shares in it, and that he who loves the 
beautiful, partaking in this madness [metechōn tēs manias], is called a lover.”25  
So too by the divine madness of the soul’s love for Erōs the lover participates in 
God [. . .kath’ hoson dunaton theo anthrōpon metaschein].26   
 Socrates readily admits that all of this is highly mysterious.  This is why 
the lover appears crazed and foolish, for to his friends and perhaps even to the 
beloved, the divine Love, Beauty, Wisdom, and Goodness which so animates the 
soul of the lover through the sight of the beloved’s physical beauty, remains 
hidden.  Observers cannot see and therefore understand the wise lover’s right 
employment of the soul’s memories of its original divine vision.  And it is 
through the correct practice of paying attention to the soul’s remembrance of this 
original blessedness that the divinely mad, rational lover becomes “initiated into 
perfect mysteries” [teletas teloumenos].27   
  Through his myth Socrates brings Phaedrus to repentance—he comes to 
see that through a mystical (i.e. un-seen, hidden and super-rational) process of 
participation in divine desire [erōs], both the lover and the beloved become 
virtuous:  good [agathon], self-controlled and orderly [egkrateis autōn kai 
kosmioi], and free [eleutherōsantes].28  And it is by the same logic of the myth 
that Socrates also shows Phaedrus the poverties of sophism and writing in the 
second half of the dialogue.  For what both lack is participation in the truth, the 
                                                          
24Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 244, D; English, 467.    
25Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 249, E; English, 483.    
26Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 253, A; English 493.  
27Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 249, C; English, 483.    
28Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 253, C; 255 B; 256 B; 257 B,39; English, 493, 499, 501, 503, 505.    
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former through pride and wickedness, the latter through laziness leading to 
forgetfulness.29     
 Thus in Socrates’ estimation—and against his own proclamations to the 
contrary—Renan’s “love without faith”—his love without participation in the life 
of Jesus—was only as a sophistic non-lover in relation to the object of his self-
interested desire.  Read in the light of Socrates’ critique of sophistic non-
participatory love and rationality, it could be argued that Renan’s Vie does to 
Jesus’ life what Lysias’ philosophy does to the lover:  it turns Jesus’ life into a 
tool—(whether to gain the chair of Hebrew at the Collège de France, or to 
“‘revenge’” himself against the government for losing the same, which were two 
of the many reasons for Renan’s publication of the Vie).30  And although the Vie 
had all the trappings of rationality—footnotes, appeals to the latest scientific, 
critical hermeneutics of German theology, exhaustive contextual references to the 
Talmud, Josephus, Philo, and others—for all of this, Socrates would say that 
Renan’s writing missed the truth by purposefully refusing to participate in it.  
Such non-love had serious consequences:     
 . . .[T]he affection of the non-lover, which is alloyed with mortal prudence 
 [sōphrosunē  thnētē] and follows mortal and parsimonious rules of 
 conduct, will beget in the beloved soul the narrowness which the common 
 folk praise as virtue; it will cause the soul to be a wanderer upon the earth 
 for nine thousand years and a fool below the earth at last.31   
Given Renan’s subject matter, perhaps a more pertinent warning of the danger of 
trying to arrive at the truth through non participatory love and rationality came 
later from a first-century Jew:  “I tell you the solemn truth, unless you eat the 
                                                          
29Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 260, C-D; 262, C; 268, A-269,C; 274, C-275 B; English, 515, 517, 523, 
541, 543, 545, 563, 565.   
30Wardman, Ernest Renan, 76, 80; on Lysias objectification of the lover, see Pickstock, After 
Writing, 5-9. 
31Plato, Phaedrus, Greek, 256, E-257, A; English, 503, 505.    
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flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in yourselves” (John 
6:53, NET32). 
 Socrates repented of the epistemological and ethical error of the practice 
of rational, non-participatory love.  Renan never did.  Nor did the generation of 
Enlightenment intellectuals who, from the late 1700s to 1914, embarked on the 
“first” quest to discover through scientific means the Jesus of Nazareth, as 
opposed to the Jesus of the Church.  The intellectual, ethical, and political results 
of their works—and particularly those of Ernest Renan—would have profound 
consequences in the first half of the 20th century, as Mussolini’s aforementioned 
praise of Renan in his 1932 article for the Italian Encyclopedia, “The Political and 
Social Doctrine of Fascism,” indicates.  Zeev Sternhell has noted in The Birth of 
Fascist Ideology that Mussolini’s article was an attempt to give fascist ideology 
intellectual respectability;33 by claiming Renan and his work fascists were 
enlisting one of the giants in the project of creating a new Christianity and Church 
fit for Modernity.  (Mussolini was an atheist who viewed the Italian Catholic 
Church as a useful tool in the Fascist project of fashioning a “modernity without 
fragmentation”34 in Italy; he also believed that the only reason Christianity had 
survived into the modern world was because of its adaption by the Roman 
Empire.35  As will be seen later, Renan’s scholarship provided “scientific” 
authority for both claims.)  Twenty-one years after the catastrophe of the Fascist 
and National Socialist experiments, in 1966 Ernst Nolte in The Three Faces of 
                                                          
32My emphasis.  
33Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asheri, The Birth of Fascist Ideology:  From Cultural 
Rebellion to Political Revolution, trans. David Maisel (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 
1994), 35.    
34Rainer Bucher sees this as one of the dangerous temptations of the political theology of Hitler; I 
think it also quite applicable to Mussolini’s fascist project in Italy.  See Rainer Bucher, Hitler’s 
Theology:  A Study in Political Religion, trans. Rebecca Pohl, ed. Michael Hoelzl (London and 
New York:  Continuum, 2011), xi.    
35On Mussolini and the Catholic Church, see Mussolini, My Autobiography, 223; on his atheism 
and sophism, see Laura Fermi, Mussolini (Chicago and London:  University of Chicago Press, 
1961), 74, 260-261, 268; and on his contention that Christianity only became a “world religion” 
via the Roman Empire, see Fermi, 218, 268.   
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Fascism pointed out Renan’s familial and intellectual connections to Joseph 
Arthur de Gobineau, whose Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines (An Essay on 
the Inequality of the Human Races) (1853–1855) was the first to assert the 
superiority of the “Aryan Race.”36  Nolte also showed Renan’s explicit 
connection to fascism through the inspiration his works provided Charles 
Maurras, the French journalist who founded the first fascist political movement, 
the Action Française, in December 1898.37  Most recently, Susannh’s Heschel’s 
2008 Aryan Jesus has demonstrated a genealogy of “racializations” of the 
“historical Jesus”—(i.e. the scholarly  deconstruction of Jesus’ Jewish identity 
and subsequent construction of Jesus as an “Aryan”)—beginning with Renan and 
continuing through the work of Professor Dr. Walter Grundmann and his 
“Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church 
Life” of the Nazi Reich.38   
 My study of Renan and his historical Jesus of the Vie is an attempt to 
answer the question of how the “quest of the historical Jesus” could end up 
participating in the creation of the most pernicious political theology yet 
conceived in the West.  Briefly, why and how did the Academic Jesus become the 
Fascist Jesus?39  Why was it that the Jesus which fascists and National Socialists 
incorporated into their political theology was almost exclusively the product of 
scientifically trained scholars?  Various researchers have offered answers to the 
question of the intellectual and cultural origins of fascism and National Socialism 
in general, and the theological problems associated with them in particular, and it 
is in this context that I wish to set my research.   
                                                          
36Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, 43.  
37Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, 64, 66.    
38Susannah Heschel, The Aryan Jesus:  Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany 
(Princeton and Oxford:  Princeton University Press, 2008).    
39In addition to Heschel’s work, my research also contributes to that of  Karla Poewe in New 
Religions and the Nazis (New York and London:  Routledge, 2006), which examines the work of 
the German academic Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, founder of the “German Faith Movement” during the 
Third Reich.   
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 Generally and broadly speaking, the problem of late 19th and early 20th 
century fascism has been understood in one of two ways.  Scholars of the 1960s, 
such as George L. Mosse and Ernest Nolte, viewed fascism and National 
Socialism as a rejection of Modern rationality.  For Mosse this meant a 
repudiation by German intellectuals of Rationalism, the Enlightenment, and 
Liberalism throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries in favor of irrational, 
mystical, and collectivist ideologies centered around the “Volk.”40  Similarly, 
Nolte’s assessment of the various fascist movements was that they were, each in 
their own turn, a rejection of the Enlightenment and Revolutionary notion of 
“transcendence”—i.e. of humanity’s triumph over its basic physical needs and 
ascendance into the realm of universal human rights, freedom, and democracy.41    
Conversely, more recent scholars such as Sternhell have viewed fascism not as a 
unique moment of post-Enlightenment irrationality, but as a fully intellectually 
and ideologically grounded cultural and political phenomenon that began with the 
late 19th century revision of Marxism by French and Italian syndicalists inspired 
by the writings of Georges Sorel.  To be sure, Sorel’s turn to a cult of violence, 
heroism, vitalism, intuition, and “tribal nationalism” in the wake of the delay of 
the Marxist eschaton—(the universal proletarian revolution against the 
bourgeoisie)—was professedly anti-rational and anti-materialist.42  But it was at 
the same time a fully rational and philosophical rejection of eighteenth-century 
rationality.  In its embrace of liberal market economics, capitalism, and 
technology it was also in a peculiar fashion a kind of “hyper-liberalism.”43  
Sternhell thus concluded that fascist ideology “represented a coherent, logical, 
and well structured totality. . .its theoretical content was neither less homogenous 
                                                          
40See George L. Mosse, The Crises of German Ideology:  Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich 
(New York:  Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).    
41See Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, Part Five, “Fascism as a Metapolitical Phenomenon,” 429-
454.   
42Sternhell, Birth of Fascist Ideology, 8-10; 24.   
43Sternhell, Birth of Fascist Ideology, 7, 22-24; 28-29.  
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nor more heterogeneous than that of liberalism or socialism”44—or, in other 
words, fascism shared the same aporias and antinomies that characterize Modern 
Western thought.   
 Similarly, scholars have been divided concerning the theological origins of 
fascism.  Heschel’s Aryan Jesus is representative of scholars who have seen 
fascism and more specifically National Socialism as an outgrowth of the historical 
tensions between Judaism and Christianity, particularly the latter’s history of anti-
Judaism/anti-Semitism against the former.45  Stated bluntly, National Socialism is 
seen as coming out of a distinctly Christian intellectual, social, and political 
culture focused in (but not exclusive to) German Protestantism.46  Other scholars 
such as Karla Poewe (New Religions and the Nazis, 2006) and Rainer Bucher 
(Hitler’s Theology, 2011) have challenged and qualified this view by focusing on 
the heretical Christian, neo-pagan, and pseudo-Hindu characteristics of fascist 
and Nazi theo-political ideology.   
 Through a detailed examination of Renan’s Vie and his other writings it is 
against this backdrop that I shall propose four main theses concerning the 
connections between the “quest of the historical Jesus” and the theological origins 
of fascism.  The first foundational thesis I shall propose is that fascism was not 
the result of an excess of irrationality (Mosse, Nolte), but rather an excess of 
Modern rationalism (following Sternhell’s analysis) which also produced a 
                                                          
44Sternhell, Birth of Fascist Ideology, 8.    
45The distinction between “anti-Judaism” and “anti-Semitism”—and whether there is or should be 
one—is quite controversial.  Heschel argues that the distinctions between theological anti-Judaism 
and biological anti-Semitism are too blurry to be parsed in both ancient and modern Western 
Christian thought and action; see Aryan Jesus, 20 and ff., and also her “Historiography of Anti-
Semitism versus Anti-Judaism:  A Response to Robert Morgan,” Journal for the Study of the New 
Testament 33, no. 3 (2011): 257-279.  Robert Morgan’s substantial review essay of Aryan Jesus 
argues that there are important (if sometimes subtle) differences between theological anti-Judaism 
and modern biologically determined anti-Semitism that should be paid attention to.  See his 
“Susannah Heschel’s Aryan Grundmann,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 32, no. 4 
(2010): 431-494.   I shall examine this in relation to Renan’s work below in Chapters 2 and 3.   
46Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 7-11.    
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corresponding neo-pagan mystical political theology.47  Second, I shall attempt to 
demonstrate the connection between the rejection of pre-Modern mystical 
Christo-Ecclesiology in both the study of the historical origins of the Church and 
political science as a foundation for the rise of fascism.  Critics of fascism have 
from very early on recognized it as both a “spiritual” and social problem, but few 
if any have seen the parallels between it and the problem of the “historical Jesus” 
and the Church—e.g. the “historical Jesus” and his connection to the Church, the 
Führer and his connection to the State, and who produces whom.    In the case of 
the scientific lives of Jesus, Modern mythological hermeneutics pioneered by 
David Friedrich Strauss’ The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (1836) appeared to 
demonstrate that in fact, Jesus—or rather “the Lord Jesus Christ”—was a fiction 
of the early Church, based upon at least four other fictions—the Gospels.  Strauss’ 
hermeneutical approach to the Gospels as myths also marked the beginning of the 
radical abstraction of Jesus from his Jewish and ecclesiological contexts which 
further amplified the dialectical conflict between Judaism and Christianity.  As 
Heschel demonstrates, this produced disastrous results by the mid 20th century.    
 All of this was in the service of Modern, avant-garde scholars’ (e.g. 
Strauss and Renan) attempt to re-present and supplant pre-Modern orthodoxy’s 
understanding of Jesus of Nazareth and the social body he founded, the Church, 
through the positing of a “secular” messiah and de-mystified ekklesia.  My third 
thesis will then be to argue for a reading of the scientific lives of Jesus as a 
response to acute crises of modernity in Europe, particularly the social and 
intellectual traumas caused by the transition from monarchal to democratic 
societies post-1789.  In this light both Strauss’ and Renan’s historical Jesus may 
be seen as part of the process of trying to bring German and French society into 
Modernity.  Both saw the Church and the Jesus whom it proclaimed as hindrances 
to this project.  Hence another of the underlying theses of this study is that the 18th 
and 19th century “quests” of the historical Jesus were not due to the death of one 
                                                          
47Here I am following the insights of “Radical Orthodoxy’s” critique of the Enlightenment project, 
especially as expressed by John Milbank in Theology and Social Theory:  Beyond Secular Reason, 
2nd ed.  (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2006).  
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peculiar Jew some nineteen centuries beforehand.  Rather, the quests were the 
result of the apparent death of the Church as a real and viable social body in the 
wake of Modernity.  But the two deaths were inseparable:  the recent death of the 
latter seemed to indicate the certain death of the former.   
 The standard narrative of the rise of the scientific approach to the life of 
Jesus has situated it with post-Enlightenment epistemology and hermeneutics.  
But my fourth argument of this study is to propose that the problem of the 
“historical Jesus” was first ecclesiological and liturgical—and not centered in the 
superiority of Modern rationalism.  Thus, following Henri de Lubac’s insights in 
Corpus Mysticum:  The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, I shall 
argue that the original quest of the historical Jesus may be found in the 
Eucharistic controversies of the 11-12th centuries—in the Church’s efforts to 
rationally determine and distinguish the “true” and “real” presence of Jesus in the 
Bread and Wine among the Body of the Church.  And drawing from Ernst 
Kantorowicz’ classic study of early modern political theology, The King’s Two 
Bodies, I hope to point out the first political fractures caused by the Church’s loss 
of a liturgical, mystical Christo-Ecclesiology.   
 Taken as a whole, my work may be seen as an argument for viewing the 
problem of Christian theology, the “historical Jesus,” and the origins of fascism as 
the resurgence of a non-liturgical, neo-Sophism48 and its rejection of ancient 
mystical, participatory rationality centered in the Church’s worship of Jesus 
Christ.  Specifically, I am arguing that the orthodox ecclesial-mystical Jesus is the 
“historical” Jesus—and the only Jesus capable of restraining the monsters of 
Modern Western political science; this is the only Jesus upon which a sustainable 
life-giving polity can be founded.  The road to the madness of fascism began 
whenever Western intellectuals began to believe that love of the divine is 
irrational, and that there can be reason without love.  This madness can already 
be seen in Lysias’ sophism.  I hope through this dissertation to demonstrate that 
                                                          
48Here I follow Pickstock, After Writing.      
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both Socrates and Jesus—Philosophy and Faith—rather affirm that all true 
knowledge is relational, passionate, and tied to the Divine Logos.    
*   *   * 
 To make these arguments, in Chapter One I shall trace 16th and 17th 
century Western intellectuals’ rejection of an epistemology and ontology based on 
mystical participation in favor of one based on rationalistic abstraction which 
Michel Foucault revealed in The Order of Things.49  Using insights from de 
Lubac’s Corpus Mysticum, I shall argue that this momentous shift in Western 
thought had already been anticipated in the crisis of worship centered around the 
Church’s attempt to rationally determine the “historical Jesus’” exact relationship 
to the mystery of the Eucharist and to contemporary worshipers.  Indeed, I 
propose that this marks the beginning of the quests of the “historical Jesus” that 
were taken up with such scientific vigor in the 19th century.  Broadly speaking, I 
view both the Church’s loss of mystical, participatory (or liturgical) rationality 
and 16th and 17th century Western intellectual’s rejection of mystical 
epistemology and ontology as types of iconoclasm—iconoclasms which post-
Enlightenment researchers into the life of Jesus inherited.  Thus in the second half 
of the chapter I treat three academically iconic lives of Jesus produced by 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, David Friedrich Strauss, and Renan during the course 
of the 19th century.  Typically all three have been considered modern iconoclasts; 
however I shall try to demonstrate that  Schleiermacher’s scientific history of 
Jesus’ life was the last attempt to maintain orthodox, mystical Christo-
Ecclesiology while at the same time embracing Modern, critical sensibilities.  
Although not altogether successful, it was, as Johannes Hoff has stated, an “idol” 
used to try to prevent the idolatry of the emerging Modern false images of Jesus.50  
                                                          
49Michel Foucault, The Order of Things:  An Archaeology of the Human Sciences trans. 
anonymous (New York:  Random House, 1970).  
50I recall Professor Hoff’s paradoxical insight from a conversation we had on 2 July 2012, at the 
opening reception of the Graduate Summer Residential at the University of Wales, Trinity St. 
David, in beautiful Lampeter.  
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In contrast, it will be seen that Strauss and Renan’s modern iconic portrayals of 
Jesus were the first steps to the construction of the “Fascist-Jesus”.       
 Chapter Two will consist of a critical analysis of Renan’s Vie in                         
light of the following discussions.  It will be shown that the essence of                         
Renan’s Jesus is his (both Jesus’ and Renan’s) modernity:  to Renan, Jesus 
anticipated the Enlightenment’s dream of an apolitical, “religion-less”                         
universal religion based on the “fraternity of Man” and individual free                         
conscience by 1800 years.  I shall also demonstrate that had Mussolini wished to 
do so, he could have found the core foundations for his fascist ideology in the    
Vie, particularly concerning the “will to power,” the “Führer principle,” and the 
conception of an autonomous secular State which actually dominates religion.   In 
this chapter I will begin to examine the Enlightenment origins of Renan’s anti-
Judaism/anti-Semitism by analyzing his treatment of the Last Supper.   This will 
reveal his anti-mystical and anti-ecclesiological biases through his (rather ironic) 
use of the Gospel of John to deny Jesus’ institution of the Eucharist altogether, 
(via John’s omission of the sacramental formula recorded in the Synoptics).  
Contrary to de Lubac’s re-discovery of Pre-Modern mystical orthodoxy whereby 
“the Eucharist makes the Church,”51 Renan posits the heterodox idea that the 
“Church made the Eucharist.”  This is a consistent theme throughout the Vie—
(and one missed by Heschel’s reading52):  by replacing Jesus’ vision with its own 
version of the old Jewish sacrificial rituals—most notably the Eucharist—the 
Church had delayed the coming of the true “religion of humanity” by nearly two 
millennia.  I will argue that Renan’s Modern anti-mysticism and ecclesiology is 
related to his anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism:  reflecting his penchant for ancient 
pagan rationality over against Judaic supernaturalism, Renan criticizes the Church 
because its liturgical practices are too Jewish. 
                                                          
51Henri Cardinal de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum:  The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, 
trans. Gemma Simmonds (Notre Dame, Indiana:  University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 88.    
52I hope to supply here what Peter Head implies Heschel’s that Aryan Jesus lacks—a critical 
theological analysis of Modern historical theology such as that given by Renan in the Vie.  See 
Head’s review of Aryan Jesus in the Journal for the Study of the New Testament 32, no. 4 (2010): 
421-430.  
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   Chapter Three will examine the evolution of Nazi political-theology 
through the academic work of Jakob Wilhelm Hauer (founder in 1933 of the 
“German Faith” movement) and Susannah Heschel’s treatment of Dr. Walter 
Grundmann’s  “Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on 
German Church Life”.  Specifically, I will trace the extent of the influence of 
Renan’s “Liberal” Jesus to the development of Hauer’s, Grundmann’s, and 
ultimately even Hitler’s “Aryan” warrior Jesus.  This will be accomplished 
through a reading of Renan’s treatment of the “opposition to Jesus” and to his 
arrest, trial, and death in the last nine chapters of the Vie.  These chapters reveal 
Renan’s anti-Judaic (and following Said and Heschel), anti-Semitic reading of the 
Gospel accounts.  
 My conclusion will attempt to address (briefly) two underlying problems 
related to Renan’s “historical Jesus” and the construction of the Fascist Jesus:  1) 
the controversy of the Christian origins of modern anti-Semitism, and 2) Modern 
Academia’s complicity in supporting anti-Semitism through scientific research on 
Jesus’ life.  To do this I shall offer a critique of Susannah Heschel’s mis-quoting 
and mis-reading of Renan in her Aryan Jesus.  What she misses is that Renan’s   
positive portrayal of Jesus as an Enlightenment Liberal was just as dangerous as 
his revival of the anti-Judaic Marcionite heresy:  both contributed to Renan’s 
anticipation of the later Academic-Fascist Jesus.  I shall argue that one of the 
reasons why she misses this in her evaluation of Renan’s work is because of her 
lack of a theological reading of Renan’s history.   And this points to the root of 
Modern academic theology’s cataclysmic failure in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries in regards to the “quest of the historical Jesus”:  its purposeful rejection 
of the pre-Modern notion of theology as “faith seeking understanding.”53  This 
first rejection led to the intellectual miss-steps that produced the fiction of the 
Fascist Jesus.  Following St. Augustine’s insights in Against the Academicians 
and The Teacher, I propose a return to the pre-Modern orthodoxy of mystical 
                                                          
53This phrase is attributed to St. Augustine, and later to Anslem.    
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participatory rationality and love as the means of overcoming what Heschel aptly 
refers to as academic “desk-murder”.54  
 The ground is now cleared for a discussion of the “mysteries” of “Christo-
Ecclesiology,” the “Church,” and their relation to political theology in pre-
Modern orthodoxy.  Along with this, in the following chapter I shall sketch the 
loss of mystical, participatory rationality in the West from the 12th and 13th 
centuries through the 19th century, and what role Renan’s Vie de Jésus played in 
this dark and mysterious process.    
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 16-17.    
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Chapter 1:                                                                                                                             
The Discarded Image:  Strauss, Renan, and Iconoclasm in the Lives of Jesus 
 
As in my Introduction, in this chapter I follow another dialogue about truth, love, 
and rationality, this time centered around the Jesus of History.  Taking the place 
of Socrates, Lysias, and Phaedrus will be Schleiermacher, Strauss, and Renan.  
Before delving into Schleiermacher’s, Strauss’, and Renan’s biographies of the 
Nazarene, however, it is also my goal to try to demonstrate the deep origins of the 
post-Enlightenment quests of the “historical Jesus.”   Following the work of 
Michel Foucault, I shall outline the dramatic shift in Western thought occurring 
between the 16th and 17th centuries from an epistemology and ontology based on 
mystical participation to one based on rationalistic abstraction.  This shift may be 
seen as having been anticipated by the crisis of worship centered around the 
mysterious nature of Christ’s presence in the Church which emerged in the 
Eucharistic controversies of the 11th-12th centuries, and which began the Church’s 
own path to an increasingly rationalistic, rather than liturgical theology—a 
rationalistic theology that would contribute to the later Enlightenment search for 
the “true” Jesus of history.   While it might appear that Schleiermacher, Strauss, 
and Renan were all similar in their iconoclastic adoption of the Enlightenment’s 
post-mystical epistemology, Christology, and ecclesiology, I hope to show that in 
fact, only two of the three—Strauss and Renan—were true iconoclasts.  Yet 
before these three scholars’ works can be examined, it is first necessary to 
remember what has long been forgotten—the “mysteries”: 
1.1.  On “Mystery,” Christ and the Church, and the Hope and Threat of                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 “Paradise Now” 
The term “mystical” is derived from mystērion, meaning in biblical usage a 
“secret” or “mystery” of “something formerly unknown but now revealed.”55  In 
the New Testament mystērion is used in reference to the “kingdom of 
God/Heaven” (Mk. 4:11, Matt. 13:11, Lk. 8:10), to the proclamation of the 
                                                          
55See the 2nd ed. of the Aland et al. Greek New Testament, 119.    
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crucified “Lord of glory” (I Cor. 2:7-8; 4:11; Rom. 16:25), to Israel’s temporary 
“hardening” before the eschaton (Rom. 11:25), and to Christ’s marriage to the 
Church (Eph. 5:31).56  Following the Jewish apocalyptic use of mystērion, New 
Testament authors used it in reference to the universal resurrection and 
transformed physicality that will happen with the “royal appearance” (parousia) 
of Christ (Rom. 15:51), to the church(es) of the “last days” (Rev. 1:20), and to the 
eschatological evil that will finally be destroyed by Christ’s coming (Rev. 17:5-7; 
2 Thess. 2:7).57  Notably, these biblical (i.e. Jewish58) usages of mystērion are 
fully consonant with the philosophical mysticism expressed by Socrates in the 
Phaedrus,59 and point to a universal pre-Modern mystical epistemology, 
hermeneutics, and ontology which was “neither specifically Jew nor Greek”—(or 
Hindu, or Daoist, for that matter).60  Rather, from China to Greece there was 
                                                          
56See also the article on μυστηριον by Bornkamm in the Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament, vol. IV, ed. Gerhard Kittel; trans. and ed., Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI:  
Wm B. Eerdmans, 1967; reprint 1995), 817, 819-822. 
57Bornkamm, μυστηριον, 814-817; 822-824.    
58Though the New Testament is written in Greek, it is thought in Hebrew—and this is true even of 
Luke’s supposedly Hellenistic gospel.  Since the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Nag 
Hammadi library, and post-World War II re-appraisals of Jewish apocalyptic texts, there has been 
recognition of a deep store of Jewish mystical traditions from which early Christian authors could 
and did draw from, rather than from Platonic sources, as was supposed from the 19th century 
onwards.   For instance, April DeConick points out the profound influence the Jewish mystical 
notion of YHWH’s “body”—His “kavod”—“glory”—had in the development of New Testament 
Christology.  Hence Paul’s description of Jesus as the “image” or “form” of God (2 Cor. 4:4, Col. 
1:15 and Phil. 2:6); the Gospel of John’s depiction of Jesus as God’s Kavod descended to earth 
(1:14; 2:11; 11-40; 12:23, 28, 41; 13:32; 17:1-5, 22-23), and the imagery of Hebrews and 
Revelation of Jesus as the High Priest of the heavenly temple and the mystical Lamb of God.  See 
April D. DeConick, “What is Early Jewish and Christian Mysticism?,” in Paradise Now:  Essays 
on Early Jewish and Christian Mysticism (Atlanta, GA:  Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), 14.  
It could also be argued that Jewish mysticism, like the mystical epistemology and hermeneutics of 
Socrates in the Phaedrus, was also against non-participatory, sophistic writing and knowledge—
see the imperatives to eat the scrolls in Ezekiel 3:1 and Rev. 10:9 (cf. Christopher R. A. Morray-
Jones, “The Temple Within,” also in Paradise Now, 147).   
59Cf. Catherine Pickstock’s After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy 
(Oxford, UK; Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishers, 1998), Chapter 1, where she argues that 
Socrates was using a mystical epistemology to combat Phaedrus and Lysias’ commodified, 
sophistic, “demythologization” of the spoken word in favor of the fetishizing of writing.  
60Renan and other scholars of the 19th century recognized the ubiquity of “mystical” thought in the 
Eurasian continent, yet they tended to view it at the same time as a marker of almost hermetically 
sealed, unique cultures and races.  Renan writes in the Vie in his conclusion on “The Essential 
Character of Jesus’ Work” that Jesus, like Buddha, Zoroaster, and Plato, conformed his teachings 
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widespread belief among religious and philosophical thinkers in hidden but 
knowable realities through participation in divine grace.    
 And so once, there was no “historical Jesus.”61  There was only the 
Invisible Eternal Word made visible and graspable—crucifiable—to the Church 
and the world (cf. John 1:1-4, 9-14; I John 1:1-2; Acts 2:22-36).  There was only 
the Man who “amazed” (ethambounto) those who did not know him and terrified 
(ephobounto) those who did (Mark 10:32; cf. John 19:5, 8-10; Matt. 27:19).                                                  
Moreover, in pre-Modern orthodoxy62—(and even among the pagan critics of 
Christianity, e.g. Pliny the Younger63 and Celsus64)—Jesus was not separable 
from his historical ecclesial body on earth.  Rather, there was only the inextricable 
oneness of Jesus, the Father, the apostles, and those who would believe the 
Gospels’ testimony concerning Jesus (cf. John 17:20-26).  There was only the 
Jesus who was persecuted when his disciples were persecuted (Acts 9:4, 22:7, 
                                                                                                                                                              
to the “instincts and needs of the heart” of his people and their specific historical context, and that  
“One is from his age and his race, even when one reacts against his age and his race,” (speaking of 
Jesus’ conflict with Judaism).  See Ernest Renan, Vie de Jésus, neuvième edition, Histoire des 
origines du christianisme, livre premier (Paris:  Michel Lévy Frères, 1863), 454-455.  Heschel’s 
research also points towards the radicalization of “mystical thought” in late 19th century German 
research on Jesus in her chapter on “Draining Jesus of Jewishness,” “The Buddhist Jesus,” pgs. 
38-39.  This was also a major part of Jakob Wilhelm Hauer’s development of the “German Faith;” 
see Poewe, pgs. 30-34.   I argue, however, that “mystical” epistemologies cannot be ethnically, 
and certainly not racially characterized, but rather should be seen as expressive of pre-Modern 
rationality.  (Cf. C. S. Lewis’ The Abolition of Man (Nashville, TN:  Broadman &Holman 
Publishers, 1996).)  It seems to me that this would go a long way in solving the so-called 
“Hellenization” question in relation to developments in Judaism and Christianity—and could have 
prevented the more artificial dialectical conflict between Jewish thought and Christian thought.   
61Cf. John Milbank in Theology and Social Theory:  Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed.  (Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell, 2006), 9.    
62As I hope my discussion of Foucault’s findings in The Order of Things will confirm, the non-
qualified use of “pre-Modern orthodoxy” as a whole is justified because prior to the 16th century, 
no intellectuals in the West apparently even conceived of a “non-mystical” ontology.  And I can 
think of no orthodox texts where data for the “historical Jesus” was not based on the Gospel 
traditions.  For example, see below on page 39 Ignatius of Antioch’s statement on the “historical 
Jesus.”   
63See Pliny’s famous letter 97 to Emperor Trajan in Pliny the Younger, Letters in The Harvard 
Classics, Vol. 9, trans. William Melmoth, revised by F. T. C. Bosanquet (New York:  P. F. Collier 
& Son, 1909-14).   
64On Celsus’ simultaneous criticism of Jesus and Christians’ beliefs about him, see John Granger 
Cook, The Interpretation of the New Testament in Greco-Roman Paganism (Peabody, MA:  
Hendrickson Publishers, 2000), 31, 35, 59-60; 85.    
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26:14).  There was simply the “the great mystery65” concerning “Christ and the 
Church” as expressed in the midst of the discussion of marital relationships in 
Ephesians 5.  The unknown author of “2 Clement” sometime in the late first or 
early second century expressed the hidden yet real union between Christ and the 
Church in a remarkable passage in this way:   
 Therefore, brothers and sisters, if we do the will of our Father God we  
 shall be from the first Church, the spiritual Church [pneumatikēs], created  
 before the sun and the moon; but if we do not do the will of the Lord, we  
 shall be from that church which was written of, saying, ‘My house has  
 become a cave of robbers.’  Let us then choose to be from the Church of  
 life [ekklēsias tēs zōēs], in order that we may be saved.  Now I do not  
 suppose you all ignorant of the fact that a living Church [ekklēsia zōsa] is  
 Christ’s body, for the scripture says ‘God made Humankind male and  
 female;’ the male is Christ, the female is the Church.  Moreover the  
 Scriptures and the apostles declare that the Church not only exists now,  
 but has been from the beginning [tēn ekklēsian ou nun einai, alla 
 anōthen], for it was spiritual [pneumatikē], as also our Jesus, but He was  
 revealed [ephanerōthē] in the last days in order to save us.  Now the  
 Church being spiritual was revealed in the flesh of Christ [tē sarki   
 Christou], and it is evident to us that if any of us keep her in the flesh and  
 do not corrupt her, that one will receive her back in the Holy Spirit.  For  
 this flesh is a copy of the spirit; therefore no one who corrupts the copy  
 will participate in [metalēpsetai] that which is real.  Therefore, brothers 
 and sisters, this is why it says ‘keep the flesh in order to partake of the  
 spirit.’  And if we say that the flesh is the Church and the spirit is Christ, 
 then the one who does violence to the flesh does violence to the Church. 
 Such a one therefore does not partake of the spirit, which is Christ.  
 (2 Clement 14:1-466) 
                                                          
65I am emphasizing the article along with the demonstrative pronoun in the Greek: το μυστηριον 
τουτο μεγα ’εστιν, ’εγω δε λεγω ’εις Χριστον και ’εις την ’εκκλησιαν.  (Eph. 5:32; see the 2nd ed. 
of the Aland et al. Greek New Testament).       
66My translation using the Greek from Michael W. Holmes, ed. and trans., The Apostolic Fathers, 
3rd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI:  Baker Academic, 2007).  Cf. Bart D. Ehrman’s translation in The 
Apostolic Fathers, ed. and trans. Bart D. Ehrman (Cambridge, MA; London, UK:  Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 187.  I wish to thank my friend and Greek tutor John Ebel for his 
assistance with this translation.  All imperfections are mine.   
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Still later St. Augustine expressed this mystical Christo-Ecclesiology as the triple 
mode of Christ’s being as God, Incarnate, and “in the fullness of the Church.”67 
 These passages point to my use of “Church” as referring to the pre-
Modern mystical conception of the worshippers of Jesus as being and belonging 
to a sempiternal, hidden and yet visible social body centered in the eternal and 
temporal Christ.  This body was considered both universal and an integral unity of 
Christ and his worshipers, and of worshipers with one another—hence the original 
meaning of katholikē as first used by Ignatius of Antioch (d. ca. 107 C. E.) in Sm. 
8:2:  “. . .wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the catholic Church.”68  In contrast to 
pagan society, “the Church” was to be characterized by homonoia—“unity of 
mind” or “harmony” originating from the mystical union with Christ.69  This 
invisible reality was either confirmed or denied by the Church’s visible actions—
“Let the wise display wisdom not in words but in good works” (I Clement 38:2); 
“For when the [nations (ethnē)] hear from our mouths the [words (logia)] of God, 
they marvel at their beauty and greatness.  But when they discover that our 
actions are not worthy of the words we speak, they turn from wonder to 
blasphemy, saying that it is a myth and a delusion” (2 Clement 13:370).   That 
early Christians did not always attain this homonoia is evidenced by Paul and 
Clement’s letters to the Corinthians (and there are many other examples as 
well71).  And yet in the face of such “objective” data to the contrary, New 
                                                          
67Quoted in Henri Cardinal de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum:  The Eucharist and the Church in the 
Middle Ages, trans. Gemma Simmonds (Notre Dame, Indiana:  University of Notre Dame Press, 
2006), 126.    
68My translation using the Greek from Holmes, 254; see also the note on καθολικη on 255.  Cf. 
Henry Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society:  From Galilee to Gregory the Great (Oxford 
and New York:  Oxford University Press, 2001), 77.  
69‘Ομονοια permeates I Clement, which was written between 80-100 C. E. in response to an 
apparent schism in the church at Corinth over the issue of displaced bishops.  See for instance I 
Clement 51:2 (from Holmes ed., Apostolic Fathers).    
70I have slightly altered Holmes’ translation as indicated by the words in brackets.  
71See for instance Celsus’ observation of the disunity of the Church:  “‘Since they have expanded 
to become a multitude, they are divided and rent asunder, and each wants to be his own party.’” 
(Quoted in Chadwick, Church in Ancient Society,112.)  
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Testament and Apostolic authors held tenaciously to their belief in the mystical 
reality of the Church’s essential unity and harmony which had “been so nobly and 
righteously handed down” to believers in Christ (I Clement 51:2).              
 These trans/extra-historical conceptions of Jesus and the Church were also 
related to pre-Modern Christians’ mystical political theology.  Thus the author of 
Ephesians writing to Gentile believers can speak of “the mystery of Christ” 
[mystēriō tou Christou] revealed “through the Church” to the “rulers and 
authorities in the heavenly realms” (Eph. 3:4,10) as Christians live out their lives 
in this world as citizens of heaven in anticipation of the Return of the Lord (cf.  
Philippians 1:27, 3:20-21).72   At the center of this mystical Christo-Ecclesiology 
was a liturgical action—the celebration of the Eucharist—which weekly 
proclaimed Jesus’ historical sacrifice and the promise of his future Return.73  For 
nearly 1300 years, this rite served as an existential reminder to the Church and to 
the world of the un-calculable and thus un-controllable power of God’s action in 
history through both Jesus and his community of believers, who, upon his Return, 
would be revealed at last as the true image bearers of God.  From Jesus’ era 
onwards the Eucharist was linked with the Jewish Passover (Matt. 26:17-30; Mk. 
14:12-26; Lk. 22:7-20; Jn. 13:1-ff74)—itself a liturgical meal fraught with 
political implications—especially vis-à-vis pagan empire.  Lactantius’ liturgical 
commentary on the Easter pascha from the early 300s expresses the inherent 
political threat that orthodox Christian eschatology has posed to all “secular” rule:  
“This is the night in which we keep vigil on account of the coming of our king 
and God.  This night has a twofold meaning:  in it Christ received life after death; 
                                                          
72See especially Paul’s use of πολιτευεσθε and πολιτευμα ’εν ’ουρανοις in Phil. 1:27 and 3:20-21.    
73Cf. Geoffrey Wainwright, Eucharist and Eschatology (London:  Epworth Press, 1971), 15 and 
passim.    
74John famously (or infamously) records Jesus’ last meal with his disciples “before the Passover 
feast,” as opposed to the Synoptics’ record of it being on the same night as the Passover.  John 
also does not mention Jesus’ institution of the Eucharist.  Renan makes much of this latter 
omission, and I shall deal with this below.    
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and in it he will gain the kingdom over the whole earth.”75  The Eucharistic 
liturgy of the Syrian St. Mark is more explicit in the judgment of the nations that 
early Christians saw in the celebration of the Bread and Wine—“[we remember] 
‘all thy saving dispensation for us. . .from thy life-giving death, three days’ burial, 
thy glorious resurrection, thy ascension into heaven and thy sitting at the right 
hand of God the Father, and thy dreadful advent. . .’”76  Positively, the Eucharist 
was viewed as the inaugural of the joyous eschatological feast of all nations 
before YHWH as prophesied in Isaiah 25: 6-8, where in addition to “rich viands” 
and “choice wines,” Death itself would be gobbled up.77  Thus a 4th (?) century 
Egyptian liturgy of the Eucharist could speak of the mysterious unity and 
universality that was believed to occur each time the sacrament was administered:  
“. . .as this bread was scattered on the mountains and gathered to be one, so also 
gather your holy Church out of every nation. . .and make one catholic Church. ”78   
 Following already well-established Jewish mystical/apocalyptic traditions, 
early Christians viewed the Eucharist as a means by which Divine Grace enabled 
them to participate in “Paradise now.”79  And herein lies the political danger of 
ancient Jewish and Christian mysticism.  The belief and practice that the 
universal justice, peace, and homonoia that comes through God’s rule on earth—
(expressed in biblical language as “the Kingdom of God/Heaven”)—can be and is 
experienceable now (however inchoately), directly challenges and destabilizes 
every notion of polity and society based on “esse in semet ipso”—to “exist in 
oneself.”  This, according to St. Augustine, was the original sin of humanity and 
                                                          
75Quoted in Wainwright, Eucharist, 23, with my emphasis.    
76Quoted in Wainwright, Eucharist, 67, with emphasis in the original.   
77See Wainwright, Eucharist, 21, and the JPS and NET translations of Isaiah 25:6-8.    
78Quoted in Chadwick, Church in Ancient Society, 680.    
79See DeConick, “Early Jewish and Christian Mysticism?”, 1-24.  
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all the Cities of Man which followed (Civ. Dei, XIV.1380).  It was simply the sin 
of Pride.   
 Renan and the Enlightenment generation rejected the “mystical Christo-
Ecclesiology” I have tried to sketch as the irrationality and/or madness 
(hystérique, une maladie du cerveau, les accidents nerveux81) of a pre-critical age.  
For Renan specifically, the survival of such irrationality in the orthodoxy of the 
Catholic church in France into the 19th century had had disastrous results.  In his 
La Réform intellectual et morale of 1871, Renan cited Catholic orthodoxy as a 
main cause for France’s defeat at the hands of the Prussian army.  “France has 
wished to remain Catholic; she now bears the consequences.”82   In its stubborn 
refusal to abandon “transcendent mysticism” and poisonous supernatural beliefs, 
Catholicism had brought France to a humiliating military defeat which had 
toppled the Second Empire itself.83  And anticipating Stalin’s dismissal of the 
Papacy’s power before the Second World War,84 Renan decried that “A student of 
the Jesuits will never be an officer capable to be opposed to a Prussian officer; a 
student of Catholic elementary schools will never be able to make intelligent war 
[la guerre savante] with perfected arms.”85  This is a classic example of the 
“secularization of the European mind” which occurred during the 19th century, 
and indeed, Renan and the quest of the historical Jesus occupies an important 
                                                          
80St. Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson, Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
609.    
81See Renan’s assessment of St. Theresa, St. Francis, and Pascal in his conclusion to the Vie in 
“The Essential Character of the Work of Jesus,” 452-453.   Here he seems to agree with Socrates 
in the Phaedrus:  “The words of the sane and the ill are all relative.  Who would not love better to 
be ill as Pascal, than sane as the common heard [vulgaire]?” (453)  I shall show later that Renan is 
actually being rather sophistic here.    
82Ernest Renan, La Réform intellectual et morale (Paris:  Michel Lévy Frères, 1871), 97.    
83Renan, La Réform, 97.    
84Stalin’s response in 1935 to the French Prime Minister’s question as to how the Soviet Union 
might ameliorate the conditions of Russian Catholics so as to win the favor of the Vatican, was 
reportedly, “The Pope! How many divisions has he got?”  See Churchill’s The Second World War, 
vol. I, (1948). 
85Renan, La Réform, 97.  
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chapter in that story.86  As will be shown below, it also reveals the problem that 
orthodox Christianity appeared to pose to avant-garde Modernists who wished for 
a world dominated by secular Western civilization.87  It is beyond the scope of 
this study to fully investigate the causes of this “secularization”; this is too great a 
mystery (for what are often taken as causes, e.g. the rise of the “historical Jesus,” 
or the new popular authority given to scientific rationality, are just as often affects 
of secularization).88   However Michel Foucault’s “archaeological” investigation 
of the rise of the “human sciences” during the Early Modern era in The Order of 
Things and de Lubac’s historical theology in Corpus Mysticum provide insight 
into the pre-foundations of Enlightenment secularization, that is, the creation of 
realms—(both intellectual and political)—where Divine and liturgical 
participation are considered un-real and un-allowable.  But this creation also 
marked a loss, and to this loss I now turn.   
1.2.  The Loss of Mystical, Participatory Rationality and the Corpus 
Mysticum 
Foucault’s The Order of Things explores the shift in Western thought from a 
mystical ontology, epistemology, and hermeneutics of “resemblances” to a non-
mystical rationality of “representations” based on precise analysis, synthesis, and 
taxonomies.  Using various texts prior to the 17th century, Foucault showed that 
“Resemblance” worked as a viable epistemology and hermeneutics because of a 
mystical conception of the universe as being “folded in upon itself.”  The earth 
was conceived as a great mirror of the heavens; human beings reflected the 
glories of the stars and vice-versa; plants and animals concealed secrets of the 
                                                          
86See Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975), Chapter 8, “History and the secular” and his 
excellent consideration of Renan and his works.  
87H. W. Wardman in my estimation rightly characterizes Renan as a part of 19th century avant-
garde intellectuals; see Chapter II, “1845-1849:  The Revolution of 1848 and L’Avenir de la 
science” in H. W. Wardman,  Ernest Renan:  A Critical Biography (London:  University of 
London, Athlone Press, 1964).  I shall discuss Renan’s shattered vision of French-German-Anglo 
domination of the world as he expressed it in La Réform intellectual et morale later.   
88See O. Chadwick’s Introduction in Secularization for the difficulty of this task, 1-20.    
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universe which were of great use to humans.89  All things were viewed in 
relationship to every other thing, and everything participated in The Whole90 in a 
great chain of being.91   
 In this system of thought there was no possibility of standing outside of 
The Whole.  There was no possibility of achieving abstracted, detached, 
“objective” knowledge—no possibility of an all-seeing Subject that could obtain 
complete knowledge of a totally alienated and totally knowable Object.  This is 
because things themselves were understood mystically, i.e., they were always 
more than what they appeared, containing invisible meaning(s) which pointed 
outside of themselves to other hidden meanings and relationships.  Everything in 
the universe was conceived as a hieroglyph.92 The universal, participatory web of 
relationships itself was also seen to be mystical. That is, the relationship between 
things and other things, and all things to The Whole—and the relationship 
between things and the words which symbolized and signified them—were all 
perceived as being hidden, invisible.  And yet, these concealed relationships were 
revealable, and in fact were constantly being revealed through hidden yet findable 
signs which in turn pointed to more mysteries.  Thus the quest for knowledge, the 
pursuit of un-veiling the mysteries of The Whole was in-exhaustible.93  Both 
words and the things they symbolized were understandable due to their 
ontological resemblance to one another—to “similitudes” mystically embedded 
into all of creation.  These enabled the learned to “read the world” and produce 
encyclopedic (and oftentimes rather fanciful) texts.94   
                                                          
89Michel Foucault, The Order of Things:  An Archaeology of the Human Sciences trans. 
anonymous (New York:  Random House, 1970), 17.    
90I am inspired here by C. S. Lewis’ The Discarded Image:  An Introduction to Medieval and 
Renaissance Literature (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 1967); The Order of 
Things confers from another perspective what Lewis saw in the Medieval mindset.    
91Foucault, Order of Things, 18-19.    
92Cf. Foucault, Order of Things, 27.    
93Foucault, Order of Things, 30.    
94Foucault, Order of Things, 18-27.    
32 
 
 Yet as early as the 16th century this mystical ontology, epistemology, and 
hermeneutics was already beginning to be super-ceded by a new “mathēsis.”    
Foucault noted the change in Western attitudes to the ancient mystical ways of 
knowing through post 17th century intellectuals’ increasing tendency to break 
apart resemblances and signs; things were “no longer anything but what they 
are”—they were losing their mystical content.95  Moreover, the whole system of 
mystical resemblances was now associated with error, illusion, and the frontiers 
of madness.  For instance, in Novum Organum (1620) Francis Bacon condemned 
the episteme and hermeneutics of resemblance as idolatrous fictions produced by 
the “peculiar nature” of the human intellect.96 These fictions seduced people into 
seeing in nature “parallels, correspondences, and relations that have no 
existence.”97  The greatest break with the mystical episteme of resemblances came 
with Descartes’ philosophy.  Descartes rejected resemblance in favor of an 
episteme founded in terms of “identity, difference, measurement, and order.”98   
The shift from an episteme based on resemblance to one based on 
measurement and order was momentous.  Through the system of resemblance, 
Western intellectuals sought to un-veil how the world was ordered; in the new 
episteme intellectuals used thought—“ratio”—to measure and thus order the 
world.99  Unlike resemblance, which produced opaque, indistinct, and infinite 
ignorance (for things are always more than what they appear and always point to 
other epistemologically “open” creatures), the new rationality produced certain 
knowledge acquired through careful measurements and analysis—the “un-doing” 
[analuein] of a whole into its constituent parts.100  Things thus measured and 
                                                          
95Foucault, Order of Things, 47.    
96Quoted Foucault, Order of Things, 52.    
97Quoted in Foucault, Order of Things, 52, with my emphasis.    
98Foucault, Order of Things, 52.  
99Foucault, Order of Things, 54, 74.      
100Foucault, Order of Things, 55.  
33 
 
broken apart could then be precisely (but abstractly) re-presented in tables, lists, 
enumerations, in a plethora of taxinomia.101  Herein was the new episteme’s great 
power:  in precisely re-presenting the world in equations, series, and tables of 
identity and difference, it simultaneously ordered the world according to the ratio 
of the human intellect.  By means of representation it was now in the power of 
Man not just to know creation, but to judge it as well.  Hence Descartes’  
judgment from the Regulae:  “‘Enumeration alone, whatever the question to 
which we are applying ourselves, will permit us always to deliver a true and 
certain judgment upon it.’”102  
There is not space in this study to go into further detail as to how the shift 
from “Resemblance” to “Representation” took place. However, it is important to 
note the shift in semiotics which Foucault found, and which echo Henri de 
Lubac’s research into the transformation in the Church’s understanding of the 
Eucharist in the 11th and 12th centuries.  Foucault points out that since the time of 
the Stoics, the system of signs in the West had been ternary, consisting of the 
complex and mysterious resemblances between “the significant, the signified, and 
the ‘conjuncture’” which formed, in actuality, One—The Whole.103  From the 17th 
century on, due to the new philosophies which emerged out of the Benedictine 
Abbe of Port-Royal, the ternary understanding was cast aside and replaced by a 
dualistic system of the significant and the signified.  As early as the end of the 
Renaissance words were beginning to lose their meaning as ontological signs 
pointing to other ontological signs.104  This shift marked a rupture:  prior to the 
17th century the question was how it was possible to know if a sign truly 
designated what it signified; after the 17th century it was asked how a sign was 
                                                          
101It is notable that taxinomia of the Gospels—(i.e. harmonization of similarities and discrepancies 
in the Gospel accounts, or “identity” and “difference” as Foucault would say)—have never been 
used liturgically by the Church  
102Quoted in Foucault, Order of Things, 55.    
103Foucault, Order of Things, 42.    
104Foucault, Order of Things, 42.  
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connected to what it signified.  (Here is an echo of the late Medieval Eucharistic 
crises:  how is Christ connected to the Bread and Wine? . . .And to the Church?).  
In short, words were no longer signs which pointed to and participated in a hidden 
(but yet discernible) ultimate reality.105  
 So too de Lubac discovered a “certain kind of rationalism”106 that enabled 
the fragmentation of the three bodies of Christ: his “corpus verum”—“true 
body”—the body in which Jesus suffered, died, and was resurrected, his “corpus 
mysticum”—his “mystical body” hidden in the Host and Wine of the Sacrament, 
and his ecclesial-social body, the “corpus Christi.”107  De Lubac’s research 
demonstrated that prior to the great debate over transubstantiation which occurred 
in the 11th century, all three bodies were considered mystical; of revealing an 
“ultimate and ‘solid’ reality while, as it were, waiting to be absorbed in it”108—
(this may be seen as a premonition of what Foucault discovered in the pre-
Modern mystical ontology of the cosmos, with the link being Christ Himself, as 
“all things are held together in Him” [Col. 1:17]).   Moreover, all three of Christ’s 
bodies were considered “mystikos kai nontos”—“mystical and intelligible.”109 
 With the debate over transubstantiation, however, a dramatic trans-
valuation of the theological concepts of “corpus Christi,” “corpus verum,” and 
“corpus mysticum” began to take place.   Responding to teachings of Berengar of 
Tours and others who “tended to spiritualize and mystify” the Sacrament of the 
Eucharist, the Church began to stress the real presence of the human and divine 
Christ in the Sacrament, and hence the host.110  Thus a remarkable chiasmus 
                                                          
105Foucault, Order of Things, 43.    
106Laurence Paul Hemming, “Henri de Lubac:  Reading Corpus Mysticum,” New Blackfriars Vol. 
90 (2009), 519.    
107See Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies:  A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1957), 195-196.   
108Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, f.n. 101, 30-31, with my emphasis.    
109Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 6.    
110Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies, 196; Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 9.      
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occurred in the theology of the Church:  “Corpus verum,” “corpus natural,” or 
“corpus Christi” were now used to designate the host.   And increasingly after 
1150, “corpus mysticum” was used to refer to “the Church as the organized body 
of Christian society.”111   More significantly, “corpus mysticum” was used to refer 
to “the body politic” or “corpus iuridicum” of the Church—i.e., “the gigantic 
legal and economic management” on which the Church in the saeculum rested.112  
I maintain that here is the first quest to discern the “historical Jesus’” objective (in 
all post-Cartesian senses of the term) relationship to the contemporary Church.  I 
also maintain that here may be seen the root cause of all the quests:  a crises in 
worship—a sundering of faith, love, and reason into distinct and fictional 
categories; an attempt to “understand before worshiping.”113  
 In Berengar’s theology may also be seen the beginning of the Modern 
view of the mystical as irrational.  The Eucharistic mystery was for him only a 
“type,” an “image” without any objective reality; the bread and wine were 
symbols—“mysteries”—that hid nothing.114  Hence for Berengar “mystical” was 
a hindrance to faith and understanding.  Worse still, to combat Berengar’s 
heretical understanding, the proponents of orthodoxy adopted Berengar’s own 
dialectical reasoning.  Gradually, over the course of the next two centuries of 
debate over the mystery of the Eucharist, the former orthodox understanding of 
theology as “faith seeking understanding” was replaced by “understanding 
transcends faith” and a “Christian rationalism” that believed in provable faith and 
demonstrable mysteries.115  The mystery of the Eucharist was now becoming an 
                                                          
111Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies, 196.    
112Kantorowicz, King’s Two Bodies, 197, 206.    
113Cf. Augustine in On Free Choice of the Will, I.2; II.2 for a classic expression of the patristic 
formula, “I believe in order to understand” (stated positively); the basis for this formulation comes 
from Isaiah 43:10:  “‘My witnesses are you—declares the LORD—My servant whom I have 
chosen.  To the end that you may take thought, and believe in Me, and understand that I am He.” 
(JPS)   
114Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 223.    
115Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 238, 240.    
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object for analysis “‘with its laws of interpretation, its ‘keys’ of explanation and 
its theory of numbers, which accentuated their rigidity.’”116  In the shift from 
dogma and contemplation to dialectics and apologetics the first step on the road to 
the “historical Jesus” had been taken.117   So too the Modern notion that the 
mystical power of the Church constituted the efficacy of the sacrament of the 
Bread and Wine, rather than the mystical power of Jesus Christ working 
historically through the mystery of the Church’s communion with His Body as the 
basis for the Church’s being, entered into Church teaching.   
 Thus the new rationalism—whether of that of Berengar or of his orthodox 
opponents—ended up displacing the pre-Modern orthodox epistemology that 
synthesized faith with reason:  “Understanding is the obligatory result and usual 
reward of faith.”118  Kantorowicz traced in The King’s Two Bodies how this long 
and obscure process of mystifying the Church in opposition to Jesus later led to 
the mystification of secular bodies—that of kings and of nations.  And by the 
early Modern period the new mystical secular bodies were becoming so powerful 
that they could begin to create ecclesial bodies in their own image:  Henry VIII’s 
“Church of England,” Louis XIV’s imperial Catholic church, or the various state 
churches of Post-Reformation Germany.  Kantorowicz’s work stressed that the 
de-mystification of the Eucharist (and I would add Jesus) was central in this 
process.  Yet what Kantorowicz’s study did not stress was that in pre-Modern 
orthodoxy the Eucharist was the participatory sacrament of the liturgy—not just a 
“reminder” of Christ’s historical sacrifice, but via a supra-rational practice a 
means of re-connecting believers to the trans-historical Jesus and Church—that 
Jesus and Church which is on pilgrimage in the world and which cannot be co-
opted in false eschatologies (whether of universal democracy, universal 
capitalism, universal communism, universal fascism). 
                                                          
116Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 228.    
117Cf. Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 240.   
118Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 231.  
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 Another major consequence of the rise of the new, anti-mystical 
rationality within the Church (particularly within Protestantism) by the 18th 
century was the de-mystification of the Gospels as icons.  As with the Eucharistic 
confusions of the 11th and 12th centuries, the Enlightenment’s iconoclasm of the 
Gospels was also a crisis of worship.  And it was this iconoclasm that gave birth 
to the 19th century quest(s) of the “historical Jesus”.   
1.3  The Enlightenment Iconoclasm of the Gospels 
When Marie-Joseph Lagrange, French Dominican and founder of the École 
biblique de Jerusalem wrote, “The Gospels are the only lives of Jesus that can be 
written.  The only thing to do is to understand them as best we can,”119 he was 
expressing the Church’s ancient view of the Gospels as icons—real images that 
pointed beyond themselves to an even greater reality.  (Hence Jesus’ words 
concerning the nature of the scriptures according to John’s Gospel:  “You all 
search the scriptures, because you think to have eternal life in them; and they are 
witnessing concerning me;”120).  It was also an acceptance of what John’s Gospel 
un-ashamedly reveals about itself, but which is true of all the Gospels:  “. . .these 
[signs] are recorded so that you all may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of 
God, and that by believing you all may have life in his name.” (John 20:30, 
NET121)  In other words, Lagrange accepted that the New Testament witnesses 
(“martyrs”) were not neutral/objective observers of the life of Jesus, but were, in 
one way or another, participators in his life through the Church.  Indeed, it was 
the biased love of years of remembering Jesus’ words and deeds that made the 
                                                          
119Quoted in Étienne Nodet, O.P., The Historical Jesus?  Necessity and Limits of an Inquiry trans. 
J. Edward Crowley (New York:  T & T Clark International, 2008), 192.    
120My very literal translation of John 5:39, to emphasize the nuance and emphatic nature of the 
Greek  ’εισιν ‘αι μαρτυρουσαι περι ’εμου (see the 2nd ed. of the Aland et al. Greek New 
Testament).   Jesus in verse 40 may be seen as being frustrated by “the Jewish leaders’” (cf. John 
5:16, NET) “representationalist” hermeneutics and pride which kept them from coming to him for 
eternal life.   
121I have slightly modified the NET’s translation to reflect the second person plurals—πιστευσητε 
and εχητε—to emphasize that the author of the Gospel is addressing a community of believers as 
opposed to the almost automatic Modern reading of “you” to refer to an individual.      
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canonical Gospels worthy of liturgical use in all churches.122  Lagrange’s 
statement was a remembrance that the Gospel portraits of Jesus were designed for 
lovers, not voyeurs.   
 Yet to assert that the Gospels are icons is not necessarily to discount their 
historical bases or historical worth.123  For the two foundational theological 
claims painted by New Testament authors—Jesus’ human and divine life, and his 
death and resurrection—are simultaneously historical claims that in some fashion 
can be portrayed—and enacted.124  This latter possibility became important in the 
8th and 9th century controversies over “the historical Jesus”—i.e., pictorial 
depictions of “the Word made flesh.”  Arguing that no image made by human or 
angelic hands could simultaneously portray Jesus’ divinity and humanity—(for 
the latter could not be separated from the ineffable mystery of the former), 
iconoclasts like Constantine V saw the Eucharist as the only image which could 
be “one in being” with the actual Christ of history, and therefore appropriate for 
Christians:125 
 It has been laid down for us that Christ is to be portrayed in an image, but  
 only as the holy teaching transmitted by divine tradition says: ‘Do this  
 in remembrance of me.’  Therefore it is evidently not permitted to portray  
 him in an image or to carry out a remembrance of him in any other way,  
 since this portrayal [in the Eucharist] is true and this way of portraying is  
 sacred.  (emphasis mine)126  
More recently, in his 2008 study of the historical Jesus, French Dominican 
historian Étienne Nodet emphasizes that the Gospels were written in the light of 
                                                          
122See Nodet, Historical Jesus?, 7, 19, 68.     
123See for instance, N. T. Wright’s concerns about perceiving the Gospels as icons in his Christian 
Origins and the Question of God, vol. II, Jesus and the Victory of God (Minneapolis, MN:  
Fortress Press, 1996), 4-5; 8-10; 123-124.  The use of the Christ Eleemon mosaic from 
Constantinople of the 11th and 12th centuries which portrays Jesus fully facing the viewer on the 
cover of the book points to Wright’s own portrait of Jesus:  pious and critical. 
124Nodet, Historical Jesus?, 4, 66.    
125See Jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries-Mary Through the Centuries (New York:  
History Book Club, 2005), 86-87.  
126Quoted in Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries, 87.     
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the Church’s belief in, and reflection upon, the tradition of Jesus’ resurrection.   
Nodet reminds his readers that the earliest writings of the New Testament—the 
epistles—and those of the Apostolic Fathers—“massively ignore” the “teachings 
and doings of Jesus” (i.e. the primary fodder for the “historical Jesus”) in favor of 
the proclamation of his birth, baptism, passion and resurrection.127  Hence 
Ignatius of Antioch’s (d. ca. 107) famous statement on the “historical Jesus” and 
the praxis of the Church: 
 Moreover, I urge you to do nothing in a spirit of contentiousness, but in  
 accordance with the teaching of Christ.  For I heard some people say, ‘If I  
 do not find it in the archives, I do not believe it in the gospel.’  And when I 
 said to them, ‘It is written,’ they answered me, ‘That is precisely the  
 question.’  But for me, the ‘archives’ are Jesus Christ, the unalterable  
 archives [ta athikta archeia] are his cross and death and his resurrection  
 and the faith that comes through him; by these things I want, through your  
 prayers, to be justified.  (Philadelphians 8:2128) 
Only later did believers in Jesus create the series of “coordinated icons”—(what 
subsequent academic theologians and historians would distinguish as “tropes,” 
“logoi,” “myths/miracles”)—that make up each of the canonical Gospels and 
which taken together form a mosaic of Jesus.129  This mosaic of four Gospels 
steadfastly refuses to be harmonized according to a post-Representationist, post-
Cartesian analytical mathēsis or taxonomy.   As Nodet points out, within the 
Church, the Gospels were valued not for their “verifiable exactness,” but rather 
because they testified to “the rule of faith” in Jesus as the Christ.130  Unlike Greek 
plays or modern documentaries, the Gospels and the Eucharist are not spectacles, 
but were constructed as and taken to be “. . .the actualization of a historical act of 
God in ordinary time, by which a people or a community have been created and 
continue to be.”131   Thus within orthodoxy neither the “historical Jesus”—who 
                                                          
127Nodet, Historical Jesus?, 66.    
128From Holmes, Apostolic Fathers.   
129Nodet, Historical Jesus?, 18.    
130Nodet, Historical Jesus?, 42.    
131Nodet, Historical Jesus?, 33-34.    
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was  recognized as God—nor the Eucharist—which was recognized as the 
Mystery of God through Christ which “made the Church”—could be spoken of 
“in a univocal discourse that compels reason.”132   
 If the Church’s understanding of Jesus of Nazareth was correct—that in- 
deed he was the Mystery of God Incarnate, then Lagrange’s historical assessment 
is correct:  the Gospels’ poetic133 and iconic portrayals are the only lives of Jesus 
that can be written.  For as Socrates tried to explain to Phaedrus, and St. Paul to 
the Corinthians, because the reality of the Divine is beyond human 
comprehension esse in semet ipso, it can only be known through the super-
rational gift of Divine Madness (Socrates) or the Moronic Wisdom of God (St. 
Paul).134   But of course, this is a matter of both historical debate and faith.  The 
Gospels themselves recognize this, even after the resurrection:  “So the eleven 
disciples went to Galilee to the mountain that Jesus had designated.  When they 
saw him, they worshiped him, but some doubted” (Matt. 28:16-17, NET, with my 
emphasis).  By the 18th century some Enlightened intellectuals within the Church 
(e.g., Remarius) were taking this doubt quite seriously.  This doubt is indicative of  
their desire for certainty; although the technology was not yet available, what 
Enlightenment-minded researchers into the life of Jesus desired was a 
photograph—a mechanically precise, fixed, and identically reproducible picture 
of the man from Nazareth.  The pre-Modern (and orthodox) belief in 
Resemblances—the great chain of “images of the Image” which viewed humans 
as images of the Original Image Maker—which only received ontic being “by 
                                                          
132Nodet, Historical Jesus?, 42, with my emphasis.    
133I am using “poetic” in the ancient sense of a work that is divinely inspired, and not the result of 
autonomous human reason.  Cf.  Plato, Ion, Greek, 530, E-531, D; English, 421, 423, in  The 
Statesman, Philebus, Ion, Loeb Classical Library, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 2006).    
134On the Socratic notion of divine madness, see Phaedrus, Greek, 249-250; English, 483 in Plato, 
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library, trans. Harold North 
Fowler (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1966).  For Paul’s understanding of God’s 
“Moronic Wisdom,” see I Cor. 1:25:  ‘οτι το μωρον του θεου σοφωτερον των ’ανθρωπων  ’εστιν, 
και το  ’ασθενες του θεου ’ισχυροτερον των  ’ανθρωπων  (2nd ed. of the Aland et al. Greek New 
Testament).   
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imitation” and participation in the Image of the Invisible God himself (the latter 
being the argument specific to Christian orthodoxy)—was no longer sufficient for 
knowing that man who claimed to be the Truth itself.135  Thus the late eighteenth-
century quest for the historical Jesus was in many ways a revival of iconoclasm 
and at the same time a turn to the idolatry of Berengarian rationalism.136  This 
brings us then to a consideration of the academically iconic lives of Jesus 
authored by Schleiermacher, Strauss, and Renan in the 19th century.    
1.4  An Idol to Prevent Idolatry:  Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Life of Jesus 
Fredrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)—whom the younger Karl Barth 
simultaneously praised and criticized as the titan of 19th century Protestant 
theology—has generally been seen as one of the well-meaning iconoclasts of the 
early nineteenth century’s attempt to produce a modern historical understanding 
of Jesus.137  (“Well-meaning” in the sense that Schleiermacher’s philosophical 
theology was intended to strengthen orthodox Christian belief and practice in an 
“age of Reason”).  While books on the life of Jesus had appeared prior to 1819, 
Schleiermacher’s lectures of that year at the University of Berlin began the 
academic attempts to historically reconstruct the life of the Nazarene.  He 
delivered lectures on the life of Jesus four times between 1819 and 1832, and in 
1864, K. A. Rütenik used Schleiermacher’s notes from the last presentation along 
with students’ notebooks to reconstruct and publish the lectures in book form as 
The Life of Jesus.138   
                                                          
135Cf. Foucault, Order of Things, chapter 2, “The Prose of the World,” pgs. 17-45; see also 
Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries, 88-89.  Pelikan points out that the logic of icons as being 
images of the Invisible Image of God—and not idols—was the basis of the pro-icon faction within 
the Church in the 8th and 9th centuries.   
136Cf. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 4-5.   
137See Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Brian Cozens and John 
Bowden (Grand Rapids, MI:  William B. Eerdmans, 2002), 411-415.    
138 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Life of Jesus, Lives of Jesus Series, ed.  Jack C. Verheyden, 
trans. S. Maclean Gilmore  (Philadelphia, PA:  Fortress Press, 1975); see lviii-lx for the history of 
Rütenik’s reconstruction of Schleiermacher’s lectures.  
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 The work did not fare well.  Schweitzer wrote that when Schleiermacher’s 
life of Jesus was finally published in 1864, it arrived “as an embalmed corpse” on 
the battlefield of New Testament studies.139  In Schweitzer’s judgment, the 
essential flaw of Schleiermacher’s biography was that it was “disingenuous.”140  
In it Schleiermacher sought to serve two masters—Science and Faith—while 
masking the latter.141  Later, Schleiermacher’s project was also found wanting 
from the perspective of Karl Barth’s post-World War I “crises theology.”142  
Within this context, the early Barth maintained that the historical “Lord Jesus” 
was for Schleiermacher “a problem child” which was difficult to accommodate 
within his sermons, philosophy, and theology.143   
 And yet, later in life, Barth questioned his early critique and understanding 
of Schleiermacher’s theological project in a way that is especially pertinent to the 
subject of this study.   Musing on the political responsibility of many of his own 
theological teachers for giving support to the Kaiser’s push for war in 1914, Barth 
wrote in his “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” (ca. 1960) that he did not 
believe that Schleiermacher would have lent his support.144  A fresh reading of 
Schleiermacher’s “Life” within the context of his philosophical theology (as 
expressed in The Christian Faith [1821-1822]) provides insight into both Barth’s 
reappraisal and the political significance of Schleiermacher’s historical Jesus.   
                                                          
139Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, First Complete Edition, ed. John Bowden; 
trans. W. Montgomery, J. R. Coates, Susan Cupitt, and John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN:  Fortress 
Press, 2001), 60. 
140Schweitzer, Quest, 57.    
141Schweitzer, Quest, 59, 60.    
142See Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion (London:  SCM, 1964), 176 
and ff.  for an excellent discussion of the effects of Barth’s reading of Schleiermacher for modern 
day interpreters.   
143Barth, Protestant Theology, 447.    
144Karl Barth, “Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher,” in The Theology of 
Schleiermacher:  Lectures at Göttingen, Winter Semester of 1923/24, ed. Dietrich Ritschl, trans. 
Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans, 1982), 263-264.   
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 First, it is important to appreciate (as Schweitzer did, howbeit 
disdainfully145) that technically, Schleiermacher’s lecture series was not a “life of 
Jesus.”146  In his introductory lecture Schleiermacher made it clear that what he 
was trying to do was provide a historical biography “of Christ.”147  Such a task 
necessitated great care, and thus Schleiermacher spent his first seven lectures 
exploring and justifying the possibility of his project.  Schleiermacher’s solution 
to the problem of the possibility of a history of the Christ came from The 
Christian Faith:  a history of the Christ was in fact possible if one grasped the 
nature of what Schleiermacher called “the feeling of absolute dependence” and 
the “God-consciousness.”  In The Christian Faith Schleiermacher carefully 
defined his conceptions of both terms.  By “feeling” Schleiermacher did not mean 
either physical sensations or emotions, and for this reason he linked “feeling” 
with “immediate self-consciousness.”  The former term, “Gefühl,” 148 might better 
be translated as “attunement,”—and in Schleiermacher’s usage, attunement to the 
objective reality of God—and one’s absolute dependence on God for their 
being—and ultimately the being of the universe.149   
 The key to Schleiermacher’s history of the Christ, then, was his 
understanding of what made Jesus unique—his Divinity or “absolute God-
consciousness.”  This was an internal uniqueness which distinguished Christ from 
all other historical figures, but which also produced a human being whose life and 
personality was a unity expressed over a natural lifetime which could be 
                                                          
145See Schweitzer, Quest, 64.    
146My guess is that Rütenik chose the title Das Leben Jesu to capitalize on the publishing frenzy of 
1864—a year in which more than 24 books were published on the “historical Jesus.”  See 
Schleiermacher, Life, xv, f.n. 7.    
147Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 1, pg. 3, with my emphasis.    
148A key insight provided by Dr. Johannes Hoff while at the University of Wales Trinity St. David.   
149See Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, vol. I, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. 
Stewart, anon. trans. (Edinburgh:  T. & T. Clark, 1928; reprint, New York:  Harper Torchbook, 
1963), §4, pg. 12.  For the extension of the “feeling of absolute dependence” to that of the universe 
itself, see Niebuhr, 186.   
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understood historically.150  Thus in his later lectures on the life of Christ, 
Schleiermacher argued that because of Christ’s uniqueness, the historian could 
not “calculate” him and “reconstruct” his life in the same fashion that one might 
be able to reconstruct Caesar’s career in Gaul.  Such a reconstruction of Christ’s 
life would place the historian above Christ; “. . .but in the instance of Christ we 
must admit that during Christ’s life no one was in a position to calculate him.”151  
As the Gospels plainly and often painfully show, the disciples did not understand 
Jesus or his inner nature during his lifetime.  Their subsequent understanding, 
Schleiermacher pointed out, was only due to Christ’s own influence on them:   
The relationship to Christ which the disciples assumed was his work; it 
was the first fruits of his directing influence.  The first result of this had to 
be that such a picture of Christ gradually took shape within them and by 
no means set them over him:  and if a complete knowledge of his life 
would enable us fully to calculate him, once we had achieved this goal we 
should not stand above him, for it would be his work.152 
In sum, Schleiermacher argued for the possibility of a scientific or critical history 
of the Christ, but not a secular one:  “. . .for only those enlightened by him can 
calculate him.”153  The historian, vis-à-vis Christ, could not produce an accurate 
history of Jesus’ life through a (fictional) objectivity and willful apathy.   
 In addition to his Christology, Schleiermacher’s ecclesiology also served 
as a foundation for the possibility of treating the life of Christ historically.  The 
basis of the Church according to Schleiermacher was “neither a Knowing nor a 
Doing, but a modification of Feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness” which 
served as the basis of the Church’s ethical life.154  The Church was the 
community where this “immediate self-consciousness” was lived out in the real 
                                                          
150Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, vol. II, §97,  pg. 409. 
151Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 3, pgs. 17-18, emphasis in the original.  
152Schleiermacher, Life, 18, emphasis in the  original.  
153Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 2, pg. 8, with my emphasis. 
154Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, vol. I, §3, pg. 5.  
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world of politics, science, and philosophy.155  According to Schleiermacher, both 
God’s divine action and the Church’s reception of the God-consciousness through 
Christ and the Holy Spirit were historical phenomena which were fair fields of 
inquiry for “the leaders of science.”156  Thus in Lecture 5 of The Life, when he 
argues for the possibility of an orthodox and at the same time scientific history of 
Christ, Schleiermacher posits the history of the Church and the role of the Holy 
Spirit in determining its external, historical actions.  No one could deny the full 
humanity and the human actions of members of the Church; members, who, 
according to orthodox belief, are filled with the Holy Spirit—the same divine 
spirit which filled Christ and was the source of his God-consciousness.157          
 And so Schleiermacher’s philosophical theology created the groundwork 
for his scientific history of Christ:  Jesus’ inward divinity would not prevent the 
scientific inquirer from probing any of the Gospels’ relations of external events 
concerning him.  To conclude this sketch of Schleiermacher’s Life, I will now 
briefly examine his analysis and historical judgments on the last week of Jesus’ 
life and the Gospel reports of the resurrection and ascension.  For in the 19th 
century, the interpretation of this last week and its aftermath not only determined 
(or sought to determine) the validity of Christian orthodoxy and orthopraxis, but 
also the fate of Judaism among its “cultured despisers.”158   
 Schleiermacher’s treatment of the Gospels’ record of Jesus’ liturgical and 
mystical investment of meaning to his passion—the Last Supper—was critical.  
One could not be certain of the historicity of Christ’s institutional words at the 
Supper for the Gospels’ records of them were all different.  Some questions could 
be raised as to whether or not Christ intended the Supper as just a commemorative 
                                                          
155Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, vol. I, §3, pgs. 5-6.    
156Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, vol. I, §3, pg. 6.    
157Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 5, pg. 34. 
158I am here playing off of Schleiermacher’s famous On Religion:  Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers, and am thinking of Renan, Hauer, and Grundmann as the “cultured despisers” of 
Judaism.  
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rite of his disciples, or for the entire “Christian church.”159   Most significant was 
the problem of John’s complete omission of the Last Supper and unique emphasis 
on Christ’s washing of the disciples’ feet.160  On the other hand, the Church’s 
early adoption of the Eucharist (as evidenced by Paul in I Corinthians 11) was 
conclusive evidence for Schleiermacher that the disciples (and hence the Gospels) 
had in fact correctly interpreted Christ’s words and actions on the night of his 
betrayal.161  Significantly, Schleiermacher concluded that the Last Supper 
demonstrated that Jesus’ was in no way in doubt about the permanency of the 
Church which he had founded:   
 The act, then, was a symbolic institution that was in a special way to bind  
 the participants together and all the participants with him and his unique  
 life.  This shows that at the time when he was certain of his impending  
 death he had no doubt at all of the continuance of the community that had  
 scarcely been founded by him but whose first foundations he had laid.   
 This continuance for him was assured and firm.162 
Thus after subjecting the New Testament accounts to scientific criticism, 
Schleiermacher ended up affirming an orthodox Christo-Ecclesiology.        
 Unlike Renan’s treatment of Jesus’ arrest and trial, Schleiermacher did not 
posit Jewish hatred as the ultimate causation of Jesus’ death.  The unique mention 
in John 18:2-24 of Jesus’ pre-trial interview by Annas, the father-in-law of the 
high priest Caiaphas, was puzzling historically for Schleiermacher; he concluded 
that the Synoptics had simply omitted this, and that John’s account was the most 
accurate.163  This is all Schleiermacher has to say about Annas and Caiaphas’ role 
in Jesus’ death.  As will be seen in Chapter 3, Renan singled out both Caiaphas 
and Annas for special responsibility, and in fact puts them and the entire Jewish 
                                                          
159Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 58, pgs. 392-393.    
160Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 58, 393.    
161Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 58, 392-393.    
162Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 58, 394.    
163Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 58, Lecture 59, pgs. 395-398.    
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theo-political hierarchy on trial.  Both Matthew’s account which implied that 
Jesus was abused by members of the Sanhedrin at his trial (26:66) and Luke’s 
report of Herod’s mocking of Jesus (23:6-12) were troubling to Schleiermacher.  
Concerning Matthew’s report, Schleiermacher concluded that Jesus must have 
been struck and spit on by servants of the Sanhedrin.  The Sanhedrin itself, was, 
in Schleiermacher’s estimation, “governed only by concern for what Christ’s 
activity might do to the general situation [i.e. the Jews’ relationship to Roman 
authority]” and was not motivated by any “personal passion” on their part.164  One 
gets the sense that Schleiermacher understood the Sanhedrin’s actions as 
stemming from a legitimate concern for the public welfare of the Jewish nation 
vis-à-vis Roman imperium.  Their problem was that they totally misunderstood 
what type of Messiah that Jesus claimed to be, and therefore erroneously charged 
him before Pilate.165  Herod’s behavior was “quite unworthy” of his status as a 
king, and not finding   Jesus guilty of anything, he should have released him 
instead of sending him back to Pilate.  In Schleiermacher’s estimation Herod was 
guilty of impropriety and lax administration of justice, but not personal malice 
towards Jesus.166 
 Such a generous judgment could not be granted to Pilate.  Historically 
speaking, as the Roman imperial authority, Pilate had the final word on whether 
or not Jesus lived or died (cf. John 19:10).167   Schleiermacher condemned 
Pilate’s actions as being both cowardly and motivated out of a personal interest in 
the affair.  Pilate was a coward in that he feared the Sanhedrin’s  appeal to 
                                                          
164Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 60, pg. 402; cf. also Lecture 61, pg. 409, where Schleiermacher 
states that the Sanhedrin had accused Jesus of claiming to be the king of the Jews against Roman 
authority to let Pilate know that “they had acted out of concern for public order and in order to 
avoid all breeches of public peace.”     
165Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 60, pg. 402.  
166Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 61, pgs. 408-409.    
167Schleiermacher does not treat Jesus’ historically troublesome statement to Pilate that “You 
would have no authority over me at all, unless it was given to you from above.  Therefore the one 
who handed me over to you is guilty of greater sin.” (John 19:11, NET)  This verse was used to 
implicate “the Jews” as ultimately responsible for Jesus’ death.    
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Caesar’s authority (John 19:12) more than concern for truth and justice, and thus 
fearing for his own political position, violated his own conscience and consented 
to what he knew was an unjust verdict, thus condemning Jesus to death.168  In 
contrast to Renan, Schleiermacher does not one-sidedly blame the Jewish 
leadership in Jerusalem for Jesus’ death, but rather sees what the Gospels seem to 
portray:  that both “Jew” and “Gentile”—i.e. all descendents of Adam and Eve—
were responsible for the crucifixion of the teacher from Nazareth.   
 Schleiermacher’s treatment of the Gospels’ resurrection accounts was 
critical, scientific, and yet ended up confirming orthodoxy.  He viewed Luke’s 
account of Jesus’ post-resurrection life in the gospel and Acts, and John’s 
“eyewitness” accounts, as the most historically reliable.169   The Gospels’ 
contradictory accounts of the resurrection did not argue against the reality of what 
occurred on the third day after the crucifixion, but in fact was one of the chief 
reasons why Schleiermacher was convinced that the resurrection of Jesus was 
historically true.  Such contradictions pointed to the actual eyewitness character of 
the accounts; real eyewitnesses often tend to perceive things differently—hence 
the “contradictions” in the Gospels’ accounts of Jesus’ resurrection.170      
 Concerning the Gospels’ post-resurrection accounts of Jesus, 
Schleiermacher once again acknowledged their contradictory nature.  On the one 
hand, the Gospel narratives portrayed the post-resurrection Jesus as fully and 
normally human; as eating, drinking, talking, and walking with his disciples in the 
same manner as he had before the crucifixion.   At the same time, however, the 
                                                          
168Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 61, pg. 410.    
169 Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 65, pgs. 434-435.  Schleiermacher did not deny the historicity of 
Matthew and Mark’s accounts, but because the sources for their accounts could not be known, 
their accounts were secondary to those of Luke and John. (passim.) As with much of his other 
thought, Schleiermacher’s high assessment of John, which was rejected for much of the late 19th 
and 20th centuries, is now being reassessed and vindicated—at least by such scholars as Craig L. 
Blomberg, and Richard Bauckham,; see The Historical Reliability of John’s Gospel (2001), and 
The Testimony of the Beloved Disciple:  Narrative, History, and Theology in the Gospel of John 
(2007),  respectively. 
170Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 65, 432-433; 436.  
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Gospels also portrayed the resurrected Jesus as being quite different from before; 
as appearing and disappearing at will, and as apparently not being bound by 
Newton’s universal law of gravity as evidenced by Luke’s account of his 
ascension.171  Of the two portrayals, Schleiermacher preferred the former as the 
correct understanding of Jesus’ post-resurrection physicality, contra a docetic 
view.172   In the end, Schleiermacher viewed Jesus’ post resurrection appearances 
as “an orderly continuation of his life and work, for he continued to teach and 
commission as he had done during his lifetime.”173  This was not a diminution of 
Jesus’ resurrection, but rather indicative of Schleiermacher’s understanding of the 
extraordinary nature of Jesus’ entire life on earth:   
If we hold fast to what Christ himself said [i.e. Luke 24:39—where Jesus 
tells his disciples that he is not a spirit], admitting that not all historical 
statements are clear. . .we see that nothing incomprehensible remains, 
except Christ’s resurrection itself.  However, the same thing is true of 
Christ’s whole appearance upon earth.  His coming was a miraculous act, 
but all that followed it was wholly natural.”174  
It also reveals that Schleiermacher had not totally succumbed to the 
Representationalist belief that science could absolutely calculate the entirety of 
reality.   
 It is worth noting at this point Schleiermacher’s thoughts on Judaism and 
his relationship to important Jewish intellectuals in Berlin in the early 19th 
century, for both distinguish him from Strauss and Renan.  Joseph W. Pickle has 
concluded through an analysis of Schleiermacher’s On Religion: Speeches to Its 
Cultured Despisers and The Christian Faith that Schleiermacher attempted a 
positive theological critique of Judaism that took it seriously as a religion on its 
                                                          
171Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 68, 444.  This was to Schleiermacher’s great consternation—the 
ascension was very problematic for him; see Lectures 70-71.  Schleiermacher ultimately 
concluded that “the story of the ascension must be accepted as a fact.” (Lecture 71, pg. 474.) 
172Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 67, pg. 447. 
173Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 69, pg. 463. 
174Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 66, pg. 445, with my emphasis. 
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own terms and not simply as a stepping stone to Christianity, or “preparatio 
evangelii.”175  One reason for this, Pickle asserts, is Schleiermacher’s close 
relationships with Markus and Henriette Herz, and Dorothea Mendelssohn Veit, 
who were a part of the Jewish Enlightenment or “Haskalah” centered in Berlin.  
Pickle argues that Schleiermacher’s controversial statement in the Speeches—
(later echoed less polemically in The Christian Faith)—that “. . .Judaism is long 
since dead.  Those who yet wear its livery are only sitting lamenting the 
imperishable mummy bewailing its departure and sad legacy”176 was actually a 
widely held view of Haskalah intellectuals, and indeed may have been the source 
for Schleiermacher’s own view.177  Haskalah intellectuals, in an almost exact 
parallel of the general Enlightenment critique of contemporary Christianity, 
believed that the rational teachings of Moses and the prophets—the original 
foundation of Judaism—had long since been corrupted by “accretions of legalism, 
mysticism, and superstition” so that contemporary Judaism bore almost no real 
connection to its original sources.178  Basically this is what Schleiermacher stated 
polemically in the Speeches, and Pickle notes that it apparently gave no offence to 
any of Schleiermacher’s Jewish friends.179   
 In sum, Pickle unveils that while his treatment of Judaism was ambivalent,   
“race” itself was irrelevant in Schleiermacher’s theology and in his own personal 
and professional relations.  Pickle notes that he was invited to visit the services at 
the main Reformed Temple in Berlin, and to mentor young rabbis in their 
                                                          
175Joseph W. Pickle, “Schleiermacher on Judaism,” The Journal of Religion, Vol. 60, no. 2 (April 
1980): 115-137.  In his rejection of the Old Testament as a preparatio evangelii Schleiermacher 
was abandoning the Pauline reading (cf. Gal. 3, especially 3:23-24) and much of pre-Modern 
orthodoxy.  From the viewpoint of my thesis, this is problematic.   
176Quoted in Pickle, “Schleiermacher,” 119.   Pickle also quotes Schleiermacher’s similarly 
disturbing statement in the Introduction to The Christian Faith:  “‘On this highest plane, of 
Monotheism, history exhibits only three great communions—the Jewish, the Christian, and the 
Mohammedan; the first being almost in the process of extinction. . .’” (133).   
177Pickle, “Schleiermacher,” 137.    
178Pickle, “Schleiermacher,” 122.    
179Pickle, “Schleiermacher,” 119, f.n. 16.    
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preaching, contact which appears to have made some considerable influence on 
later Jewish reformers.180  Schleiermacher’s “historical Christ” is “rooted in the 
life of his people”—i.e. fully Jewish and yet original in his development and 
expression of the “God-consciousness.”181  Unlike Renan and later German 
scholars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Schleiermacher did not 
problematize Jesus’ race.     
 In this regard Schleiermacher’s life and work may be one of the best 
arguments against Susannah Heschel’s insistence upon the lack of distinction 
between “anti-Judaism” and “anti-Semitism.”182  For while the charge of “anti-
Judaism” might well be leveled against Schleiermacher, he can in no way be 
considered an “anti-Semite.”  Around 1799-1800 when there was talk in the 
Prussian government of granting Jews Prussian citizenship upon condition of 
conversion to Christianity, Schleiermacher vehemently opposed the condition out 
of concern for the purity of the Church:  faith could not in any way be coerced.  
Positively, Schleiermacher did support citizenship for Jews as Jews, with their 
own state-sponsored religious communities (like that of Reformed and Lutheran 
congregations).183 
 From the perspective of pre-Modern mystical Christo-Ecclesiology 
Schleiermacher’s adherence to Enlightenment “historical-critical 
understanding”—whether from the Haskalah or from German philosophy—does 
make his life of Christ somewhat suspect.  But Schleiermacher’s work was judged 
even harsher by Modern critics.  Both Strauss and Schweitzer weighed 
Schleiermacher’s Christology and found it wanting theologically and historically.  
The problem was that in their estimation Schleiermacher’s theology and history 
were lukewarm:  his Jesus fit neither in the 1st century (he was either too 
                                                          
180Pickle, “Schleiermacher,” 136.    
181Schleiermacher, Life, Lecture 2, pgs. 8-15.     
182Susannah Heschel, “Historiography of Anti-Semitism versus Anti-Judaism:  A Response to 
Robert Morgan,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 33, no. 3 (2011): 257-279.  
183Pickle, “Schleiermacher,” 129-130.    
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rationalistic or psychological—the great defect of “the God-consciousness”), nor 
in the 19th century (he did rise from the dead, ascend to heaven, and would 
return).  Thus Schleiermacher’s historical Jesus had justly been spit-out of the 
mouth of modern theology.184  What Modern critics rightly sensed (and what 
Barth himself later came to sense, if at least in potentia) was that 
Schleiermacher’s philosophical theology did not make human feeling supreme 
over God, Christ, or Grace, but rather emphasized the reality of human 
dependence upon all three.185  As Niebuhr pointed out, Schleiermacher’s theology 
was essentially “Christo-morphic,” “person-forming,” and “person-building” (all 
terms that Schleiermacher himself used)—and thus the opposite of Lysian 
“objective non-love”.186    
  Read in this light, Schleiermacher’s theological and historical projects 
may be seen as being much closer to pre-Modern orthodox Christo-Ecclesiology 
than to the Enlightenment.  He certainly was no iconoclast.  Martin Redeker 
relates in his biography of Schleiermacher that on his deathbed on Wednesday, 
February 12, 1834, he called his family and friends together for a celebration of 
the Lord’s Supper.  One of his friends recalled Schleiermacher’s words before the 
bedside rite:  “Whoever like myself seeks salvation, believing in Christ’s 
redeeming death, will enjoy the Holy Supper with me.”187  I maintain that it was 
this fundamental attachment—“attunement”—to orthodoxy that prevented 
Schleiermacher’s life of Jesus from slipping into the emerging neo-pagan anti-
Judaism of the late Enlightenment.  This also provides some insight into 
Schleiermacher’s political theology—of why, as Barth mused, he would not have 
supported the German Reich’s disastrous push for war in 1914, and certainly not 
                                                          
184cf. Revelation 3:15-16.    
185See Jacqueline Marina’s “Christology and Anthropology in Friedrich Schleiermacher,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, ed. Jacqueline Marina (Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 151-170.    
186Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ, 212-215.    
187Quoted in Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher:  Life and Thought, trans. John Wallhausser 
(Philadelphia, PA:  Fortress Press, 1973), 213.    
53 
 
the Nazis’ demonic and delusional eschatology of a “thousand-year Reich.”  
Schleiermacher’s faith in the Resurrection and Return of the Christ enabled him at 
critical times to resist state authority, such as the above mentioned resistance to 
the forced conversion of Jews to Christianity in exchange for citizenship, and 
towards the end of his life, to King Friedrich Wilhelm III’s imposition of his own 
national liturgy of the Eucharist against that of local church congregations.188  For 
the core insight of his philosophical theology—“the feeling of absolute 
dependence”—can in no way support the Enlightenment’s notion of an 
autonomous secular State.  In Schleiermacher’s theology, the State, as with all 
other human creations, “has no life in itself” (cf. John 6:53).  
1.5  Strauss’ Life of Jesus Critically Examined: Seeds for the Fascist Jesus 
Two years after the publication of his Life of Jesus Critically Examined (1836), 
David Friedrich Strauss boasted of his prize winning essay for the faculty of 
Catholic Theology at Tübingen on the resurrection of the flesh, written in the 
early 1830s:  “With complete conviction I proved the resurrection of the dead by 
exegesis and natural philosophy, and as I made the last point it was clear to me 
that there was nothing in it at all.”189  It was a classic statement from the man 
whom Barth believed was himself the incarnation of the typical un-believing 
theologian of the 19th century.190  It may also be read as a revelation of the 
sophists’ talent for viewing probabilities as more estimable than truths, of those 
who “make small things seem great and great things small by the power of their 
words, and new things old and old things the reverse—” (Phaedrus 267, A-B).191  
Certainly this was the effect that Strauss’ Life of Jesus had within the sphere of 
European academic theology.  For according to Barth, Strauss’ actual goal and 
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success in the work was not in fact to de-mythologize and de-supernaturalize the 
Gospels in order to arrive at the historical Jesus, but rather to reveal that the 
“historical sources” for Jesus were overwhelmingly mythological.  Strauss did not 
thereby deny the historical existence of Jesus, but rather called into question 
modern theologians’ reliance on history as a basis for their theology, and hence 
claims of “knowing Jesus.”192  It was intended to undermine orthodoxy’s 
conviction that the Word had been made flesh.  Strauss’ methodology may also be 
viewed as indicative of the Modern mathēsis and its proclivity to destroy or 
hollow out traditional knowledge and replace it with new, transformed models.   
In Strauss’ case, his new mythological hermeneutics prepared the ground for the 
construction of an abstracted, ahistorical christology and ecclesiology that could 
lend itself to the birth of a new Jesus—a fascist Jesus.     
 Strauss defined what he meant by “mythi” based on the works of 
Eichhorn, Gabler, Schelling, Bauer, and others.   A mythus, he explained, “is the 
representation of an event or of an idea in a form which is historical, but, at the 
same time characterized by the rich pictorial and imaginative mode of thought and 
expression of the primitive ages.”193  More specifically, Strauss defined the 
“evangelical mythus” as a narrative directly or indirectly about Jesus produced by 
his earliest followers which expressed their ideas about him, and not actual 
facts.194   The evangelical mythus had two sources:  1) Old Testament mythi 
concerning the Messiah, and 2), the effect that Jesus’ own personality, actions, 
and death had on his earliest followers which then modified their beliefs about the 
Messiah.  In order to get behind what was concealed by myth, Strauss took two 
basic approaches, one negative, the other positive.  Any narrative that violated the 
universally known laws of science and nature—and the Enlightenment’s 
conception of history as an atheistic closed system of natural causes and effects—
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was automatically to be declared un-historical.195  Any accounts which were 
contradicted by other Gospel accounts, or which were internally inconsistent with 
themselves, were also to be deemed as unhistorical.196  Positively, one needed to 
recognize both the content and the form of a myth—“If the form be poetical, if the 
actors converse in hymns, and in a more diffuse and elevated strain than might be 
expected from their training and situations, such discourses, at all events, are not 
to be regarded as historical.”197  In other words, any liturgical passages were 
automatically deemed as irrational and un-historical.  Through this hermeneutic 
Strauss hoped to provide a new approach to interpreting the historical Jesus, one 
which would replace both the “antiquated systems of supernaturalism and 
naturalism” prevalent in the early 19th century—and also what he deemed to be 
the hybridization of the two as represented by Schleiermacher’s Christology and 
history.198 
 However, his treatment of the Gospels’ account of the Last Supper is 
similar to Schleiermacher’s in its critical approach.  Strauss spends much time 
pointing out the problem of the disagreement between the Synoptics and John’s 
Gospel as to when the Last Supper took place (the Synoptics describe the meal as 
having taken place on the Passover, whereas John’s Gospel places it the night 
before).199  Like Schleiermacher he notes John’s omission of Jesus’ words over 
the bread and wine in favor of a description of Jesus’ foot-washing of the 
disciples.  Unlike Schleiermacher, however, his conclusions here are much more 
radical.  The foot-washing scene in John is probably totally fictional—a legendary 
construction of a synoptic teaching on humility.200  Strauss found the different 
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confessional understandings of Jesus’ words at the Supper—“this is my            
body. . .”—whether Catholic or Protestant—as “obsolete” in the Modern age, and 
really a product of the misunderstanding of the “ancient oriental”  by the 
“occidental mind.”201   The more important and “interesting” question was 
whether or not Jesus intended the meal as simply a last demonstration of his 
“attachment” to the disciples, or if he intended it as the disciples’ perennial 
commemorative celebration of him.  Strauss concluded simply that both 
“supposed cases” were true of the Last Supper.202  
 If it was Schleiermacher’s orthodox love for Christ combined with the 
spirit of Enlightenment toleration which kept him from any anti-Semitic polemics 
in his historical treatment of Jesus, it might be argued that it was Strauss’ anti-
orthodox zeal to reveal the mythological character of the Gospel narratives which 
kept him from doing the same.  Unlike Renan’s approach, Strauss does not place 
the Jewish hierarchy or “race” on trial for Jesus’ crucifixion.  Only the Gospels 
themselves are judged and found wanting by Strauss.  It is true that Strauss does 
mention the “hatred of the enemies of Jesus,” but only twice and in the context of 
discussing the Gospels’ portrayal of Pilate’s actions in Jesus’ trial compared to 
the depictions of the Pharisees and Sadducees’ actions.203  In sum, Strauss 
believed that the Gospels’ account of Pilate’s hesitancy to condemn Jesus was the 
product of later Christians who were suffering persecution at the hands of Jews 
and was intended as a stinging taunt:  even a Gentile could see that Jesus was 
righteous.204  Likewise and significantly, Strauss viewed the infamous statement 
of “the people” [ho laos] (as opposed to “the Jews/Judeans” [hoi Ioudaioi] of 
John 19) who cried out before Pilate concerning Jesus, “Let his blood be on us 
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and on our children!” (Matt. 27:25, NET), as “in the highest degree 
suspicious.”205 
 Strauss’ combination of negative criticism and positive analysis of the 
Gospels’ portrayal of Jesus is most forcefully seen in his treatment of the accounts 
of Jesus’ death and resurrection.  In §134 Strauss—(like Schleiermacher)— 
affirmed the death of Jesus and saw the centurion’s wounding of Jesus as 
recorded in John 19 not as a cause of his death, but as a confirmation of it. Unlike 
Schleiermacher, Strauss ultimately questioned the historicity of the spearing of 
Jesus altogether.  By the end of §134 he concluded that the story—which is only 
found in John, and thus without any other historical corroboration—was a legend 
meant to attach the Old Testament prophecies of Zechariah 12:10 (“they will look 
to me, the one they have pierced”) and Exodus 12:46 (prohibition of breaking any 
bone of the Passover lamb) to Jesus’ death.206     
 Strauss found the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ post-resurrection body and 
life the most difficult to take seriously as historical and scientific.  He particularly 
focused on Mark 16:12—“After this he appeared in a different form [en hetera 
morphē ] to two of them while they were on their way to the country” (NET), 
citing the “in a different form” of Mark 16:12 five times in §139.   For Strauss, 
Mark’s language pointed to the disciples’ ultimate conception of Jesus’ post-
resurrection body and life as a supernatural existence.  This was evidence that the 
resurrection accounts could not be considered historical.  Thus the Gospel’s 
accounts of Jesus’ post-resurrection existence met both of Strauss’ negative 
criteria for being un-historical.  In the end, the Gospels’ blended portrayal of 
Jesus’ post-resurrection humanity—his ability to eat, drink, and to be embraced, 
along with his “supernatural” qualities—his ability to appear and disappear at 
will, and to “ascend to heaven,” simply were not acceptable in the modern world 
according to Strauss:  “It is quite another question, whether on our more advanced 
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position, and with our more correct knowledge of nature, those two different 
classes of particulars can be held compatible with each other.”207  Moreover, the 
Gospel accounts of Jesus’ resurrection were not based on reliable witnesses—the 
disciples were not impartial, objective informants.208  Thus, as with Celsus, the 
great pagan critic of Christianity in the second century—whom Strauss 
subsequently cites—Strauss determined that Jesus’ resurrection was a fiction.209   
And unlike Schleiermacher, Strauss did not struggle with Luke’s report of Jesus’ 
ascension:  dead men neither rise again nor fly away.210   
 In the conclusion to his The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined Strauss 
proclaimed his victory over the orthodox, iconic portrayal of Jesus in the Gospels: 
The results of the inquiry which we have now brought to a close, have 
apparently annihilated the greatest and most valuable part of which the 
Christian has been wont to believe concerning his Saviour Jesus, have 
uprooted all the animating motives which he has gathered from his faith, 
and withered all his consolations.  The boundless store of truth and life 
which for eighteen centuries has been the aliment of humanity, seems 
irretrievably dissipated; the most sublime levelled with the dust, God 
divested of his grace, man of his dignity, and the tie between heaven and 
earth broken. . .211   
But next, Strauss sought to solve the very problem that his withering attack on the 
historical Jesus had caused:  how to re-establish Jesus as a dogmatic foundation 
for the Church.212   His solution to the irrational, dishonest, and ultimately 
impious Christologies of orthodoxy, neo-supernaturalism, and Rationalism was 
his own mythical/ideal Jesus.  Strauss’ modern icon of Jesus offered the 
possibility of a new, powerful Christianity in which humanity was Lord.  In this 
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way, Strauss unknowingly prepared a seedbed for the beginnings of a fascist-
christo-ecclesiology.           
   Strauss maintained that his early philosophical studies—particularly of 
Hegel—had liberated him intellectually and emotionally from “certain religious 
and dogmatical [sic] presuppositions”213 and had enabled him to see the true 
Jesus—the mythical Jesus.  It was this Jesus that could liberate Modern Man and 
his Culture.  All the contradictions and falsehoods of ancient and modern 
conceptions of Christ were abolished when humanity took the place of the ideal 
individual represented in the life of Jesus of Nazareth.   Echoing Hegel, Strauss 
stated:  “Humanity is the union of the two natures—God become man, the infinite 
manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude; it is 
the child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature and Spirit. . .”214  
Hence Strauss’ ideal and mythical Jesus completed the telos of Enlightenment 
thought—the deification of humanity:   
 By faith in this Christ, especially in his death and resurrection, man is 
 justified before God:  that is by kindling with him of the idea of Humanity, 
 the individual man participates in the divinely human life of the species.  
 Now the main element of that idea is, the negation of the merely natural 
 and sensual life, which is the negation of the spirit, (the negation of 
 negation, therefore,) is the sole way to true spiritual life.                      
  This alone is the absolute sense of Christology. . .”215  
Contrary to Orthodoxy and Rationalism’s weak Christologies, Strauss’ ideal and 
mythical christology—where an ideal christ = the historical human species—
provided Modern Man with real power—power that manifested itself over nature: 
 [Humanity] is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human 
 history the spirit more and more completely subjugates nature, both within 
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 and around man, until it lies before him as the inert matter on which he 
 exercises his active power.”216                      
Indeed, this seemed especially true in Strauss’ day, when man was daily gaining 
“almost incredible dominion” over nature; when ideas of “irresistible force” were 
conquering all “unintelligent matter.”217  Strauss’ conception of the dead, 
mythical Jesus may be the earliest and most potent expression of what Barth 
referred to as the Eighteenth Century’s ideal of “absolute man”.  The mythical 
Jesus of Strauss removed the impediment of the Lordship of the Christ of history 
and thus enabled humanity to realize “its own authority and power, which [it] can 
therefore set in motion in all directions and without any restraint. . .”218  Such a 
conception of humanity could easily lend itself not only to the mastery of nature 
as so much dead matter, but also over other human beings.  And indeed, it could 
be argued that Strauss’ deification of humanity at the expense of Christ and the 
Church opened very important theological and philosophical doors for the idea of 
the Totalitarian State of the twentieth century.   
 For example, the similarities between Strauss’ mythical christo-
anthropology and the fascist statist-anthropology later expressed by Mussolini are 
striking.  Strauss described the proper understanding of the importance of his 
“historical Jesus” in which    
 [Humanity] is the sinless existence, for the course of its development is a 
 blameless one, pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch 
 the race or its history.  It is Humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to 
 heaven, for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a 
 higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as personal, 
 national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the 
 heavens.219         
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In 1932, Mussolini wrote “The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism” for the 
Enciclopedia Italiana and there described the fascist conception of the state:   
 Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which 
 all individuals  or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their 
 relation to the State. . .The State, as conceived of and as created by 
 Fascism, is a spiritual and moral fact in itself, since its political, juridical, 
 and economic organization of the nation is a concrete thing:  and such  
 an organization must be in its origins and development a manifestation of 
 the spirit. . .And the State is not only a living reality of the present, it is 
 also linked with the past and  above all the with the future, and thus 
 transcending the brief limits of individual life, it represents the immanent 
 spirit of the nation.220                         
Both Strauss and Mussolini’s idealized anthropologies obliterated individual, real, 
lives—including Jesus of Nazareth’s—as “merely natural and sensual” lives.221   
It could be argued that one need only substitute “State” where Strauss uses 
“Humanity,” “Christ” or even “spiritual” to arrive at a fascist anthropology, 
though this of course was not his intent.  And yet, Mussolini’s article offers an 
intriguing possibility of a theological genealogy of fascist thought that runs from 
Strauss to Renan.   
 Arguing against Liberal Democracy, Mussolini quotes a long passage 
from one of Renan’s “philosophical meditations” to support the Fascist belief in 
political inequality among individuals.  (It is in this context that Mussolini refers 
to Renan as “one of the inspired pre-Fascists”—among other French intellectuals 
of the 19th century—Sorel, Peguy, and Lagerdelle).222  The passage from Renan 
that Mussolini uses points back to Strauss’ anthropology—an anthropology that 
sacrifices individuals to the whole.  Thus Renan, quoted by Mussolini, states:     
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 The principle that society exists solely through the well-being and the 
 personal liberty of all the individuals of which it is composed does not 
 appear to be conformable to the plans of nature, in whose workings the 
 race alone seems to be taken into consideration, and the individual 
 sacrificed to it.  It is greatly to be feared that the last stage of such a  
 conception of democracy. . .would end in a condition of society in which a 
 degenerate herd would have no other preoccupation but the satisfaction of 
 the lowest desires of common men.223 
Mussolini, Renan, and Strauss were all convinced that they were a part of an 
avant-garde intellectual elite called to save the vulgar masses from themselves.  
All three suffered from the great danger of non-loving philosophy and 
intellectualism:  the sin of pride.    
 And yet it is important to emphasize that Strauss was no monster.  Barth 
actually saw in his anti-historicism a gift to modern theology:  rightly understood 
it pointed out the fallacies of “Absolute Man’s” hubris in trying to rationalize 
God’s Revelation.224  The un-happy fact was that neither Strauss nor his readers 
could perceive this.  In the end Barth concluded that Strauss was neither an 
Antichrist nor Prometheus; he found him nothing more or less than “a Central 
European rejoicing in his learning, but not, unfortunately, quite content with 
himself and the world about him.”225  Barth speculated that had Strauss been able 
to obtain “a respectable professorship somewhere” that he would very likely have 
come to very different theological conclusions.226  Faced with the opportunity of a 
professorship in Zurich, he revised his Life of Jesus (the 3rd edition) to be more 
amenable to (at least) liberal academic orthodoxy.   When conservatives in Zurich 
protested and caused him to lose the position, he promptly rescinded his revisions 
and returned to his more radical conclusions.227  Strauss’ work might be best 
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characterized as that of an un-happy sophist.  And this might in itself be even 
more disturbing than if Strauss had been a monster.  For it points to a similar 
conclusion concerning the banal nature of evil and its effects as that found by 
Hannah Arendt.  One need only consult her Eichmann in Jerusalem.    
1.6  Renan’s Laboratory:  Orientalism and the Vie de Jésus  
In May 1845, while wrestling with his un-belief at the St. Sulpice seminary, 
Ernest Renan made his first attempt to construct a “historical Jesus”—to analyze 
Jesus Christ as “‘a psychological and historical fact’.”228  At stake was the 
validity of what Renan called the “theological hypothesis,” of whether or not 
Jesus was truly divine.  At the end of the work Renan questioned Jesus directly:   
 O Jesus, enlighten me, you who are the truth and the life.  I suffer, O 
 Jesus, from having raised your problem.  It is too heavy for me, for I am 
 nothing but a man, but you were something more.  Oh!  Tell me then that 
 which you are!  My God, am I in good faith?  Purify me, and once and for 
 all, tell me yes or no!229 
“But Jesus gave him no answer.” (John 19:8, KJV)  By August 1845 Renan’s 
decision to leave the Church was final.  In his “resignation” letter to the Abbé 
Cognat, Renan explained that God had betrayed him:  He had placed within him 
“a miserable faculty—this fatal critique” of reason, and when Renan made 
rational inquires into whether or not Jesus was divine, God refused to answer.230  
Renan in good conscience could not follow a faith which violated the judge of all 
his other “faculties”:  Reason.231  Rejected by God, by orthodoxy, by “the rule of 
faith,” Renan consecrated himself to the search for truth through science.   
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 The science that Renan first turned to was the science of words.  He had 
fallen in love with the study of Hebrew while at St. Suplice, and after leaving the 
Church dedicated himself to the academic mastery of the language.  By 1847 he 
had distinguished himself in this study by winning the Volney prize for linguistics 
for his “Historical and theoretical essay on the Semitic languages in general and 
the Hebrew language in particular.”232  It is ironic that a scholar whose future 
reputation would rest upon his studies of the historical Jesus should win a prize 
named for one of the first scholars to suggest that there was no historical Jesus—
that he was a purely mythological construction of later Christians.233   
 Or maybe it is not.  The heart of Edward Said’s damning critique of the 
connections between 19th century academics’ study of “Semitic” language and 
culture and Western imperialism is that Western “Orientalism” was a fictitious 
construction of an inferior “Other” facilitated by the abstract mathēsis made 
possible by the non-participatory epistemology of Representation.  The new 
science of philology (developed in the late 18th century) was the principle 
laboratory in which Western intellectuals invented the “irrational,” “fanatic,” 
“sensuous” “backwards” “Semite” and “Oriental.”  Said points out that Renan 
was one of the foundational doctors in this laboratory, and that the Vie de Jésus 
was one of the most popular productions.234  Thus Renan’s winning of the Volney 
prize was not ironic in any sense.  Volney had proposed the fictitious nature of 
Jesus and Christianity; Renan appeared to propose a historical Jesus and 
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Christianity that was in fact fictitious.  As Said states, “. . .we must realize that the 
Vie was. . .a construction enabled by the historian’s capacity for skillfully crafting 
a dead. . .Oriental biography. . .as if it were the truthful narrative of a natural 
life.”235   This was the same conclusion Schweitzer had came to in his appraisal of 
the Vie in The Quest of the Historical Jesus:  “It is ‘Christian’ art in the worst 
sense of the term—the art of the wax image.”236  “There is a kind of insincerity in 
the book from beginning to end;” “[Renan’s] intention was to say not what really 
happened, but what might have happened.”237  Perhaps here lies the essence of the 
iconoclasm of both Strauss’ and Renan’s lives of Jesus.  They destroyed not so 
much by stripping away old accretions of myth to reveal the naked truth, but 
rather by positing new images—new myths—based on the supposed superiority of 
rational non-love.  To conclude this chapter I shall now examine Renan’s 
methodology for the Vie as expressed in his Introduction.  As Phaedrus to Lysias, 
it will be seen that Renan had been enchanted by Strauss’ mythological 
hermeneutic, and like Phaedrus, Renan wished to make such sophistry popular.   
 In order not to burden his audience with a mass of footnotes and technical 
discussions—(the first edition of the Vie was originally intended for the cultured 
public)—Renan recommended a number of recent scholarly works that had been 
translated into French six pages into his introduction.  The majority of the works 
were produced by German scholars, and Émile Maximilien Paul Littré’s 
translation of the second edition of Strauss’ life of Jesus was chief among them.      
“The criticism of the detail of the Gospel texts in particular has been made by Mr. 
Strauss in a manner which leaves little to desire,” Renan averred.238  Renan did 
find the work too devoted to theological discussion rather than history, but it 
remained “indispensible” for understanding Renan’s motives in his own 
interpretation of the Gospels and the technical problems they presented for the 
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historian.239  It is a telling remark, a brief moment of perhaps un-guarded honesty 
for Renan, for, as seen above, Strauss’ avowed purpose in his life of Jesus was to 
create a new theological foundation for Christianity in the Modern age.  Though 
never explicitly stated in Renan’s Vie, this is in fact also his underlying motive.240  
It would simply take France’s defeat at the hands of the Prussians in 1871 and a 
rather lengthy burst of honesty by Renan in La réform intellectual et morale to see 
this, as I shall discuss in Chapter Two.   
 Like Schleiermacher and Strauss before him, Renan felt it necessary to 
address the issue of the “miraculous” in attempting to write a scientific history of 
Jesus.  Schleiermacher had pointed out that the limits of human understanding of 
nature left room for speculation concerning the “supernatural”;241 Strauss simply 
cast biblical stories of miracles as mythic fictions, but Renan rather wished to 
idealize them.  He also wished to conceal his own skepticism and disbelief.242  On 
the one hand, supernatural accounts [“récits surnaturels] had to be approached 
with the upmost care.  It was necessary for the historian to interpret these 
accounts—or even to “reduce them to legends” in order to get to the facts which 
they concealed.  This was not to mutilate the facts of such supernatural accounts 
in the name of an a priori theory, but rather to begin the very observation of the 
facts themselves.243  All of this was a recognition that ancient texts were filled 
with miraculous accounts because they were written before  people were 
scientifically conscious enough to distinguish between the characteristics of 
miracles and of a fact.  But Renan also pointed out that this was true even in 
modern times:  “In our days, have we not seen almost all peoples of the world 
                                                          
239Renan, Vie, viii.  
240Here I disagree with Schweitzer’s assertion that Renan differed from Strauss in wishing “to set 
up a new system of dogma on the basis of history.”  (See Schweitzer, Quest,158).    
241See Schleiermacher, Life, Lectures 4 and 5, pgs. 28-30.    
242Cf. Schweitzer, Quest:  “Renan professes to depict the Christ of the Fourth Gospel, though he 
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duped from vulgar influences or from childish illusions?”244  Renan cited the 
Gazette des Tribunaux, 10 Sept. and 11 Nov. 1851, and 28 May 1857, for 
contemporary accounts of miracles which through research were shown to be 
false; so too, critical examination of ancient accounts of miracles would probably 
also reveal their own illusionary character.  It was not therefore an a priori 
philosophical decision against miracles, but rather “a constant experience” which 
was the cause for banishing miracles from history.  Thus Renan’s famous, and 
given his own personal beliefs, sophistic statement: “We do not say:  ‘The miracle 
is impossible;’ we say:  ‘There has not been so far a verified miracle.’”245  He 
wished to appear to leave room for the possibility of miracles—and specifically 
resurrection—but only under the imperium of science:   
   That tomorrow a miracle worker presents himself with guarantees serious  
  enough to be discussed; that he announces himself able, I conjecture, to 
 resurrect a dead person;  would that make him one?  A commission 
 composed of physiologists, of doctors, of chemists, of experts in 
 critical/scientific history [la critique historique] would be named.  This  
 commission would choose the cadaver, ascertain that it is actually dead,   
 designate the hall where it ought to be examined, regulate all the necessary 
 precautions in order not to leave no room for doubt.  If, within such 
 conditions, the resurrection would work, a probability almost equal to 
 certainty would be given.246    
But Renan qualifies this:  to meet the requirements of the scientific method, the 
miracle worker would have to verifiably repeat the resurrection of multiple 
corpses, under other conditions, and in different settings.  Only then could it be 
historically/scientifically accepted that the miracle worker possessed supernatural 
powers.247 
 On the other hand, Renan wished not to be bound by a minimalist 
historical hermeneutic which would only allow the modern historian to repeat the 
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stark consensus concerning Jesus’ death voiced by Josephus and Tacitus, that 
Jesus had been “‘put to death by the order of Pilate at the instigation of the 
priests.’”248  Renan freely admitted that the “admirable” account of the Passion 
found in the Gospels contained a mass of non-historical details; but it was 
precisely these “preachings” [prédications] which disclosed the “characteristic 
features [physionomie] of his discourses.”   To omit such passages in the search 
for the truth would be “a kind of inexactitude worse than those to which one 
exposes himself in admitting the details which the text furnishes to us.”249  
Rather, what Renan took as the poetic “inexactitude” of the Gospels pointed to a 
more profound truth:  “These details are not true to the letter; but they are true to a 
superior truth; they are more true than the naked truth, in the sense that they are 
the truth rendered expressively and lifelike, elevated to the height of an idea.”250   
This would almost pass for orthodoxy—(one is reminded of Origen’s view of 
contradictions in the Gospels as pointing to more profound spiritual truths)—but 
for two hindrances.  The first is that Renan saw in the Gospels a pre-cursor to the 
ideas of the Enlightenment, and particularly its dreams of human intellectual 
autonomy, especially vis-à-vis the State, (as will be seen in the next chapter).  
Second, it was by such means that Renan obscured his intention “to say not what 
really happened, but what might have happened.”251   
 “To say what might have happened;” to predict; to project through 
abstraction alternative realities—like the new maps of world of the 17th century—
according to Foucault and Said, such was the power of the modern episteme of 
Representation.  In essence, Representation enabled the displacement of the actual 
by the abstract.  Renan’s Vie was a part of this project, and in his introduction 
Renan provided a glimpse into how the practical application of the displacement 
of the Gospels’ iconic portraits of Christ and the Church in favor of modern 
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conceptions of social and political order could be effected.  This can be seen in 
the “fifth gospel” which displaced the Gospels of orthodoxy for Renan:  the “Holy 
Land.” 
 One of the unique qualities of Renan’s life of Jesus was that he had 
actually seen for himself the places where the historical Jesus had lived and 
walked.  This had been facilitated by his participation in the French “scientific 
mission” as a member of the Académie des Inscriptions  in 1860 and 1861-62 to 
the “former Phoenicia”—(formerly Ottoman Phoenicia; the French had recently 
established their own hegemony there at the time of Renan’s writing).252  While in 
Phoenicia Renan was able to frequent the “frontiers of Galilee” and to visit 
Jerusalem, Hebron, and Samaria.  He claimed in fact that not one of the important 
places in the history of Jesus’ life had escaped him.253  Thus Renan was able to go 
beyond even Strauss in his critical history of Jesus:  his life of Jesus was a literal 
archeaology, a joining of textual analysis with the “enlightenment” of seeing the 
physical environment of the Nazarene.  The results were intoxicating for Renan: 
 All this history which, at a distance seemed to float in the mists of a world 
 without reality, took thus a body [un corps], a solidity which astonished 
 me.  The striking accord of the texts and the places, the marvelous 
 harmony of the evangelical ideal with the landscape which served to 
 frame it were to me like a revelation.254   
Here history (as practiced by Renan) embodied in the land and now verified topo-
logically replaced the Body of Christ in all three of its pre-Modern orthodox 
understandings—“corpus verum,” “corpus mysticum,” and “corpus 
ecclesiasticum”; (cf. above, pgs. 29-30).   However, just like the extant Gospel 
manuscripts, this gospel of the land had been “torn” [lacéré] by the ravages of 
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Semitic culture—particularly through the decadence of both Islam and Judaism.255  
Nevertheless, it was here that Renan claimed to have found the “historical Jesus”: 
 I had before my eyes a fifth gospel, torn, but still readable, and                          
 henceforth, through the accounts of Matthew and Mark, in place of an  
 abstract being that one could say has never existed, I saw an admirable 
 human figure, living and moving.256  
 But one wonders:  if Said’s analysis of “Orientalism” in general and 
Renan in particular is true, then could this be another displacement of Jesus by 
(and perhaps in) Renan?  Instead of an affirmation of a “historical Jesus,” might it 
rather be a subtle and sophistic expression of another kind of historical-
topographical taxonomy in which Renan could construct his Jesus?257  Might it be 
the iconographer showing his viewers the new wood on which he would paint the 
new image?  It is hard to tell with Renan, for his relationship to the land of the 
Gospels was sophisticated.  And perhaps here Schweitzer provides good insight:  
to the end, the New Testament was “something foreign” for Renan.258  The 
implications of this insight concerning the Modern icon of Jesus posited in the Vie 
will be considered in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 2:                                                                                                                             
Origins of the Modern Jesus, Origins of the Fascist Jesus 
 
Renan’s negative critiques of orthodox Judeo-Christian theology and history have 
been correctly recognized as contributing to the culture of late 19th century ethnic 
nationalism and anti-Semitism in the West.259  That his positive assessments of 
Judaism and Christianity as the origins of Western modernity also played a part in 
the rise of fascist ideology, however, has not often been recognized.260  In this 
chapter I shall try to demonstrate that it was Renan’s presentation of Jesus as a 
Enlightenment idealist with a heroic will that made Jesus attractive (to the extent 
that he could be) to Fascists such as Mussolini.  For Renan’s Jesus proclaimed a 
“kingdom of God” that simultaneously emphasized the individual’s internal 
freedom and necessity to follow the Führer—whether Caesar, or a great idealist 
like Jesus—providentially provided within the secular State.  In other words, 
Renan’s modern and positive conception of Jesus’ “kingdom of God” anticipated 
the later Fascist political theology of the autonomous Great Leader working his 
will within the autonomous State.  Thus in tracing the origins of Renan’s Modern 
Jesus, I shall also trace the origins of the Fascist Jesus.   
2.1.  The Modern Jesus:  Renan’s Vie 
The 19th century was an age obsessed with origins.  In particular, it was obsessed 
with the wondrous origins of the “modernity”261 so powerfully manifested in its 
                                                          
259See for instance, See Edward Said, Orientalism (New York:  Vintage Books, 1979) and Halvor 
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own age and image.262  And yet among some intellectuals there was a disturbing 
sense of the fragility of this Modernity, especially when viewed in the light of its 
ancient roots.  After seeing the ruins of Paestum in Italy in 1860, Renan wrote to 
his friend Marcelin Berthelot, the famous chemist and author, that    
 I trembled for civilization on seeing it so circumscribed, resting on so 
 fragile a foundation and on so few individuals even in the country where it 
 is in the ascendant.  For how many men are there in Europe who really 
 are of the nineteenth century?  And what are we, leaders of the avant-
 garde, in the face of this inertia, this herd of brutes which follows us? 
 Ah!  Supposing one day they threw themselves on us and refused to 
 follow us!263       
Ancient ruins pointed to nagging questions about the origins of modern Western 
civilization:  could Modernity be traced back to the venerable and solid 
foundations of Antiquity, or was it the result of a definite break with the past, and 
as such, rootless and ultimately ephemeral—subject at any moment to a reversion 
to barbarism by the brutish masses?  In other words, if, with such pillars as 
Socrates, Aristotle, and Jesus, ancient Western culture had crumbled before a tidal 
wave of ignorance, how long could Modern Enlightened Man hope to survive?  
The avant-garde was few; the vulgar were legion; indeed the propagation of the 
latter was seen by Renan and others (like Nietzsche) as perhaps the most 
significant achievement of modern bourgeoisie culture.      
 For Renan this was a particularly daunting problem.  On the one hand, he 
was convinced that Jesus could be considered a man belonging to the 19th century.  
On the other hand, his faith in science had convinced him of the deficiency of the 
foundational stories of origins found in ancient texts such as the Bible.  The 
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Hebrew account(s) of the creation of the universe, of humankind, of the 
development of society and civilization (Genesis 1-11) were no longer considered 
a suitably rational and moral basis for modern life.264  The same deficiency 
applied to the New Testament’s proclamation of a new humanity centered around 
Jesus of Nazareth, and which was lived out in a new community—the Church.   
And so the 19th century’s quest of origins was at the same time a quest to posit 
new foundations for explaining, understanding, and re-structuring the world.265  
In the natural sciences Darwin’s Origins of Species (1859) and Descent of Man 
(1871) exposed the masses to the most recent scientific research on the genesis of 
animal and human life, and, whether intentionally or not, also exposed them to the 
most powerful deconstruction of the biblical narrative of the creation and ordering 
of the world.   In the same way, Renan’s Vie de Jésus—the opening volume of his 
Histoire des origines du christianisme—exposed Europe’s reading masses to 
avant-garde German criticism of the New Testament and to the historical 
Jesus.266  And Renan was quite intentional:  the Vie was to be the beginning of the 
scientific liberation of Jesus, the church, and modern humanity from the historical 
bondage of 1800 years of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, which was itself an expression 
of the perpetual credulity of the masses that was being amplified in the 19th 
century by mass, materialistic culture.267  Renan was convinced that the historical 
Jesus discovered by German scientific research (a la Strauss) was the basis for the 
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267See Ernest Renan, La Réform intellectual et morale (Paris:  Michel Lévy Frères, 1871), Part I, 
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74 
 
Enlightenment.268  Thus through his own research Renan could show the link 
between Modernity and Jesus, and in so doing, demonstrate the timeless 
foundations of Modernity itself.   
            This Modern re-construction of Jesus, I argue, marks the beginning of the 
construction of the Fascist Jesus.  Specifically I shall attempt to demonstrate that 
all of the elements of Renan’s thought that attracted Mussolini to his writings in 
his formation of Fascist ideology can be found in the Vie de Jésus.  For beyond 
Renan’s gilded sentimental framing, the portrait he paints of Jesus is actually one 
of an idealistic, heroic futurist—a man of direct action, who, by the force of his 
personality and will established a solely interiorized and individual Kingdom of 
God that simultaneously laid the foundations for the autonomous Liberal State.  
That is, a State free from the mystical influence of the Body of Christ, but which 
through the pouvoir-savior of science institutionalized in State academies could 
work its will on the church—(an exact inversion of Schleiermacher’s scientific 
and orthodox Christo-Ecclesiology).269  
2.2.  “Behold the Man”: Constructing the Liberal Modern Jesus  
On 21 February 1862 Renan initiated his professorship at the Collège de France 
with a lecture on “The Role of the Semitic Peoples in the History of Civilization.”  
Opening the lecture he famously remarked that Jesus was “‘an incomparable 
man’” and despite the fact that Renan as a scientist could only treat him as a 
historical figure, he nevertheless could not find fault with those who called this 
remarkable Jew “God.”270  (For this remark Napoleon III suspended Renan from 
lecturing at the Collège from 1862 until 1871).271  Standing firm in his conviction, 
the following year Renan was more explicit with the publication of the Vie:  
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“Jesus did not for a moment announce the sacrilegious idea that he was God.”272  
This was a sophistic statement—Renan certainly knew the several egō eimi—“I 
AM” statements by Jesus in the Gospels, whereby Jesus explicitly equated 
himself with YHWH by use of the Name of the God of the Jews (e.g. Exodus 
3:14-15; John 6:20; 8:24, 28, 58).  At the same time it was born out of the 
conviction that  Jesus’ New Testament biographers had not embellished his 
character, but rather had diminished it by attributing their own mistaken ideas of 
divinity to him—and this due to the “mediocrity” of their understanding.273   Thus 
one of the first steps in liberating Jesus for the Modern age had to be his de-
divinization.  If, as Renan believed, Jesus was in fact one of the primary founders 
of the Modernity of the West, he must be made comprehensible to the modern 
sensibilities of the 19th century.   This meant that Jesus had to be free from the 
Gospels’ mystical theology of a participatory God, a God so desirous of 
participating in his creation that he would become a part of it, even to the point of 
being consumable (“Take, eat, this is my body. . .” Matt. 26:26) —but not 
commodified or manipulated:  “‘I am the food of the mature; grow then and you 
will eat me.  You will not change me into yourself like bodily food:  you will be 
changed into me’” (St. Augustine, Confessions VII.10.16).274   For rational non-
lovers of Jesus like Renan, such theology was madness and un-befitting the 
extraordinary man who had so nobly planted the seeds of human freedom—
human morality—in the world.    
 Thus the Gospels’ assertions of Jesus’ divinity and entanglement with the 
miraculous was not just rationally embarrassing, but also morally problematic.  
For Renan, to violate one’s reason by believing in the supernatural was immoral 
(as he had explained to the Abbé Cognat in August 1845); it was a refusal to deal 
with the world as elucidated by Modern science.  This was the central problem 
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that Jesus uniquely posed to the Modern age, particularly to those like Renan 
who, through “. . .absolute sincerity and . . .disinterested love of the pure idea”, 
had dedicated their life to science in order to found “. . .a new ideal of 
morality.”275  In the conclusion to the Vie Renan contrasted Jesus with two of his 
other moral heroes:  Marcus Aurelius and Baruch Spinoza.  He noted that, of the 
three, the ancient Roman and the modern Jew were much more accessible to 
modern moral sensibilities than Jesus:     
 I know that our modern ideas are bruised more than once by this legend 
 [i.e. the legend of Jesus], conceived by another race, under another sky, in 
 the midst of other social needs.  There are virtues which, in some regards, 
 are more conformed to our taste.  The honest and suave Marcus-Aurelius, 
 the humble and gentle Spinoza, not having believed in miracles, have been 
 exempted from some errors that Jesus participated in.  The second, in his 
 profound obscurity, had an advantage that Jesus did not seek.276   
Renan continued by stating that, in spite of  the issue of Jesus’ questionable 
“personal merit” of believing in and perpetuating the masses’ belief in miracles, 
he had still bequeathed to the world—even to Modernity—an “inexhaustible 
principle of moral renaissances” for which he had been rightly sanctified from the 
likes of Marcus Aurelius, Socrates, and Spinoza.277    
 Here Renan’s noted “lack of conscience” betrays itself in a powerful 
way.278  Throughout the Vie Renan argues that Jesus, like all of his fellow Jews in 
Palestine, was ignorant of Greek anticipations of post-Newtonian science which 
excluded divine intervention in “the government of the universe.”279  Therefore 
Jesus could be pardoned for his belief and performance of “miracles”, which were 
often simply the power of Jesus’ persuasion and force of personality on people 
with weaker bodies and minds (—i.e. the healing miracles of the sick); he and 
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“especially” his disciples acted with a “perfect good faith.”280  At the same time, 
Renan pointed out that many of the miracle stories of the Gospels suggested that 
Jesus only became a miracle worker later in his ministry and this against his will 
(“contre-coeur”).281  Why?  “Philosophy is not sufficient for the masses.  Sanctity 
is necessary for them.”282  In order for Jesus to establish his vision of the 
Kingdom of God on earth, he had to play to the sentiments of the masses.  
Subtlety, and perhaps unconsciously, Renan suggested that Jesus manipulated 
(howbeit with the best of intentions) the crowds around him to achieve his ends.  
In Renan’s estimation, Jesus’ moral vision justified his “miracles” and those of 
the Gospel writers who recorded them:   
 We admit therefore without hesitation that some acts which would be 
 immediately considered as acts of illusion or of folly have held a great 
 place in the life of Jesus.  Is it necessary to ungratefully sacrifice to this 
 side of his life the more sublime portion?  May we guard ourselves from 
 it!283   
This passage strikingly anticipated Mussolini’s later sophistic perversion of Mark 
11:23 in his critique and appreciation of the political utility of the “miraculous” 
and faith.  Speaking early in his political career as a Socialist, Mussolini asked,  
 . . .is socialism perhaps reducible to a theorem?  We want to believe in it,  
 we must believe in it, mankind has need of a creed.  It is faith that moves 
 mountains, because it gives the illusion that mountains move.  Illusion is  
 perhaps the sole reality of life.284 
On the other hand, Renan suggested that Jesus had been manipulated by the spirit 
of the times in which he lived.  “The miracles of Jesus were a violence done to 
him by his age, a concession extracted from him by passing necessity.  Thus the 
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exorcist and the miracle worker have died; but the religious reformer will live 
eternally.”285  Later in the Vie, while discussing Jesus’ overcoming of his agony 
in the Garden of Gethsemane to face the cross, Renan posited that Jesus totally 
rejected his former roles as a sophist debater, healer, and exorcist:        
            Henceforth, in effect, Jesus found himself again completely and 
 unclouded.  The subtleties of the polemist, the credulity of the             
 miracle worker and the exorcist are forgotten.  There only remains the  
 incomparable hero of the Passion, the founder of the rights of the free  
 conscience. . .286   
It is not clear from the text whether it was Jesus who forgot his former activity as 
a polemical magician at the prospect of becoming an “incomparable hero,” or if it 
was Renan who charitably forgot this after considering Jesus’ liberation of the 
Modern conscience.   
 Remarkably, Renan seems to have viewed Jesus as almost Machiavellian.  
He is the miracle worker who, forced by the necessity of the times, appears to 
have used miracles to form, in actuality, a new religious consciousness that finds 
miracles rationally and morally repugnant.  One is here reminded of Machiavelli’s 
famous advice to Lorenzo de Medici on the advantages of the prince who can play 
the role of appearing virtuous:   
 I will even venture to say that [the virtues] damage a prince who possesses 
 them and always observes them, but if he seems to have them they are 
 useful.  I mean that he should seem compassionate, trustworthy, humane, 
 honest, and religious, and actually be so; but yet he should have his mind 
 so trained that, when it is necessary not to practice these virtues, he can 
 change to the opposite and do it skillfully.287       
Had Mussolini wished to do so, he could have found in Renan’s portrayal of Jesus 
a model for manipulating a highly religious population which still believed in the 
miraculous—a population, for instance, like that of Catholic Italy in the early 20th 
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century.288  And, quite apart from his own intentions, in de-divinizing and de-
mystifying Jesus and his miracles, Renan confirmed the orthodox formula, “aut 
Deus aut malus homo.” 
2.3.   Jesus and the “Führer Principle” 
The Vie offered other potential lessons as well, because Renan saw Jesus’ age and 
that of his own as similar in their revolutionary aspects.  The first century C.E., 
just like Europe in the post-Enlightenment age, was ripe for the rise of dynamic 
leaders, an idea which some German thinkers would develop in the later 19th and 
early 20th centuries as the “Führer principle.”289  In Renan’s reconstruction, Jesus 
lived during a heroic age where all great leaders and movements led to death; a 
time of “hidden forces” which “humanity keeps in reserve” for epochal change.  
Only the French Revolution and the social and political changes it brought 
compared to the fevered and perilous days of Jesus’ life.290      
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Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism,” former trans. Richard Washburn Child; latter trans.  
Jane Soames; (former New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1928; latter London, W.C.:  Leonard 
and Virginia Woolf, Hogarth Press, 1933; reprint, New York: Dover, 2006), 239; and Laura 
Fermi, Mussolini (Chicago and London:  The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 259.  However, 
unlike Renan’s near Machiavellian Jesus, Mussolini made no real effort to appear as a devout 
Catholic.  He never attended Mass nor observed the holy days of the liturgical calendar.  As one 
Italian Catholic writer noted in the post war years concerning Mussolini’s use of religion, “The 
image of the devout son, of the penitent, of the son in prayer, was not an image of himself that he 
could accept:  his intuition told him also that it was not an image of himself that he could show his 
faithful:  the most sincere and trustworthy [were] barbarian warriors.”  (Quoted in Fermi, 261).   
289One good example of this development in Germany is Ernst Kantorowicz’ 1928 biography of 
Frederick II as the mysterious “wonder of the world” of Medieval Germany, who pointed to the 
modern Führer needed to save Weimar Germany.   See Norman F. Cantor, Inventing the Middle 
Ages (New York:  William Morrow and Company, 1991), chapter 3, “The Nazi Twins:  Percy 
Ernst Schramm and Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz,” pgs. 79-117.  I wish to thank my colleague Dr. 
Scott Jesse for alerting me to this source. 
290Renan, Vie, 44-45.    
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 According to Renan, government was not a matter of speculative 
philosophy, metaphysics, or systematic theology, and neither was religion.  Here 
the Semitic religions excelled all others, for they were “as little philosophical as 
possible.”291  Moses and Muhammad, Renan pointed out, were “hommes 
d’action” who had “dominé l’humanité” by proposing action to their followers.292 
Jesus was also a man of action who did not engage in systematic theology or 
philosophy, but rather required of his disciple only one action:  “to attach himself 
to him, to love him.”293   Renan emphasized that what made Jesus such a 
powerful leader was his will:  “Jesus had neither dogmas nor system, but rather a 
fixed personal resolution, which, having surpassed in intensity every other created 
will, still directs to this hour the destinies of humanity.”294  Jesus was also in 
essence an idealist who provided the perfect moral exemplar for Modern 
humanity:  “His perfect idealism is the highest rule of the free (détachée) and 
virtuous life.”295   
 Voluntarism and Idealism—the former declared heretical by the Church, 
and the latter non-existent in the canonical New Testament—were the two 
foundations upon which Jesus established his Kingdom of God on earth according 
to Renan.   Understood in a post-Revolution, post-Romantic framework, Jesus 
became “the transcendent revolutionary” who tried to transform the world from 
its core and “found on earth the ideal which he had conceived.”296   Essentially, 
Jesus’ ideal of the Kingdom of God was a kind of Jewish utopia.  Renan noted in 
particular the apocalyptic and eschatological antecedents of Jesus’ thought in the 
Book of Daniel, but Jesus was unique in adding to the old Jewish dreams “a moral 
                                                          
291Renan, Vie, 45.    
292Renan, Vie, 45-46.    
293Renan, Vie, 46.    
294Renan, Vie, 46.    
295Renan, Vie, 445.  
296Renan, Vie, 116, with my emphasis.    
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sense” and “social inclination” that the author of Daniel “had scarcely dared to 
imagine.”297   Jesus, as the “intimate” “son of God” and “executioner of his will,” 
believed himself to be the instigator of this universal revolution in which God’s 
“saints” would finally be revealed as the true rulers of the world and the wicked 
judged.298  Specifically, Renan emphasized that this eschatological transformation 
of heaven and earth would be accomplished through Jesus’ “heroic will” in which 
he believed himself to be “all powerful.”299  Or again, summing up the “essential 
character of Jesus’ work,” Renan wrote, “Devoted without reserve to his idea, he 
subordinated everything to such a degree that, towards the end of his life, the 
universe no longer existed for him.  It is by this access to a heroic will that he has 
conquered heaven.”300  It could be argued that Renan wrote of Jesus’ 
establishment of the Kingdom of God in the same way that Mussolini would write 
of the Fascist State: “The Fascist State is an embodied will to power and 
government:  the Roman tradition is here an ideal of force in action.  According to 
Fascism, government is not so much a thing to be expressed in territorial or 
military terms as in terms of morality and the spirit.”301  The Jesus of the Vie was 
non-doctrinaire in his doctrine of action, just as Mussolini described himself and 
the origins of Fascist doctrine:   
 Fascism was not the nursling of a doctrine worked out beforehand with 
 detailed elaboration; it was born of the need for action and it was itself 
 from the beginning practical rather than theoretical; it was not merely 
 another political party but, even in the first two years, in opposition to all 
 political parties as such, and itself a living movement.302  
                                                          
297Renan, Vie, 116  
298Renan, Vie, 116-118.    
299Renan, Vie, 118-119, emphasis mine.    
300Renan, Vie, 458, with my emphasis.    
301Mussolini, “The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism,” 239, with my emphasis.    
302Mussolini, “Political and Social Doctrine,” 228, emphasis mine.  
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In sum, Renan managed to construct perhaps the supreme oxymoron:  a 
Nietzschean Jesus.303   That is, in Renan’s portrayal, Jesus through the force of his 
own personality and will made himself into a god—just as Mussolini and Hitler 
would try to do in the 20th century.   
 The Kingdom would also come through Jesus’ intimate connection with 
the people.  Read in the light (or rather the darkness) of the future development of 
the fascist regimes of the 20th century, Renan’s judgment of Jesus’ relationship to 
“the people” is striking, especially when compared to Hitler’s view of his 
relationship to the German “Volk.”  Speaking of Jesus’ love for those rejected by 
orthodox Judaism, Renan writes:     
 The love of the people, pity for their impotence (impuissance), the feeling 
 of the democratic chief who feels the spirit of the masses living in him, and 
 who recognize him as their natural interpreter, burst forth at every instant 
 of his actions and teachings.304     
                                                          
303Wardman argues that Renan himself was quite Nietzschean in his quest for academic and social 
power and so identified himself with the “historical Jesus” that he could not help projecting his 
own “will to power” onto the Nazarene.  (See Wardman, Ernest Renan, 2, 26, 48, 56, 73, 76, 80, 
86, 88).                                                                                                                                      
 To be fair, Nietzsche would disagree with my assessment.  In his 1888 Twilight of the 
Idols he castigated Renan and his theology:                                                                                                     
 Renan. — Theology: or the corruption of reason by ‘original sin’ (Christianity).  Witness  
 Renan, who misses the mark with embarrassing regularity whenever he risks  
 generalizing his yeses and nos.  For instance, he would like to unite la science with 
 la noblesse:  but la science belongs with democracy, this is completely obvious.    
 His desire to present an aristocratism of the spirit is no minor ambition: but at the 
 same time, when faced with its counter-principle,  the évangile des humbles, he  
 falls down on his knees and does not stop there. . . What good is all this free- 
 thinking, modernity, cynicism, and turncoat flexibility if at some gut level you are 
 still a Christian, a Catholic and even a priest!  Renan’s inventiveness lies in seduction,  
 just like a Jesuit and father confessor; his spirituality beams with a big, fat clerical 
 smile,— like all priests, he only gets dangerous when he loves.  Nobody can equal 
 his life-threatening type of adoration. . . This spirit of Renan's, a spirit that enervates, 
 is one more disaster for poor, sick, sick-willed France.—                                           
(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, eds. 
Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2005), from Twilight of the Idols, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” Aphorism 2, pg. 192; I wish 
to thank Dr. Michael Behrent for pointing out this passage to me).                
 Along with Wardman, however, I argue that Nietzsche misread Renan.  What is more 
remarkable is that Susannah Heschel apparently shares Nietzsche’s mistaken notion that Renan 
was actually a Christian Catholic.  I shall address Heschel’s misreading below.   
304Renan, Vie, 185, with my emphasis.      
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Speaking in 1941, Hitler proclaimed his faith in the justice of Providence and his 
devotion to the German Volk thus:   
 Here I believe in a higher and eternal justice.  It is imparted to him who  
 proves himself worthy of it.  And it was in this belief that I stood up  
 before you for the first time twenty years ago.  Back then I believed:  it  
 simply cannot be that my Volk is forsaken.  It will be forsaken only if  
 there are no men to be found to rescue this Volk.  If, however, someone  
 pledges himself with a trusting heart to this Volk and works for it, who  
 places himself wholly at the disposal of this Volk, then it cannot be that  
 Providence will allow this Volk to perish.  Providence has wrought more  
 than miracles for us in the time since.305 
Here Hitler proclaimed himself worthy of the Volk—(and one can note, as with 
Renan’s portrayal of Jesus, a denial of miracles); earlier in his career in 1923 he 
challenged the German people as to whether or not they were worthy of a Führer: 
 What can save Germany is the dictatorship of the national will and of the  
 national resolution.  And if it be asked, ‘Is there a fitting personality to act  
 as a leader?’—it is not our task to look for such a person.  He is either  
 given by Heaven or he is not given.  Our task is to fashion the sword for  
 his use when he appears.  Our task is to give to the dictator when he comes 
 a people that is ripe for him.  German people, awake!  It draws near to  
 day!306 
For a time in National Socialist Germany, both parties found each other worthy.   
Remarkably, a similar dialectical relationship between Jesus and his followers can 
be seen in Renan’s treatment of Jesus’ death.  In the following passage significant 
elements of fascist political theology can be seen:  heroic death and struggle, 
“ardent battle,” and a popular, conferred divinity.   Contra orthodoxy, the main 
sign of Jesus’ divinity was not his resurrection (Renan flatly dismissed this307), 
but rather his death.  After recounting Jesus’ last words, Renan writes:   
 Rest now in your glory, noble initiator.  Your work is completed; your 
 divinity is founded.  No longer fear to see crumble by a failure (faute; i.e.  
                                                          
305Quoted in Rainer Bucher, Hitler’s Theology:  A Study in Political Religion, trans. Rebecca Pohl, 
ed. Michael Hoelzl (London and New York:  Continuum, 2011), 62, emphasis mine.    
306Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 65 n. 2, with my emphasis.    
307Renan, Vie, 433.    
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  the crucifixion [?]) the edifice of your efforts. . .At the price of some 
 hours of suffering, which have not even struck your  great soul, you have 
 purchased the most complete immortality.  For some thousands of years, 
 the world will be dependent on you!  Flag of our contradictions, you will 
 be the sign around which it will give itself over to the most ardent battle.  
 A thousand times more living, a thousand times more loved since your 
 death than during the days of your passage here below, you will become 
 so much the corner-stone of humanity that to root out your name from this 
 world would be to shake it to its very foundations.  Between you and God, 
 one will no longer distinguish.  Complete conqueror of death, take  
 the royal highway that you have traced, by centuries of adorers.308   
 Here Renan’s denial of Jesus’ resurrection proves problematic both 
historiographically and in its implications for 19th and 20th century political 
theology.  As N. T. Wright has convincingly argued in The Resurrection of the 
Son of God, no first-century Jew would have had such faith in a dead messiah, as 
attested by Simon bar Cochba’s failed messianic revolt against Hadrian of 132-
135 C.E.  Rabbi Akiba had proclaimed Simon “bar Cochba”—“son of a star”—a 
messianic allusion to Numbers 24:17; after the revolt was brutally crushed by the 
Romans, later rabbis referred to Simon as “bar Koziba”—“son of a lie.”309  
Renan’s assertion, then, that Jesus’ Jewish followers worshiped him after and 
because of his heroic death simply has no historical basis.  Theologically, Renan’s 
notion that Jesus’ followers made him divine is analogous to the modern 
heterodoxy identified by Henri de Lubac wherein the “Church makes the 
Eucharist,” rather than vice-versa.310   And it is this combination of bad history 
and heterodoxy that makes Renan’s Jesus so susceptible to being read as a 
Führer. Renan asserts that the Church made the Christ; but the relationship is 
dialectical—the force of Jesus’ personality is what drew the Church to him, and 
                                                          
308Renan, Vie, 426, emphasis mine.  I wish to thank my colleague Dr. Michael Behrent for aid in 
translating the beguiling “va relever de toi” intransitively.  All imperfections are mine.   
309N. T. Wright, Christian Origins and the Question of God, vol. 3, The Resurrection of the Son of 
God, (Minneapolis:  Fortress Press, 2003), 138; 205; 233; 244-45; 273; 582-83; 727; see also 
Henry Chadwick, The Church in Ancient Society:  From Galilee to Gregory the Great (Oxford 
and New York:  Oxford University Press, 2001), 21.   
310See Henri Cardinal de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum:  The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle 
Ages, trans. Gemma Simmonds (Notre Dame, Indiana:  University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 88 
and passim.   
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what compelled the Church, in the wake of his death, to make him the Christ. The 
same may be said of National Socialism and Hitler; a social body made Hitler 
Führer, but it was the force of Hitler’s personality which drew this social body to 
him.  Here the thread common to both Renan’s “Liberal Christ” and the later 
fascist “Führer principle” can be seen in both Jesus’ and Hitler’s election by their 
respective followers.  Hitler, after all, could at times be quite liberal.  
“Dictatorship,” he once said, was “the highest form of democracy.”311 
In Hitler’s case this is consistent with the inner-logic of liberalism—at 
least until the people lose their agency—i.e., up to the point that the 
democratically elected Führer who embodies the will of the people becomes the 
un-removable dictator.312  With Jesus, such a liberal conception is utterly 
incompatible with orthodoxy: “You did not choose me, but I chose you,” says 
Jesus to his disciples in John 15:16 (NET); and as YHWH again and again says to 
Abraham and Israel (see Gen. 12:1; Deut. 7:7; Is. 65:12; 66:4; Psalm 78:67; 
118:22; I Sam. 8:7).  And un-like Hitler’s relationship to his social body, Christ’s 
lordship is no post-Enlightenment dictatorship—“My commandment is this—to 
love one another just as I have loved you” (John 15:12 NET; cf. also Mark 10:41-
45).  Under Christ’s dominion there is freedom (Gal. 5:1) within a real social 
body that does not work by coercive (if often latent) force, but rather by self-
giving love. Unlike in fascism, the individual does not die to the group, but rather 
only to a narcissistic selfishness; there is unity with diversity—there is one Spirit, 
but many gifts, one Body but many different members (I Cor. 12), and election 
without warfare (cf. Acts 1:12-26 and the disciples’ replacement of Judas).  In the 
Vie Renan appears to love the new social body and praxis proclaimed by Jesus 
and the Church.  Yet in reality he simultaneously rejects them as being irrational; 
his Lysian “rational non-love” continually trumps his admiration for the kingdom 
of God as found in the New Testament.  Ultimately Renan’s representation of the 
Church founded by Jesus is Liberal:  Jesus’ movement was a “delicate 
                                                          
311Quoted in Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 88.  
312Cf. Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 85-88.    
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communism,” but like the ill-fated revolutions of 1848, was doomed to fail:         
“. . .it is clear that they could not rally the whole of society.  Jesus soon 
understood that in effect, the official world of his time would accept nothing of 
his kingdom.”313  Jesus’ project was beautiful, but not rational.314  Therefore one 
could not really participate in it.  Thus Renan counselled his readers:   
Happy is he who has been able to see with his eyes this divine blossoming, 
and to participate, if only for one day, this illusion without parallel!  But 
more happy still, Jesus would say to us, those who, free from all illusion, 
reproduce in themselves the celestial apparition, and, without millennial 
dreams, without a chimerical paradise, without signs in the heavens, by the 
righteousness of his will (par la droiture de sa volonté), and the poetry of 
his soul, will newly create in his heart the true kingdom of God!315  
In other words, the modern rational (non-) lover of Jesus must scour away all the 
mystical signs and practices of orthodoxy to create within and by themselves—in 
imitation of Jesus’ own voluntarism—an internalized and, subjective “kingdom of 
God.” 
2.4.   Jesus and the Autonomous Liberal State  
Perhaps what made Jesus an enduring Führer for Modern Man was the fact that, 
according to Renan, Jesus’ ideas of “radical revolution”—of the apokatastasis  
pantōn (“the restoration of all things”) of Acts 3:21 (cited by Renan in the 
Greek)—extended to everything except the political realm.   Speaking of Jesus’ 
early ministry and the development of his ideas of the kingdom of God, Renan 
wrote:    
From that time on, without doubt, he had renounced politics; the example 
of Judas the Galilean had revealed to him the futility of popular sedition.  
He never thought of revolting against the Romans and the tetrarchs.  The 
unbridled and anarchical principle of Judas was not his.  Jesus’ submission 
to the established powers, which was at heart derisive, was complete in 
outward expression.  He paid the tax to Caesar in order not to scandalize.  
                                                          
313Renan, Vie, 178.    
314Renan, Vie, 193.    
315Renan, Vie, 194, with my emphasis.      
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Liberty and right are not of this world; why trouble his life through some 
vain susceptibilities?316  
In this portrayal, Jesus’ political theology is subversive to the Romans only in his 
cynicism, not in his actions.  Yet Jesus’ action of paying the hated tax to Caesar 
was a direct challenge to some strands of Jewish political theology of the Second 
Temple period—(for example Judas the Galilean’s disastrous revolt against the 
Roman census/taxation of 6 C.E.).  According to Renan, Jesus’ political theology 
was a stumbling block to Jewish revolutionary hopes, but Pagan Empire had 
nothing to fear from the young and beautiful Galilean teacher.317  Renan’s Jesus 
made space for the world’s—particularly the pagan world’s—Führer by laying 
the foundations of an apolitical, “religion-less” universal religion.  In doing so, 
Renan’s Jesus laid the foundations for the Autonomous Liberal State.   
 Indeed, Renan believed that primitive Christianity distinguished itself 
from both Jewish and Pagan thought in its world-denying political theology.  The 
unique kingdom of God which Jesus founded, Renan stressed, was “the kingdom 
of the spirit,” the “doctrine of the liberty of souls” abstracted (“abstraction faite”) 
from the “imperfections which mix themselves in all things realized by 
humanity.”318  Certainly pagan philosophers had produced such thoughts before 
Jesus; Renan notes the “beautiful” ideas of the Stoics who had also found means 
of being free under tyrants.  Yet, like the Jews, the ancient pagan world tended to 
attach freedom to specific political systems, and thus if the Jews had their 
“Theudas” and “Barkokeba,” the pagans had their “Harmodius and Aristogiton,” 
their “Brutus and Cassius.”319  
                                                          
316Renan, Vie, 119, emphasis mine.   
317On Jesus as beautiful, see pg. 80 of the Vie where Renan asserts that Jesus “without doubt” had 
a “ravishing” face.  
318Renan, Vie, 121.    
319Renan, Vie, 121.    
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 Still, in the Vie Renan affirmed that the genius of Christianity’s political 
theology stemmed from its Jewish roots.320  The Law of the Jews was “social and 
moral” in character, and if well observed was a path towards “perfect 
happiness.”321  By contrast, the “Laws” of the Greeks and the Romans were rarely 
concerned with questions of “abstract right” and “happiness and private 
morality.”  The pagans had provided the West with the foundations for national 
(i.e. specific) laws and civil republics; the Jews, however, established the 
foundations for transcendence:  “. . .the oeuvre to which this people works is a 
kingdom of God, not a civil republic; a universal institution, not a nationality or a 
country.”322   And in contrast to the ancient Indo-European peoples who looked to 
an ever vanishing original paradise in the past, the Jewish people were thoroughly 
eschatological—always placing their hope in the age to come.  “Israel placed the 
Golden Age in the future.”323  The Jews’ avant-garde penchant for transcendence 
and progress (i.e. their forward looking worldview), made them a living protest 
against the “superstition and religious materialism” of the surrounding pagan 
cultures of the Mediterranean world.324  At the same time, Renan also stressed 
that this kernel of enlightenment had itself often been overcome within Judaism 
by its own proclivity to “severity, egoism, mockery, cruelty, narrow-mindedness, 
subtlety, sophistry,” and a fanatical obsession with ritual sacrifice and obedience 
to the national “cult of Jehovah” as evidenced in the Torah.325  
                                                          
320By 1887 and the publication of the first volume of l’Histoire du peuple d’Israël, Renan had 
come to the conclusion that in fact it was the “Aryan” races which had perfected Christianity 
socially and politically; I shall examine this in the next chapter.  See Laudyce Rétat’s excellent 
introduction to Ernest Renan: Histoire des origines du christianisme:  Vie de Jésus, Les Apôtres, 
Saint Paul, intro. Laudyce Rétat (Paris:  Robert Laffont, 1995), xiii-xvii.     
321Renan, Vie (1863), 10-11.    
322Renan, Vie (1863), 11.    
323Renan, Vie (1863), with my emphasis.   
324Renan, Vie (1863), 11-12.    
325Renan, Vie (1863), 49, and 9, respectively.  
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 Jesus, on the other hand, had introduced an “idea (l’idée)” into the 
world—not a religion based on culturally specific rituals (e.g., kosher laws, 
sacrifices, and so forth).  His “perfect idealism” distinguished him from all 
ancient and modern “agitators.”326  Renan’s Jesus was in some regards an 
anarchist, “for he had no idea of civil government” that was not abusive and “the 
natural enemy of the men of God.”  Yet he never advocated armed revolution 
against the established powers, but rather taught by example that force was to be 
overcome by purity of heart.327   Thus, as opposed to Judaism, Jesus had 
democratized “the kingdom of God”—all people now had the right (“le droit de 
tous les hommes”) to participate in the universal spiritual polity opened up by 
Jesus.328  Some 1700 years before the Enlightenment, Renan’s Jesus had finally 
wrought the separation of religion from the State (“l’État”):  “The rights of 
conscience, removed from political law, arrived to constitute a new power—the 
‘spiritual power.’”329  It is significant to note that Jesus’ revolution of “spiritual 
power” is, in Renan’s account, actually intellectual—not the biblical 
pneuma/pneumatikos—“spirit/spiritual”—the communal experience of God’s 
Spirit given by Jesus and experienced through participation in his life, death, and 
resurrection (cf. John 15:26; Phil. 3:10).330   Renan’s intellectualizing of Jesus and 
his ministry was a part of liberating Jesus from the Church and Modern Man from 
the praxis of orthodox Christianity while still enabling friendly relations with the 
Nazarene.      
 However, Renan was careful to note that the intervening centuries 
between Jesus and the birth of the Church had seen the rise of “horrible tyranny” 
                                                          
326Renan, Vie (1863), 127 and 439.    
327Renan, Vie (1863), 127-128.    
328Renan, Vie (1863), 439.    
329Renan, Vie (1863), with my emphasis.    
330See also the article on πνευμα by Schweizer in the Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament, vol. VI, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich; trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand 
Rapids, MI:  Wm B. Eerdmans, 1968; reprint 1995), 396-397.   
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at the hands of bishops who were actually princes, and popes who were in reality 
kings.  This duplicitous “empire of souls” had in the past used “torture and the 
stake” to maintain its power.331  Hence while Renan’s Jesus had laid the 
foundations for the separation of Church and State, for human intellectual 
autonomy vis-à-vis the State and the Church, for the creation of Modern private, 
subjective spirituality, the fruition of his work had only come in the post-
Enlightenment, Post-Revolution age.  “But the day will come when the separation 
will bring its fruits, when the domain of the things of the spirit will cease to be 
called a ‘power’ in order to be called a ‘liberty.’”332  Contrary to the Gospels’ 
portrayal of a surprising Divine participation in the world, Renan asserted that 
originally Christianity had been a people’s movement—apparently not unlike the 
French Revolution itself.  It had arisen from the “conscience of a man of the 
people” and had been “loved and admired” from the beginning “by the people.”333 
In fact Christianity was “. . .the first triumph of the revolution, the victory of the 
popular feeling (du sentiment populaire).”334   
 On the surface, Renan’s representation of Jesus and early Christianity 
seems benevolent enough, for certainly orthodoxy does indeed call for the dignity 
and freedom of every human individual based on their intrinsic being as a 
(mystical)335 image of God (cf. Gen. 1:26-27).  The problem is that Renan, along 
with the majority of the intellectuals of his generation, had rejected the orthodox 
mystical ontology which had for nearly two millennia been the basis for Western 
liberties in exchange for the Modern fiction of autonomous, individual “human 
                                                          
331Renan, Vie (1863), 439.     
332Renan, Vie (1863), 439-440.    
333Renan, Vie (1863), 440.    
334Renan, Vie (1863), 440.  
335It is the mystical, hidden/un-seen nature of humanity’s divine “image-ship,” or perhaps rather 
the rejection of this pre-Modern orthodox belief that has caused so much controversy among 
Christians regarding Darwinian Evolutionary theory.  Moreover, this loss also helped to give rise 
to the autonomous, contractual, “rights” based State. . .this bears much more research in the future. 
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rights.”336  In reality his genealogy of Modern “liberty” and “rights” from Jesus to 
the French Revolution is like the speeches of the Sophists Gorgias and Tisias, 
whom Socrates mocked for their ability to persuade those ignorant of the truth by 
making “new things old and old things the reverse.”337  For neither the Old nor 
New Testaments know anything of autonomous human rights.  The concept of 
“right” always implies that one is owed something.  In this sense the Modern, 17th 
and 18th century conceptions of “right” were similar to the antique idea of justice 
(to render to each person what they are due).  But the Modern conception went 
further in believing that humans are somehow first owed existence itself—as John 
Locke stated in the first of his triad of “Natural Rights”—“Life, Liberty, and 
Property.”338  From the view of pre-Modern orthodoxy, the Modern development 
of the concept of autonomous human rights was another expression of the sinful 
and delusional “esse in semet ipso.”  “Shall the clay say to the potter, “What are 
you doing?” (Is. 45:9, JPS); “What advance claim did heaven and earth have upon 
You, when you made them in the Beginning?  Let Your spiritual and corporeal 
creation speak up and tell us what rights they had” (St. Augustine, Confessions 
XIII.2.2)339—biblical, pre-Modern orthodoxy radically rejected any type of 
creaturely autonomy.  Therefore it rejected the right to life; yet it also universally 
prohibited murder based not on the fragile, contingent existence of other 
                                                          
336On the genealogy of the rejection of the orthodox, mystical basis of human liberties and the rise 
of the early Modern legal fiction of autonomous, individual human rights, see John Milbank, 
“Against Human Rights:  Liberty in the Western Tradition,” Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 
(2012), pp. 1-32.  On the fictitious nature of Modern human rights, see Alasdair MacIntyre’s After 
Virtue, 3rd ed., (Notre Dame, Indiana:  University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 66-69.   
337Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library, trans. Harold 
North Fowler (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1966), 539.    
338See John Milbank in Theology and Social Theory:  Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed.  (Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell, 2006), 13-18.   The Deistic foundation of modern human rights as found in the U. 
S. Declaration of Independence—“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—” is not supported by biblical Judeo-Christian 
theology.  See for instance Deuteronomy’s absolute proclamation of the “rights” of the Creator:  
“See, then, that I, I am He; there is no god beside Me.  I deal death and give life; I wounded and I 
will heal; None can deliver from My hand” (32:39, JPS, with my emphasis).     
339St. Augustine, The Confessions, trans. and intro. Maria Boulding (New York:  New City Press, 
1997), 343.    
92 
 
creatures—(e.g. kings, princes, die Führer, “the people” or their contracts)—but 
on the ontological reality of God and his Goodness:   
I the LORD am your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the 
house of bondage. . .You shall not murder. (Ex. 20:2, 13, JPS)  
Murder of God’s image-bearers (cf. Gen. 1:26-27) was the ultimate form of 
iconoclasm and was seen first and foremost as a sin against God; thus even kings 
were not above or beyond the sixth commandment (cf. Psalm 51).  Positively, 
such theology produced a radically new form of “government” for the societas 
perfecta of the Church that might best be described as “agape-ocracy”:   
Jesus  said to him, ‘Love  the Lord your God with all your heart, with all 
your soul, and with all your mind.’. . .‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ 
(Matt. 22:37; 39; Deut. 6:5; Lev. 19:18, NET). 
But I say to you, love your enemy. . . (Matt. 5:44, NET). 
 Thus in its original political theology (cf. Paul’s use of politeuesthe and 
politeuma en ouranois in Phil. 1:27 and 3:20-21), the Church posed a threat to 
every political theology based on autonomy—whether the (tragic) autonomy of 
force of Greco-Roman heroic politics, or the secular and collectivist autonomy of 
18th century Liberal contractual politics.  The biblical notion that ontologically 
humans have no right to existence, and thus by extension no other self-generated 
“rights,” but rather simply exist because of God’s Grace and Love, could be very 
frightening—witness the Gospels’ accounts of Pilate’s trial before Jesus; (cf. Mt. 
27:11-14; Mk. 15:1-5;  Jn. 18:33-38; 19:8-11).  It apparently was too frightening 
for the Enlightenment, and was universally rejected within Protestant political 
theology from at least the 18th century onwards.  The rejection proved 
momentous—particularly in 20th century Germany.  As Germans were to find out 
under the National Socialist regime, rights based on the contingencies of 
autonomously conceived contracts (for example, the Weimar constitution) and the 
secular “will to power” of Modern democracy proved fragile indeed, particularly 
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with regard to the State’s right to murder.340   The Jesus of orthodoxy, of biblical 
history, cannot be made to support such political theology.  Renan’s Jesus could 
and did.   
 That the Vie was one of Renan’s contributions to the on-going perfection 
of the French autonomous state can be seen by briefly examining his La réform 
intellectual et morale, his bitter response to the German defeat of France in the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1871.  Here, Renan openly expressed his Liberal, anti-
democratic philosophies.  France’s defeat in the war had revealed the decadence 
of its bourgeoisie materialism and the impotence of its vulgar democracy.341  
Renan’s remedy was a call for a secularized monarchy and Christianity—a 
Modern Autonomous State—wherein an avant-garde of intellectuals would be 
free to construct a new Empire based on Science.342  There were no contradictions 
here for Renan:  “One can be royalist without admitting divine right, just as one 
can be Catholic without believing in the infallibility of the pope, Christian without 
believing in the supernatural and the divinity of Jesus Christ. . .”343  What the war 
highlighted was the problem of Catholic Christianity in the Modern era, and 
particularly France’s anachronistic adherence to Catholicism’s “transcendent 
mysticism” and poisonous supernatural beliefs.344 Protestant nations such as 
England and Germany had managed to adjust to Modernity through the 
                                                          
  340Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 74, calls attention to genocide researcher Gunnar Heinsohn’s thesis 
that Hitler’s primary goal in the Holocaust was to eliminate the people and religion which made a 
universal prohibition against murder (Ex. 20:13), and thereby remove “‘all future conquests of a 
bad ‘conscience’ in the course of exterminations.’”     
341Ernest Renan, La réform intellectual et morale (Paris:  Michel Lévy Frères, 1871), 25, 37, 39, 
64, 82, 94, 107, and passim.    
342Renan, La réform; see for instance 42 on Renan’s hope for a French, English and German 
“political and intellectual union” which would direct “humanity and civilization.”   
343Renan, La réform, 76.    
344Renan, La réform, 97.    
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acceptance of science and modern rationality; France’s defeat came precisely 
from its “lack of faith in science” (Le manque de foi à la science).345   
 Thus Renan called for a radical reform of France’s entire educational 
system.  His model was that of Germany’s Protestant system of public 
instruction, which from Luther onwards had emphasized rationality in all things:  
  Lutheranism having made religion to consist of reading a book, and later 
 having  reduced Christian dogmatics to an impalpable quintessence, has 
 given an importance to education outside of the schoolhouse; the illiterate 
 has almost been chased from Christianity; sometimes Communion is 
 refused him.346            
In Renan’s estimation the genius and power of German Protestantism was that it 
had transformed traditional Christianity from a mystical, liturgical faith into a 
rational exercise—into “reading a book.”  Such was not the case in Catholic 
France: 
 Catholicism, on the contrary, having made salvation to consist of 
 sacraments and belief in the supernatural, considers education a 
 secondary thing.  Excommunicating those who neither know how to read 
 nor write would appear impious to us.  The school not being the annex of 
 the church is the rival of the church.347    
Renan hoped for a day when the Catholic church would purge itself of its obsolete 
rules; when village curés might teach students from the latest scientific textbooks     
rather than from breviaries.348  In this context his Vie de Jésus could be taught in 
Catholic schools, for it would teach students the scientific, historical Jesus—the 
founder of strong, autonomous states.  It would teach students how to be Modern 
Christians, Christians who did not believe in the supernatural nor in the divinity of 
Christ; Christians who did not waste their time in “outdated” (surannées), 
ritualistic worship; Christians who would be of great service to their nation in 
                                                          
345Renan, La réform, 95.    
346Renan, La réform, 95, my emphasis.    
347Renan, La réform, 95, emphasis mine.    
348Renan, La réform, 96.    
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conquering inferior races, in executing revenge on Germany; in regaining French 
glory in the modern age.349   
 While Renan hoped for such church reform, he was doubtful it would ever 
come.   Ultimately, he argued that if there ever was to be true intellectual and 
moral progress in France, its universities would have to be free from ecclesiastical 
influence and oversight.  In other words, in calling for secular universities he was 
calling for the inculcation of a rationality without worship, of reason separated 
from divine love that was not only anti-orthodox, but also anti-Socratic (as 
demonstrated in The Phaedrus).  This was the way forward for Renan.  For these 
new universities would help produce a Modern philosopher-king:    
 Formed by the universities, a head of a rational society ruling by science, 
 proud of this science and little disposed to let its privilege perish to the 
 profit of an ignorant mass. . .giving more to specialty, to science, to those 
 things which the Germans call the ‘Fach,’350 less to literature, to the 
 talents of writing and speaking; completing these solid deeds of the social 
 edifice by a brilliant court and capital, from which the cry of an 
 aristocratic spirit does not exclude the solidity and strong culture of 
 reason; which at the same time elevates the people, reviving its weakened 
 faculties, inspiring it with the aid of a good clergy devoted to the 
 country; the regard of a superior society, the  respect of science and virtue, 
 the spirit of sacrifice and devotion; this is what would be ideal.  It would at 
 least be beautiful to seek to approach it.351                  
Notably, these new universities would also produce a secularized clergy devoted 
to the State, rather than to the trans-national, trans-historical, Mystical Body of 
Christ.  However, this too, according to Renan, would be consistent with the 
historical Jesus, or at least with his anti-theological, anti-liturgical Jesus of the 
Vie.    
 
                                                          
349Renan, La réform, 96; on Renan’s hope for future French conquest of “races inférieures” as 
France returned to its natural European role as “une race de maîtres et de soldats,” see 93-94; on 
his scientific racism, see 99; 111; for France’s revanche on Germany, see 120.  
350Fach in German refers to a field of specialized knowledge, cf. fach gebiet, fach kenntnisse.    
351Renan, La réform, 106-107, with my emphasis.    
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2.5.   The Anti-Theological, Anti-Liturgical Jesus 
Both Mussolini and Hitler from very early on in their political careers recognized 
the utility of public ceremonies, of symbols, of beguilingly beautiful masses, of 
secular liturgies in uniting people around their causes.352  The Jesus of the Vie 
was thoroughly against all of these things.  And yet, Renan’s anti-liturgical Jesus 
was capable of contributing to the darkest element of fascism:  its anti-Judaic, 
anti-Semitic pathology.  To see this it is necessary to examine Renan and Jesus’ 
ecclesiology in the Vie, for here the connection between the Liberal Modern and 
Fascist Jesus is clearest.   
 Renan’s ecclesiology at first seems Catholic; Jesus’ essential work was the 
calling of the disciples and the depositing of his remarkable doctrine of love in 
their hearts.353  Reading further one finds that it was actually “Protestant” (to the 
degree it may be considered in any way Christian), Modern, and anti-Mystical: 
Jesus is not a founder of dogmas, a maker of symbols; he is the initiator of 
the world to a new spirit.  The least Christian of men were, on the one 
hand, the doctors of the Greek Church, who, at the beginning of the fourth 
century, entangled Christianity in puerile metaphysical discussions, and, 
on the other hand, the scholastics of the Latin Middle Ages, who wished to 
draw from the Gospel thousands of articles of a colossal ‘Summa.’ 
Clinging to Jesus in view of the kingdom of God—this is what it meant in 
the beginning to be Christian. . . .In order to renew itself, [Christianity] has 
only to return to the Gospel.  The kingdom of God, such as we conceive it, 
differs notably from the supernatural apparition that the first Christians 
hoped to see bursting in the clouds.  But the feeling that Jesus has 
introduced in the world is rightly ours (bien le nôtre).  His perfect idealism 
is the highest rule of the free (détachée) and virtuous life.354   
Rather than theology and a real social body, Renan’s Jesus brought “. . .liberty, 
that society actually excludes as an impossibility, and which only has all its 
amplitude in the domain of thought;” he was the first to proclaim and live out      
                                                          
352See Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 8-9.    
353Renan, Vie (1863), 443-44.    
354Renan, Vie (1863), 444 and 445 with my emphasis.    
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“. . .the royalty of spirit.” 355  (It is necessary to note the triple entendre of l’esprit 
in French:  “spirit, mind, understanding,” and its difference from the biblical 
pneuma—divine spirit.  The anonymous English translation of the Vie from 1863 
renders l’esprit as “mind,” reflecting Renan’s portrayal of Jesus as an 
Enlightenment philosophe).356  In this sense, Christianity was “almost 
synonymous with ‘religion’” itself, and it was also in this sense that Renan could 
state that     “. . .we are Christians, even when we differ on almost all the points of 
Christian tradition which has preceded us.”357  
 This new religion which Renan’s Jesus had founded was completely 
different from other ancient religions.  On the one hand, Jesus, in a revolutionary 
break from Judaism, taught an un-mediated relationship between Man and his 
heavenly Father, anticipating the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment’s 
dream of a “pure cult” without priests or “exterior practices” by nearly 1800 
years.358  On the other hand, Jesus’ priest-less religion was a break from Greco-
Roman practice as well, and Renan acknowledged that the prophets of Judaism 
(especially Isaiah) were unique in antiquity for their antipathy towards ritualistic 
worship.359  Christianity had thus “seduced the noblest souls (âmes élevées)”360 
through “the attraction of a religion free from all exterior ritual (forme 
extérieure).”361   
 However, the centrality of Eucharistic liturgical practice in eighteen 
centuries of Christian history posed a special problem for Renan’s historical 
                                                          
355Renan, Vie (1863), 446, my emphasis.   
356See Ernest Renan, The Life of Jesus, anon. trans. (Albert & Charles Boni, Inc., 1936), 292.    
357Renan, Vie (1863), 445, 447.    
358Renan, Vie (1863), 85.    
359Renan, Vie (1863), 88.    
360 “âmes élevées” could also be translated as “the most educated minds; (see Renan, Life, (1936), 
112 and its rendering:  “elevated minds.”  
361Renan, Vie (1863), 112.    
98 
 
representation of Jesus’ “religion-less religion.”  In his treatment of the Last 
Supper Renan acknowledged that the remembrance of the meal became the height 
of Christian piety and the foundation of the most fruitful Christian institutions.362  
After Jesus’ death, the disciples came to imagine and invest the meal with a    
“sweet mysticism” (suave mysticité).363  From here, Renan began to de-construct 
the orthodox significance of the meal as the institution of the Eucharist.  Renan 
asserted that, in reality, Jesus did nothing extraordinary at this meal; Jesus’ 
breaking of the bread was one of his regular “mysterious rite[s]” (Renan must 
have in mind Jesus’ breaking of bread to feed the crowds).  The Church’s belief 
that this meal was the institution of the Eucharist was based on the Gospels’ 
confusion of the last supper with the Passover seder and the early Christian belief 
that Jesus’ death was the supreme sacrifice which superseded the sacrificial 
system of the Law.  This combination of erroneous beliefs was what had 
transformed Jesus’ last meal with his disciples into the mystical sacrament 
practiced by the Church in the mass.364     
 Prejudicing the value of John’s eyewitness testimony of the meal over the 
Synoptic accounts, Renan pointed out that the Fourth Gospel makes no mention 
of Jesus’ sacramental words over the bread and wine:  “. . .Take, eat, this is my 
body . . .All of you drink from the cup, for this is my blood of the covenant which 
is being poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins” (Matt. 26:26-28; cf. Mk. 
14:22-24; Lk. 22:19-21).365  This was proof to Renan that John did not view the 
Eucharist as having been instituted by Jesus.  Rather, for John, Jesus’ central 
action that night was the washing of the disciples’ feet.366  Renan mused that the 
“sacrament” of foot-washing probably obtained an importance in “certain 
                                                          
362Renan, Vie (1863), 384.    
363Renan, Vie (1863), 385.    
364Renan, Vie (1863), 386.    
365My translation.    
366Renan, Vie (1863), 387.    
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primitive Christian families” that it had since lost.367  Then again, even this was 
suspect.  John’s report of Jesus’ act of humility vis-à-vis his disciples on the night 
of the Last Supper reflected the tendency in all of the canonical Gospels to 
associate all of Jesus’ “great moral and ritual recommendations” with the rich 
drama of the Teacher’s last night with his disciples.368 As with the breaking of 
bread, Jesus’ washing of the disciples’ feet must have been a regular practice.  
John simply could not resist the opportunity to add this to such a ready-made 
scene of “high feeling.”369  
 What was significant about the Last Supper for Renan was the Johannine 
Jesus’ last command to his disciples for them to “love one another as I have loved 
you” (John 13:33-35; 14:12-17).  This a-religious command—and not a dominical 
mystical sacrament—was the true foundation of the unity of the Church:  “It is 
always the unity of his Church, constituted by him or by his spirit, which is the 
soul of the symbols and of the discourses that the Christian tradition made go 
back to this sacred moment.”370  In his simultaneous de-construction and re-
presentation of the Last Supper, Renan’s Jesus anticipated the optimistic 
sociology of the French Revolution by teaching “avec un sentiment exquis,” of a 
“brotherhood of man” as “sons of God.”371   More radically, in denying Jesus’ 
institution of the sacrament of the Eucharist, Renan’s historical approach denied 
the radical essence of the Gospel:  God’s gracious and mystical forgiveness of 
sins through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ.   
 At the level of political theology, this is the same implicit denial of the 
deistic ontology of the Autonomous Liberal State as conceived in the 18th century.  
                                                          
367Renan, Vie (1863), 387.  
368Renan, Vie (1863), 387-388; cf. also f.n. 1, where Renan dismisses John’s record of Jesus’ 
farewell discourse as un-historical.  
369Renan, Vie (1863), 388.    
370Renan, Vie (1863), 388.  
371Cf. Renan, Vie (1863), 81.    
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“Nature’s God” (U. S. Declaration of Independence) and the “Supreme Being” 
(French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen) did not participate in this 
world because it was not necessary; humanity did not need salvation because 
there was no such thing as sin.  There was also no Grace in this world.  However 
when, after the disaster of the First World War, European nations re-discovered 
the need for salvation, Mussolini and Hitler filled the grace-less void created by 
Enlightenment political theology with their own offers of deliverance and the 
purging of sins—other peoples’ sins (e.g. those of Communists, Jews, Gypsies, 
homosexuals)—through a hideous theology of elimination and self-generated 
force.372  Renan could not foresee the potential implications of the political 
theology of his historical Jesus.  Nor was he alone in the avant-garde de-
mystification and rationalization of Christianity that would create the conditions 
for the possibility of the advent of the “fascist Jesus” of early 20th century German 
academia.  But he does seem to be one of the early pioneers in the rise of 
academic anti-Judaism within the study of the origins of Christianity.  This can be 
seen again in his treatment of the institution of the Eucharist.   
 As discussed above, Renan’s Jesus was unique in the history of religions 
precisely by creating a “religion-less religion.”  However, Christianity had been, 
and still was in Renan’s day, characterized by religious rituals, particularly the 
Eucharist within Catholic Christianity.  The Church’s early reversion to a Jewish-
like priesthood and “exterior practices”—(e.g. the Eucharist—the Church’s new 
Passover ritual)—had subverted Jesus’ own vision: 
 An absolutely new idea, the idea of a religion founded on the purity of the 
 heart and on human brotherhood, entered the world through him.  It was 
 an idea so elevated that the Christian church became in this regard 
 completely false to his intentions and, even in our day, only a few souls 
 are capable of accepting it.373  
                                                          
372Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 112-118.    
373Renan, Vie (1863), 90, with my emphasis.      
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In other words, the Church’s liturgical practices are too Jewish—“too exterior.”  
Renan’s criticism of the Church is thus latently anti-Judaic, and, as will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter, also racially based and therefore anti-Semitic.  
 I have attempted in this chapter to show how Renan’s historical Jesus and 
ecclesiology could serve as a basis for Fascist political theology through his 
adherence to Modern conceptions of autonomous reason and the autonomous 
liberal State.  Renan’s de-mystified Jesus was not Lord (cf. Philip. 2:9-11) but 
was simply one Führer among many others living in a self-governing world.  In 
the next chapter, I shall try to demonstrate how Renan’s historical Jesus managed 
to contribute to the distinguishing feature of Fascist ideology in German National 
Socialism:  its anti-Semitism.374  For not only was Renan’s Jesus Liberal, he was 
also a Marcionite.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
      
            
                                                          
374Both Ernst Nolte and Zeev Sternhell make the point that Fascism was not a monolithic political 
ideology.  Nolte casts French Fascism, Italian Fascism, and German National Socialism in a 
Hegelian dialectical relationship of thesis-antithesis-synthesis.  See Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of 
Fascism:  Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New 
York:  Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), chapters 1-2, and part 5, “Fascism as a Metapolitical 
Phenomenon.”  Sternhell is adamant in distinguishing Fascism from Nazism, the latter being at its 
core driven by “biological determinism.”  See Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asheri, 
The Birth of Fascist Ideology:  From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution, trans. David 
Maisel (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1994), 4-5.  It is my argument that Renan’s Vie 
has the dubious honor of having contributed to both Fascist and National Socialist thought. 
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Chapter 3:                                                                                                                             
A Genealogy of the Fascist Jesus: From Renan to Jakob Wilhelm Hauer and 
Walter Grundmann    
 
This chapter traces the origins of the “Academic-Fascist Jesus” which emerged in 
German academic theology between the two World Wars and its connection to 
Renan’s historical Jesus of the Vie.  Here the darkest legacies of Renan’s revival 
of the ancient Marcionite heresy can be seen in the “German Faith Movement” of 
Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, the academic anti-Semitic Institute of Walter Grundmann, 
and the murderous rhetoric of Hitler himself.  The genealogy of the Academic-
Fascist Jesus is a chilling reminder of Rainer Bucher’s insight from his study, 
Hitler’s Theology:  “. . .the ground of civilization is thin beneath our feet and. . .it 
is not threatened from the margins of society but first and foremost from society’s 
centre. . .”.375  By the early 20th century, Western civilization was being 
threatened from the heart of some of its most venerable theological faculties 
through cutting-edge research into the life of Jesus.  And if Susannah Heschel’s 
thesis in The Aryan Jesus is correct, scholars such as Grundmann and Hauer were 
not only producing scholarly literature, but also academic “desk-murderers” as 
well.376    
3.1.  The Return of the Marcionite Heresy and the Rise of the Fascist Jesus 
Speaking before a Nazi assembly in Munich in April 1922, Adolf Hitler expressed 
his understanding of Christian theology and Christian duty thus:   
 . . .my feeling as a Christian points me to my Lord and Savior as fighter.   
 It points me to the man who once in loneliness, surrounded only by a few  
 followers, recognized these Jews for what they were and summoned men  
 to the fight against them and who, God’s truth! was greatest not as sufferer 
 but as fighter.  In boundless love as a Christian and as a man I read  
 through the passage which tells us how the Lord at last rose in His might  
                                                          
375Rainer Bucher, Hitler’s Theology:  A Study in Political Religion, trans. Rebecca Pohl, ed. 
Michael Hoelzl (London and New York:  Continuum, 2011), 122.  
376Susannah Heschel, The Aryan Jesus:  Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany 
(Princeton and Oxford:  Princeton University Press, 2008), 16-17.    
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 and seized the scourge to drive out of the Temple the brood of vipers and  
 adders.  How terrific was His fight for the world against the Jewish poison 
 [and] today, after two thousand years, with deepest emotion I recognize 
 more profoundly than ever before in the fact that it was for this that He 
 had to shed His blood upon the Cross.  As a Christian I have no duty to 
 allow myself to be cheated, but I have the duty to be a fighter for truth and 
 justice.377  And as a man I have the duty to see to it that human society 
 does not suffer the same catastrophic collapse as did the civilization of the  
 ancient world some two thousand years ago—a civilization which was  
 driven to its ruin through this same Jewish people.378 
Here Hitler expressed in a new and powerful way the old heresy of Marcion, 
whose theology was condemned by the Church in the second century for positing 
that the God of the Old and New Testaments were not the same, and for denying 
the mystical being of Jesus as recorded in the birth narratives of the Synoptics and 
the prologue of John’s Gospel.  Like Marcion, Hitler argued that the God of the 
Old Testament and his followers were in actuality satanic.  Christianity therefore 
was a radical break with Judaism; Jesus did not, could not, worship YHWH, let 
alone be His Incarnation.   
 Hitler’s rhetoric was also pure sophistry.  He was no Christian, but rather a 
deist whose god was the product of his own mystical beliefs in Providence, Social 
Darwinism, and völkisch (racist) ideology.379  In numerous private “table talks” 
with his staff, Hitler repeatedly and consistently stated his dis-belief in all things 
Christian; Christianity was “the maddest thing any delusional human mind has 
ever produced;” “He who lives naturally [. . .] will inadvertently come into 
opposition to the Church.  This will cause the Church to collapse.  Science will 
reign victorious.”380  “[The Protestant churches] have no future.  At least not for 
                                                          
377Hitler’s statement here is illustrative of the danger of the concept of autonomous human rights:  
he contradicts Jesus’ ethics of graced “right-less-ness” (to coin a very awkward new word) from 
the Sermon on the Mount—“. . .if someone wants to sue you and to take your tunic, give him your 
coat also” (Matt. 5:40, NET), and Paul’s admonition, based on Jesus’ ethics, to those Corinthians 
given to lawsuits—“Why not rather be wronged?  Why not rather be cheated?” (I Cor. 6:7, NET).     
378Quoted in Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 77, with Bucher’s emphasis.   
379This is the heart of Bucher’s thesis concerning Hitler’s god; see 10 and passim.      
380Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 26, 27, from “table talks” of 14 October 1941 and 13 December 
1941 respectively; my emphasis added.   
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Germans.  . . . Nothing will prevent me from eradicating totally, root and branch, 
all Christianity in Germany. . . . A German Church, a German Christianity, it is all 
rubbish. . .One is either Christian or German.”381  His talk of “boundless love as a 
Christian” was in reality negated by the non-participatory rationality of his 
deistic belief in a creator god who stands aloof from the world and by his 
fundamental hatred.  He perversely spoke of ancient Western pagan civilization’s 
collapse at the hands of “Jewish people,” meaning in actuality the rise of 
Christianity—subtly obscuring the fact that his anti-Semitism extended quite 
logically to Christianity,382 and belying the falsity of his latent assertion that Jesus 
was not himself Jewish.   In sum, Hitler’s sophistry was itself satanic:   
 Every word that issues from Hitler’s mouth is a lie.  When he says peace  
 he means war and when he most sinfully names the name of the Almighty, 
 he means the force of evil, the fallen angel, Satan.  His mouth is the  
 stinking throat of hell and his power is fundamentally depraved.383 
By 1945 it would become apparent just how lethal was the combination of 
Hitler’s sophistry, heresy, and deistic science based on a non-loving, non-
participatory rationality.     
 Yet Hitler’s espousal of Marcion’s heretical theology was in fact not 
exactly something altogether new.  Renan had already posited the same ideas 
about Jesus and his relation to Judaism (though not with the same force or 
purposes) in the Vie.  For instance, speaking of Jesus’ first journeys to Jerusalem, 
Renan wrote: 
 These journeys, moreover, were essential to his design; for he knew  
 already that in order to play a role of the first order, it would be necessary  
 to go out from Galilee and attack Judaism within its strong hold, which  
 was Jerusalem.   
                                                          
381Quoted in Karla Poewe’s New Religions and the Nazis (New York and London:  Routledge, 
2006), 112, from Hitler’s “table talk” of 7 April 1933.    
382This point is made forcefully in Poewe’s study of the work of the German academic Jakob 
Wilhelm Hauer and his “German Faith Movement” during the Third Reich.  See Ibid., pgs. 7,8, 9-
10, 14, 55, 63, 109, 137, 142-143, 156.    
383Quoted in Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 82.    
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  The little Galilean community was [in Jerusalem] very far from 
 home.   Jerusalem was then almost that which it is today—a city of 
 pedantry, of acrimony, of disputes, of hatreds, of the petitesse d’espirit.  
 Fanaticism there was extreme and its religious seditions very 
 frequent. . .384  
Commenting on Jesus’ frequent pilgrimages to Jerusalem and to the Judean 
desert, Renan mused: 
 These trips, where the nation re-united to communicate its ideas, and 
 which were almost always the crucibles of great agitation, put Jesus in 
 contact with the soul of his people, and without doubt inspired in him 
 already a lively antipathy for the faults of the official representatives of 
 Judaism.  One supposes that early in his life the Judean desert had been 
 for him another school and that he had made long stays there.  But the God 
 which he found there was not his.  It was rather the God of Job, severe 
 and terrible, who answers to no one.  Sometimes it was Satan which came 
 to tempt him.  He returned then to his dear Galilee, and met again his 
 heavenly Father, in the midst of its verdant hills and clear streams. . .385  
It is notable that Satan is here paralleled with the inscrutable God of Judaism.  
Elsewhere Renan contrasted Judaism’s “partial despot”, which set Israel as a 
chosen people against the world, to Jesus’ God who “. . .[was] the God of 
humanity.”386  And in a similar fashion, Renan emphasized that Jesus himself 
represented the antithesis to Judaism:  “Far from Jesus being the continuator of 
Judaism, he represents the rupture with the Jewish spirit.”387   
 This radical abstraction and re-presentation of the historical Jesus from his 
Jewish context has been recognized as Renan’s attempt to, on the one hand, place 
Jesus beyond the bounds of race and ethnicity altogether; to make him “‘neither 
Jewish nor Greek’” and thus the ideal carrier of a universal modern religious 
                                                          
384Ernest Renan, Vie de Jésus, neuvième edition, Histoire des origines du christianisme, livre 
premier (Paris:  Michel Lévy Frères, 1863), 206, emphasis mine.      
385Renan, Vie, 69-70, with my emphasis.  
386Renan, Vie, 78.    
387Renan, Vie, 455.   
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ethic.388  Contra Matthew and Luke’s nativity accounts of Jesus’ birth in 
Bethlehem of Judea, Renan placed Jesus’ birth in Nazareth of Galilee.  Noting 
that Gelil haggoyim (Galilee) in Hebrew means “circle of the Gentiles,” and 
pointing out the great number of non-Juifs resident there in Jesus’ time, Renan 
wrote that it was “therefore impossible to raise here any question of race and to 
seek which blood flowed within the veins of the one who has contributed the most 
to erasing within humanity the distinctions of blood.”389  However, Jesus’ race 
was in fact tied to his conception of religion in Renan’s estimation.  In his 
conception of God as a universal Father of all, Jesus “was nothing like his race 
(en cela il n’est nullement de sa race).  Neither the Jew nor the Mohammedan  
has understood this delightful theology of love.”390   If Jesus’ race could not 
exactly be ascertained, Renan seemed certain (at least in the Vie) that in many 
ways Jesus was not Jewish.  This points to the other often recognized tendency in 
Renan’s scholarly work on Jesus and the history of Christianity:  his penchant to 
“occidentalize.”391  By the time the first volume of his Histoire des origines du 
peuple d’Israël appeared in 1887, the remarkable dialectic of Renan’s thought had 
led him to the conclusion that while Jesus and Christianity were in their origins 
tout juif, Christianity had only reached its perfection among the Aryan races.392  
He had already intimated this in the final volume of his history of the origins of 
Christianity, Marc-Aurèle (1882), when he wrote that Judaism was “the wild-
stock upon which the Aryan race has produced its flower.”393   
                                                          
388See Laudyce Rétat’s introduction to Ernest Renan, Histoire des origines du christianisme:  Vie 
de Jésus, Les Apôtres, Saint Paul, intro. Laudyce Rétat (Paris:  Robert Laffont, 1995), viii.   
389Renan, Vie (1863), 22 and f.n. 1.    
390Renan, Vie (1863), 77, with my emphasis.    
391Renan,  Histoire des origines du christianisme, xii, and Edward Said, Orientalism (New York:  
Vintage Books, 1979), chapter, II:  Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan:  Rational Anthropology 
and Philological Laboratory, 123-148. 
392Renan, Histoire des origines du christianisme, xii-xiii.    
393Quoted in Renan, Histoire des origines du christianisme, xiii.    
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 In this way Renan’s Vie heightened the dialectical tensions between 
Judaism and Christianity, and a generation later would provide “scientific” 
support for anti-Semitic polemics among fascist academics in Germany between 
the two World Wars.  Karla Poewe’s New Religions and the Nazis (2006) 
chronicles the (de)evolution of Renan’s type of scholarly Marcionitism in the 
early 20th century through an examination of Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, founder of 
the German Faith Movement of the Nazi regime.  Poewe argues that Hauer’s path 
to the neo-Pagan and Hindu hybridization that characterized his new religion 
began with liberal Christian theology—the very same kind of theology so 
powerfully exemplified by Renan and his work on Jesus.394   Similarly, Susannh 
Heschel’s 2008 Aryan Jesus has demonstrated a genealogy of “racializatons” of 
the “historical Jesus,” beginning with Renan and continuing through the work of 
Professor Dr. Walter Grundmann and his “Institute for the Study and Eradication 
of Jewish Influence on German Church Life”.395  Through an examination of 
Renan’s treatment of Jesus’ supposed Galilean roots contrasted with his equally 
supposed antagonism towards Judea and Jerusalem, and Renan’s portrayal of 
Jesus’ arrest and trial, I hope in this chapter to demonstrate the genealogical links 
between Renan and Hauer and Grundmann’s Aryan Jesus.  In doing so I shall also 
try to demonstrate that, tragically, the Fascist-Aryan Jesus was the Academic 
Jesus. 
3.2.  Renan’s Dialectic: Indo-European versus Semitic  
Renan situated Jesus in a dialectical world of two contrasting races.  In the first 
chapter of the Vie—“The Place of Jesus in the History of the World”—Renan 
stated that only two races had really made humanity:  the Indo-European and the 
Semitic.396  The former gave the world moral and natural religion, or rather the 
poetic basis which was the foundation of morality and religion.  But due to their 
                                                          
394See Poewe, New Religions and the Nazis.     
395See Heschel, The Aryan Jesus.  
396Renan, Vie (1863), 4.    
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inability to overcome the intellectual deficiencies of polytheism, mysticism, and 
localism, the Indo-European races had failed to deliver to humanity a universal, 
rational religion.397  Rather, this glory fell to the Semitic race, which had been 
isolated from the irrationalities and absurdities of Indo-European polytheism and 
fetishism.398   Jewish monotheism’s superiority stemmed from its “Law,” which, 
compared to the institutions of the Egyptians and the ancient Babylonians, 
contained “powerful seeds of  social equality and morality.”399 Liturgically, the 
praxis of Israelite priests differed very little from that of other ancient 
priesthoods—and this was one of ancient Judaism’s deficiencies—its adherence 
to the Ark of the Covenant and the “relics,” “souvenirs,” and “book” it contained.  
“Not from this,” Renan wrote, “would come the institution which would 
determine the future. . .”400  Yet what did distinguish the Israelites from other 
“theocratic” peoples was their subordination of sacerdotal praxis to the inspiration 
of the individual, that is, the inspired visions and oracles of their prophets.   In a 
remarkably modern and liberal way, Renan saw Israel’s prophets as “defenders of 
the ancient democratic spirit, enemies of the rich, opposed to every political 
organization and to those who had led Israel in the ways of the other nations”; 
they were the “true instruments of the religious primacy of the Jewish people.”401 
 At the same time, it was these very prophets which had inculcated in the 
Jewish race a fanatical, nihilistic faith.  Their oracles were often instrumental in 
provoking the wrath of Gentile empires (e.g., the Assyrians), and in fostering 
dangerous dreams of Jewish empire by way of eschatology:   
 From very early on [the prophets] announced unlimited hopes, and when 
 the people, in part victim of their impolitic councils, had been crushed by 
 Assyrian power, they proclaimed that a reign without bounds was reserved 
                                                          
397Renan, Vie (1863), 4-5.    
398Renan, Vie (1863), 5-6.    
399Renan, Vie (1863), 6.    
400Renan, Vie (1863), 7, with my emphasis.    
401Renan, Vie (1863), 7, emphasis mine.    
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 to them, that one day Jerusalem would be the capital of the entire world 
 and that the human race would make itself Jewish (le genre humain se 
 ferait juif).  Jerusalem and its  temple  appeared to them as a city placed on 
 the summit of a mountain to which all the peoples of the world ought to 
 flock, as an oracle from where the universal Law must go out, as the 
 center of an ideal reign, where the human race, pacified by Israel, would 
 rediscover the joys of Eden.402   
Renan thus saw a connection between the Jews’ resistance to imperial oppression 
and their proclivity to fanaticism and irrational eschatological rêves (“dreams”) 
but also “day dream,” “illusion.”  The Maccabean revolt (ca. 167-163 B.C.E.) was 
a prime example—and analogous to the same tendencies that Christians would 
indulge in and express during the persecutions of Nero some two centuries later; 
the former producing the first apocalyptic book, Daniel, and the latter the 
Apocalypse of John.403  Renan saw the Book of Daniel as the ultimate expression 
of the messianic hopes of the Jews, and suggested that its author expressed the 
ultimate transformation of Jewish conceptions of the messiah caused by the 
Maccabean revolt.  Prior to the Maccabean revolt, the messiah was seen as a 
human king after the fashion of David, Solomon, or even Cyrus the Great.  But 
during the conflict and after the Jewish victory over the pagan regime of 
Antiochus IV, the messiah was transformed into “‘a son of Man’ appearing in the 
sky, a supernatural being, clothed with human appearance, commissioned to judge 
the world and to preside over the coming golden age.”404  In Renan’s estimation, 
the unknown author of the Book of Daniel marked the transition from the old 
prophets of Judaism to the “kingdom of God”—from religious sentiment to 
religious empire.405      
 It was a dangerous shift which Jesus partly inherited.  Renan’s Jesus—
(and also that of orthodoxy)—fully adopted the “new” messianic conception of 
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403Renan, Vie (1863), 14.    
404Renan, Vie (1863), 15.    
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the mysterious “son of Man” of Daniel 7 who, along with the “Ancient of Days,” 
would in the “last days” replace the destructive and beastly reign of pagan empire 
with his own.406  And, consonant with orthodoxy, Renan’s Jesus also eschewed 
violence against the pagans as a means of establishing the Kingdom of God on 
earth.  (Significantly, however, unlike the New Testament accounts, Renan’s 
Jesus, as will be seen below, was totally apolitical; his Jesus did not “have all 
authority in heaven and on earth” [Matt. 28:18, NET, with my emphasis]).407  
However many of Jesus’ fellow-Jews were beguiled by the political messianism 
expressed in the Book of Daniel, and by the time of the Roman dominance of 
Judea, this had produced in the zélateurs du mosaïsme408 an “extraordinary 
contempt for life, or to say it better, a kind of appetite for death.”409  This was one 
of Renan’s major points in chapter IV of the Vie—“The Order of Ideas Which 
Surrounded the Development of Jesus.”  Here Renan posited a 
dialectic/dichotomy between the nihilism of irrational Jewish political messianism 
and the benign, rational (and perhaps at times tyrannical) empire of the Romans.  
And after recounting numerous failed Jewish revolts against the Romans, Renan 
made a connection with the contemporary heirs of the Semites and Indo-
Europeans in North Africa—that is, the Muslims of Algeria vis-à-vis the French 
Empire.  Writing of the similarities between the doomed fanaticisms of first- 
century Jewish rebels to that of Islamic resistance to French power in Algeria, 
Renan stated,  
 Experience counts for nothing within these great fanatical movements.  
 Algeria, from the beginning of French occupation, witnessed each spring 
 some prophets which declared themselves invulnerable and envoys of God 
                                                          
406Cf. Renan, Vie (1863), 38.    
407For the New Testament’s portrayal of Jesus’ political relevance in his day and ours, see (among 
many others) Matt. 2:13-23; 22:15-22; Lk. 2:13-14; Jn. 18:4-6; 18:28-19:16; Phil. 2:10-11; the 
entire Book of Revelation).  N. T. Wright also emphasizes this in his “historical Jesus”; see his 
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and 3 of his Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis:  Fortress Press). 
408Renan, Vie (1863), 58.    
409Renan, Vie (1863), 62.    
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 for the  chastisement of the infidels; the following year, their death was 
 forgotten and their successor found no less faith.410  
The historical lesson that Renan taught here was that Semitic irrationalism had 
survived into the Modern world, and, just as in the first century C.E., was still 
being crushed through the power of Indo-European rational States.  Unlike his 
race, Renan pointed out that Jesus had presented no such problem for Pagan 
Empire:  “Within his itinerant career, one does not see a single time Jesus having 
been troubled by the police.”411 Yet this was in part due to the internal dialectic 
Renan saw within Jewish culture between Galilee in the north, and Jerusalem and 
Judea in the south.   
3.3.  Renan’s Dialectic: Galilee versus Jerusalem 
Renan found Jesus encircled geographically, politically, and theologically:  to the 
North of Nazareth lay Hermon and Caesarea Philipi, centers of pagan empire; to 
the South beyond the mountains of Samaria lay “sorrowful Judea, dried up as by a 
scorching wind of abstraction and death.”412  Jesus, Renan pointed out, spent the 
majority of his life within the “enchanted circle” of Nazareth/Galilee, the “cradle 
of the Kingdom of God,” shielded from pagan empire on the one hand and the 
theological abstraction and nihilism of his fellow Jews on the other.413    
 Renan made much of what he saw as the dialectical tension between the 
Galilean liberté of the north versus the Judean messianisme of the south.  It had 
produced in the “Hebraic nation” a fecundity of moral thought characteristic of 
“every people called to a high destiny.”414  In this the Jews mirrored the creative 
tension in Greece between Sparta and Athens, which were “rival sisters necessary 
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411Renan, Vie (1863), 62.   
412Renan, Vie (1863), 28.    
413Renan, Vie (1863), 28.    
414Renan, Vie (1863), 62, 63.    
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to one another.”415  Renan latently related Athens to Galilee, and Sparta to 
Jerusalem.  It was not Jerusalem which had “conquered humanity”—just as Sparta 
had not through its martial philosophy been able to mould the Western mind.416  
Rather it was Galilee—“the north”—(as Athens in relation to the 
Peloponnesus)—which alone had “created Christianity” (“Le nord seul a fait le 
christianisme”) and thus had left an indelible mark on the world.417  Renan 
(perhaps unconsciously) portrayed Jesus as the product of a bucolic Jewish 
version of Athens situated in the hills of Galilee.  Renan’s historical Jesus, the 
product of a re-presented Galilean Athens, became the Jewish Socrates.  And here 
Renan also revealed his antipathy for Judaism in intensifying the historical 
dialectical conflict between Judaism and Christianity through his anthropological 
geography:   “Jerusalem, to the contrary, is the true country of the obstinate 
Judaism (judaïsme obstiné) which, founded by the Pharisees, codified by the 
Talmud, has traversed the Middle Ages and has come down even to us.”418  
 At the same time, Renan concluded that Jesus, like Buddha, Zoroaster, and 
Plato, conformed his teachings to the “instincts and needs of the heart” of his 
people and their specific historical context.419  However, the religion (or 
philosophy?420) Jesus produced was clearly distinct from Judaism.   In 
contemplating how Jesus as a Jew could produce a religion that was at once 
universal and like every other product of human culture except that of his own 
race, Renan asked,  
 Is it more just to say that Jesus owes all to Judaism and that his greatness  
 is nothing other than that of the Jewish people?  No one is more disposed 
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417Renan, Vie (1863), 64.    
418Renan, Vie (1863), 64.   
419Renan, Vie (1863), 454-455.    
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 to place high this unique people, whose particular gift seems to have been 
 in containing in its bosom the extremes of good and evil.421   
It was in actuality a rhetorical question; again, Renan placed Jesus in the context 
of other historical figures to illustrate his point that Jesus did not owe the genius 
of his religion to his own people.  Jesus had indeed come out of Judaism, but only 
as a reactionary in the same way that Socrates had come out of Greek Sophism, 
as Luther from late medieval scholasticism, or Rousseau from 18th century 
Enlightenment thought.422  On the one hand, nobody could escape their age and 
race—“One is from his age and his race, even when one reacts against his age and 
his race.”423  Yet Renan emphasized that Jesus represented the antithesis to 
Judaism; it was in this context that he stated that Jesus was “far from. . .being the   
continuator of Judaism” and that he represented “the rupture with the Jewish 
spirit.”424  Moreover, following Jesus’ lead, the historical development of 
Christianity had increasingly been away from its Jewish roots.  Indeed, 
Christianity’s “perfection” (apparently in the Modern Reformation age)                
consisted not in returning to Judaism, but “to Jesus.”425  Renan’s historical Jesus 
was thus himself anti-Jewish.  And in his treatment of Jesus’ arrest and trial, 
Renan revealed his anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic tendencies.   
3.4.  “Let His Blood Be On Us”:  Renan and the “Enemies of Jesus” 
Renan’s view of an original dialectical and violent conflict between Judaism and 
Christianity was most explicitly revealed in his reading of the Gospel accounts of 
Jesus’ arrest, trial, and crucifixion.  Read in the light of Schleiermacher and 
Strauss’ accounts (see Chapter 1, pgs. 41-62), Renan’s is remarkably passionate, 
belying a critical blind-spot in Enlightenment notions of objectivity:  while love 
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for one’s subject matter was always to be guarded against, antipathy was often 
not, and particularly antipathy against those perceived as embodying threats to the 
Enlightenment itself.  This may be seen as the great flaw of Renan’s interpretation 
of Jesus’ conflict with Jewish and Roman authorities.  He projected the 
Enlightenment’s political theology onto Roman Judea:  Rome became the 
tolerant, secular, civil power; Annas, Caiphas, and the Jewish priesthood became 
the seditious fanatics dedicated to the overthrow of secular reason, order, and 
civilization.  Jesus became the victim of the latter’s refusal to follow either Rome 
or Jesus’ enlightened paths.  And of the two groups, Renan emphasized that the 
most implacable “enemies of Jesus” (see the title of Chapter XXVII) were the 
Jews.     
 The Romans were, in Renan’s estimation, essentially secular—largely 
aloof from religious matters—and yet, being a “political people,” they lent semi-
official support for the “confounded” religious and civil laws of the Jews; this was 
how the Romans found themselves involved in the arrest and trial of Jesus.426   
Renan found this similar to Europe’s post-Enlightenment imperial regimes’ 
experiences in the Orient:    
 Although neutral in religion, the Romans sanctioned thus very often some 
 penalties against religious offenses.  The situation was somewhat similar 
 to the holy cities of India under English domination, or better yet of that 
 state which Damascus would be the following day if Syria were to be 
 conquered by a European nation.427  
The latter statement came from Renan’s personal experiences as a part of the 
French intervention in Syria during the eruption of ethnic violence between 
Christians and Muslims in Ottoman “Phoenicia”.  (This was the context of 
Renan’s “scientific mission” there as a member of the Académie des Inscriptions 
in 1860 and 1861-62; Renan was protected in his work by Napoleon III’s army 
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and navy.)428  Renan’s implicit argument was that Western Enlightenment rule 
(whether Ancient or Modern) was more just than Eastern Theocratic rule, whether 
under the Jews or the “. . .Arabs of Algeria . . . ruled by the code of Islam.”429 
Pilate, Renan speculated, probably viewed the Jews in the way “liberal prefect[s]” 
in France used to view the Bas-Bretons, who would revolt against the building of 
a new road or a new school; it was the Jews’ own Law that was the main obstacle 
to Pilate/Rome’s attempts to improve the infrastructure of the country—just as 
Islamic Shari ‘a impeded French improvements in Algeria in Renan’s day (cf. 
above, pgs. 110-111).430     
 Contrary to Schleiermacher’s assessment of Pilate’s culpability in Jesus’ 
death, Renan took pains to exonerate the representative of Roman justice.  It was 
certainly true that Pilate did not love the Jews; but the Jews’ hatred (détestaient) 
for Rome and its rule was greater.431 In Renan’s interpretation, the Jews were 
convinced that Pilate was determined to abolish the Jewish Law.  “Their narrow 
fanaticism, their religious hatreds shocked [the] broad feeling of justice and civil 
government that the most mediocre Roman carried with him everywhere.”432  
Pilate had no wish to play a part in the Jewish leaders’ plot to kill Jesus; he hated 
their Law and actually wished to save Jesus.433  In perhaps what was a self-
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projection, Renan speculated that Pilate must have found Jesus “an inoffensive 
dreamer” and as such no threat to secular order.434   Rather, according to Renan, 
Pilate knew that when “religious fanaticism” was able to “obtain the violence of 
civil governments”, it was then the first to blame the State for its use of force.435  
Renan then offered his own judgment:  “Supreme injustice; for the true culprit, in 
such cases, is the instigator!”436   
 Yet, fearing for his position, and the Jews’ accusation that Jesus was an 
insurgent “King of the Jews” opposed to Roman rule, Pilate gave into the Jews’ 
demands for the life of Jesus, and cast upon them all the responsibility for the 
future consequences of their complicity in the death of Jesus.  Here Renan 
brought up the notorious “blood guilt” verse of Matthew 27:25.  “[These 
consequences], according to the report of the Christians, [the Jews] would have 
fully accepted, in crying out themselves: ‘Let his blood fall on us and on our 
children!’”437  Like Strauss (see above, Chapter 1, pgs. 56-57), Renan did not find 
Matt. 27:25 historical; yet, un-like both Schleiermacher and Strauss, Renan 
believed it did express “a profound historical truth.”438  And this was the truth:  
the Jews’ “religious intolerance” had “forced the hand of the civil power!”439  
Renan was quite emphatic on this point.  “The ‘secular arm,’ behind which the 
clerical cruelty hides, is not culpable.  No one may say that he has horror of 
blood, when he pours it out for his servants.”440  In Renan’s court of 
Enlightenment historical judgment, Pilate and Roman Imperium should be 
exonerated for the death of Jesus; the same did not apply to Judaism and its 
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leaders:  “It was, then, neither Tiberius nor Pilate which condemned Jesus.  It was 
the old Jewish party; it was the Mosaic law.”441  
 Thus the bulk of Renan’s energy was spent in condemning Annas, a part 
of the “old Jewish party,” and the father-in-law of the Jewish High Priest 
Caiaphas, under whom Jesus’ trial in the Sanhedrin took place.  This is rather 
curious considering that Annas is only mentioned four times in the New 
Testament, with only two of these references (John 18:13, 24) directly relating to 
Jesus’ trial.442   However according to Renan, Annas had complete religious 
authority, and speculated that the order for Jesus’ arrest probably came from 
him.443  Notably, again in contrast to Schleiermacher and Strauss, Renan used the 
term “murder” in referring to Annas’ role in Jesus’ death:  he was the “true author 
of the juridical murder (meurtre juridique)” of Jesus, yet lacked the actual power 
to have him put to death (hence his turning of Jesus over to the High Priest 
Caiaphas).444  Concerning Caiaphas himself, Renan judged that he was merely the 
“blind tool” of Annas.445  In sum, Renan concluded that the Sanhedrin’s death 
sentence against Jesus was pronounced with a careless disdain; he mused that the 
members of the court could never have imagined that their sons would have to 
give an account to an “angry posterity” for the results of their fathers’ laxity.446  
 In the Vie Renan wrestled with the historical consequences of Jesus’ 
crucifixion for both Judaism and the Modern State.  On the one hand he noted that 
modern thought no longer imputed “moral demerit” for the crimes of the father 
against the son; each must now answer to human and divine justice for their 
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individual acts.447  Hence contemporary Jews could rightly protest against the 
blame for Jesus’ “murder” (meurtre), for perhaps they were descended from 
Simon of Cyrene, or “perhaps at least they were not among the crowd crying 
“‘Crucify him!’”448  And yet, “. . .[N]ations have their responsibilities as do 
individuals.   And if ever crime was the crime of a nation, it was the death of 
Jesus.”449  Jesus had been tried and condemned by his nation for blasphemy—for 
claiming to be the Jewish messiah.  In this regard Renan conceded that Jesus’ 
death was legal.  The Mosaic prescription against blasphemy, with which the 
Jewish leaders condemned Jesus before Pilate, was, in his words, “. . .the very 
soul of the nation.”450   From this perspective the Jews’ actions against Jesus 
made perfect sense, for Jesus had  
 . . .without doubt attacked the [Mosaic] cult and aspired to destroy it.  The 
 Jews said to Pilate with a frankness simple and true: ‘We have a Law, and 
 according to this Law he ought to die; for he makes himself the Son of 
 God’ [Jn. 19:7].  The law was detestable; but this was the law of ancient 
 ferocity, and the hero who offered himself up to abrogate it must first
 submit everything to it.451  
Once again, Renan’s poor historical analysis (exemplified here by his modern 
projection of post-Reformation Protestant antipathies towards “external” religious 
rites of Judaism (and Catholicism) onto a first-century milieu in which the 
distinctions between “Judaism” and “Christianity” were not so clear452), 
combined with heretical theology, produced a dangerous sophism.  The sophism 
can be seen when comparing Renan’s analysis to the primary text(s) of the New 
Testament.  According to Matthew’s Gospel, Jesus made a rather programmatic 
statement early in his ministry concerning his position towards the Mosaic Law:  
                                                          
447Renan, Vie (1863), 411.    
448Renan, Vie (1863), 411, with my emphasis.    
449Renan, Vie (1863), 411, my emphasis.    
450Renan, Vie (1863), 411.  
451Renan, Vie (1863), 411-412, with my emphasis.    
452See for example, Galatians, Romans 9-11, Hebrews, James 2:14-26, and the Didache.    
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“Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets.  I have not 
come to abolish these things but to fulfill them.  I tell you the truth, until heaven 
and earth pass away not the smallest letter or stroke of a letter will pass from the 
law until everything takes place” (Matt. 5:17-18, NET).453  The danger can be 
seen in Hitler’s theology as expressed in his speech in Munich in 1922: 
 . . .my feeling as a Christian points me to my Lord and Savior as fighter.   
 It points me to the man who once in loneliness, surrounded only by a few  
 followers, recognized these Jews for what they were and summoned men  
 to the fight against them and who, God’s truth! was greatest not as sufferer 
 but as fighter. . .454 
 Yet unlike Hitler, Renan seemed to advocate tolerance for those with 
differing religious views than his.  In fact he concluded his chapter on Jesus’ 
arrest and trial by lamenting that it had taken eighteen centuries for Jesus’ blood 
sacrifice to bear its fruit of enlightenment and tolerance.  He was disgusted that 
the intervening eighteen centuries had witnessed the torture and death of thinkers 
as noble as Jesus in the name of the great teacher from Nazareth.455  Still, there 
was for Renan an important distinction to be made between Christianity and 
Judaism in this regard:  “Christianity has been intolerant; but intolerance is not 
essentially a Christian fact.  It is essentially a Jewish fact. . .”456  Judaism was the 
first faith to posit the Absolute in religion.  It was also the first to condemn 
absolutely—to the point of death—any innovator which deviated from the already 
received divine law (citing Deut. 13:1 ff.).457  To be sure, the pagan world had 
also had its share of religious violence, but then, in a strange question, Renan 
asked, “But if it had had this law [the Mosaic law], how would it become 
Christian?”458  No, “The Pentateuch has thus been in the world the first code of 
                                                          
453Cf. Luke 16:16-17; 24:44-47.  
454Quoted in Bucher, Hitler’s Theology, 77, with Bucher’s emphasis.  
455Renan, Vie (1863), 412.    
456Renan, Vie (1863), 412, with my emphasis.    
457Renan, Vie (1863), 412.    
458Renan, Vie (1863), 412.    
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religious terror.  Judaism has given the example of an immutable dogma, armed 
with the sword.”459   For Renan, Judaism was the counter-revolutionary 
movement to Enlightenment Modernity that had displayed its own code of 
political terror, with the most conspicuous example being its murder of Jesus.   
The chapter then ended with another dangerous sophism:       
 If, instead of pursuing the Jews from a blind hatred, Christianity had 
 abolished the regime which had killed its founder, how much more of 
 consequence, how much better it had deserved of the human race!460   
 The first clause appears to condemn the Christian history of violence against “the 
Jews”—against the race.  Yet throughout the entire chapter Renan argued that 
“the regime” which killed Jesus was Jewish—made up of Jewish leaders (e.g., 
Annas, Caiaphas), enforcing the “soul of the nation” which was the Mosaic Law. 
Thus by the end of the sentence Renan wished for the complete abolition of 
Judaism.  Renan does not here call for genocide of the Jewish race.  However, 
given the connections Renan made between geography, culture, and race 
elsewhere in his writings—e.g. “[T]he desert is monotheistic; sublime in its 
immense uniformity, it revealed at first sight to Man the idea of the infinite, but 
not the feeling of this incessantly creative life which a nature more fecund has 
inspired in other races” (from Histoire générale des langues sémitiques, 
1855)461—his statement is indicative of the perilous “slippages” in anti-
Judaic/anti-Jewish/anti-Semitic language and thought that Susannah Heschel 
rightly identifies as contributing to the Nazi ideology that made the Holocaust 
possible.462    
                                                          
459Renan, Vie (1863), 412-413.    
460Renan, Vie (1863), 413, with my emphasis.    
461Quoted in Renan, Histoire des origines du christianisme, xix.    
462See Susannah Heschel, “Historiography of Anti-Semitism versus Anti-Judaism:  A Response to 
Robert Morgan,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 33, no. 3 (2011), 258.  Questioning 
Morgan’s call for a distinction between “anti-Judaism” and “anti-Semitism,” Heschel writes:  
“How, for example, ought we to understand the mixture of Scripture and murder in this 1936 
statement of Siegfried Leffler, one of the leaders of the German Christian Movement:  ‘Even if I 
know ‘thou shalt not kill’ is a commandment of God or ‘thou shalt love the Jew’ because he too is 
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 As alluded to above, in addition to the consequences of Jesus’ crucifixion 
for Jews and Judaism, Renan also pondered the results that Jesus’ execution had 
wrought in the development of the Modern State.  A key theme in Renan’s 
thought concerning both of these topics—that of Judaism and the State—was the 
notion of “the times of the great Christian revenges” (le temps des grandes 
vengeances chrétiennes).463  Renan’s interpretation here is highly questionable; 
revenge/vengeance has never been a Christian virtue (cf. Deut. 32:35 and Romans 
12:19), and when “Christian” kings, armies, or individuals have exercised 
revenge, they have done so in contradiction to their own scriptures.  Nevertheless, 
to Renan, Christianity’s greatest revenge came against the State itself.  Even 
though the Roman “civil power” was “innocent in the death of Jesus” (Pilate 
having signed his death warrant against his will), the official Roman sanction and 
execution of Jesus’ death sentence merited blame for the greatest miscarriage of 
justice in world history.  In presiding over Calvary, “the State had given itself the 
gravest wound.”464   This facilitated the spread of a legend “full of all kinds of 
irreverence” where Roman judges and police had united “against the truth” to 
effect a most odious offence.465  In Renan’s estimation this was a most dangerous 
legend:   
 Seditious to the highest degree, the history of the Passion, propagated by  
 thousands of popular images, showed the Roman eagles sanctioning the 
 most iniquitous of executions, the soldiers carrying it out, a prefect 
 ordering it.  What a blow to all established powers!  They have never 
                                                                                                                                                              
a child of the eternal Father, I am able to know as well that I have to kill him, I have to shoot him, 
and I can only do that if I am permitted to say: Christ.’  In Morgan’s terms, is Leffler’s statement 
an example of Christian theological anti-Judaism?  Cultural antisemitism ?  Theological 
antisemitism?  How is this taxonomy useful to historians?”  (258-259).  Heschel’s question is 
prescient, but I would dare offer other terms for characterizing Leffler’s statement:  heretical and 
satanic.  I am well aware that these too “[run] counter to current academic approaches” (258), but 
if my thesis that the loss and rejection in Modern (post Enlightenment) Academia of an 
epistemology and ontology based on the mystical Christo-Ecclesiology of orthodoxy helped 
produce the “slippages” that Heschel identifies, I do not think my terms unwarranted.  This will be 
a central focus in the conclusion to the dissertation.    
463Renan, Vie (1863), 439.  
464Renan, Vie (1863), 440.    
465Renan, Vie (1863), 440.  
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 recovered well.  How can they receive from the regard of poor people an 
 air of infallibility when they have on their conscience the great mistake of 
 Gethsemane?466                      
Renan noted that this “popular attitude” persisted even to the days of his youth in 
Brittany: the gendarme, “as the Jew elsewhere,” was viewed with “a kind of pious 
repulsion; for it was he who arrested Jesus!”467  Thus in the Vie Renan expressed 
latently what is explicit in La réforme intellectual et morale:  the Church (and its 
Gospels) were the great enemy to the State and social stability.  One can also 
detect here a Gnostic disdain for the vulgar masses, for those un-enlightened (and 
perhaps un-enlightenable) to the true nature of the historical Jesus and historical 
church which fostered such pernicious legends.  Notably, Renan’s disdain was 
only for the popular acceptance of Church dogma regarding the former’s 
superiority to the State.  He had nothing to say against the popular anti-
Judaism/Semitism expressed in the Brittany of his youth.   
 In sum, Renan not only saw Judaism but orthodox Christianity as the great 
counter-revolutionary antagonists to his Enlightenment Jesus and the Liberal 
“religion-less” political theology which Renan attributed to him.  But as was seen 
in the previous chapter, Renan was a “critical liberal”468 (37; 42-44)—especially 
after France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War—who wished to see the 
restoration in France of a strong, centralized State which would encourage and 
also be sustained by the imperium of Modern Science.  Renan and his Vie de 
Jésus would, he hoped, play an important role in the formation of this new avant-
garde Modernity.  This is why Ernst Nolte in his Three Faces of Fascism 
included Renan in his genealogy of the Modern thinkers who wished to establish 
                                                          
466Renan, Vie (1863), 440-441, with my emphasis.    
467Renan, Vie (1863), 441.    
468This is Ernst Nolte’s characterization of Renan (and August Comte, Frédéric Le Play, Hippolyte 
Taine, and Fustel de Coulanges)—all intellectual forerunners and “teachers” of Charles Maurras, 
the founder of the first Fascist political party, La Action Française.  See Ernst Nolte, Three Faces 
of Fascism:  Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New 
York:  Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 37; 42-44.   In Nolte’s reading, all these men wished to 
posit a counter Modernity to the one ushered in by the French Revolution.   
123 
 
through revolutionary means (in Renan’s case through revolutionary historical-
theological research) a counter Modernity, or perhaps better, a kind of hyper 
Modernity that would supersede liberalism, socialism, and most especially 
orthodox Judaism and Christianity.469  Furthermore, Renan’s critical life of Jesus 
opened the path way for other “critical liberals” of the early 20th century, such as 
Germany’s Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, Professor of Religious Studies and Indology at 
the universities of Tübingen and Marburg, and “‘prophet and leader’” under the 
Nazis of the German Faith Movement.470    
3.5.  Critical Liberal Theology and the Nazis:  Jacob Wilhelm Hauer’s 
German Faith Movement 
One of the more powerful (and controversial) theses of Karla Poewe’s New 
Religions and the Nazis is that the anti-Semitism of German National Socialism 
did not originate from Christianity.471  She demonstrates this through her 
examination of the life and work of Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, whose synthesis of 
neo-Pagan and Hindu philosophy and theology became the basis of the German 
Faith Movement he founded in 1933.  Poewe also demonstrates that Hauer’s path 
to the German Faith Movement began with his liberal academic theology—that 
is, the scientific study of Christianity and Judaism free from faith and love—the 
same path taken by Renan a generation earlier.  While Poewe did not find any 
instances where Hauer directly referenced Renan or his work, she does note that 
Renan “fit into the völkish phenomenon, which however soon moved beyond him 
in the more radical direction as seen in the constructions used by ‘German-
Christians’ (Deutsche Christen) and beyond that into the worldview paradigm of 
for example the SS.”472  Politically there were parallels between Renan’s life and 
                                                          
469This is the core of Nolte’s thesis concerning the rise of Fascism:  it was a revolutionary 
movement against revolution; specifically the revolutionary Liberal and Marxist “modernities” 
which Fascists believed were the fruition of the French Revolution.  See ibid., 6, 20-21, 37-53.  In 
the Fascist movements’ wish to create a new Modernity, I see them as “hyper.”   
470Poewe, New Religions,18.    
471Poewe, New Religions, 8, 14, 63, 142-143, 170-171.    
472Karla Poewe, e-mail message to author, 6 January 2014.    
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Hauer’s as well.  In his day Renan attached his hopes for a new enlightened world 
to a revived scientific monarch in France; Hauer saw in Hitler and National 
Socialism the political form which would complete his German Faith Movement 
and the eradication of what Hauer would have called “the Church and Jewish 
Problem.”473  He was drawn to Hitler precisely because he correctly perceived 
that the Führer was not Christian.474  And like Renan, Hauer’s intellectual work 
began with a loss of faith and inability to participate in the love of the Teacher 
from Nazareth.   
 From 1900 to 1911 Hauer was a missionary with the Basel Mission 
Society, and it was through this that he came to India and was exposed to Hindu 
theology from 1907 to 1911.  It was during his time as a missionary that he also 
lost his faith through a combination of reading Nietzsche, the Apologia of 
Socrates, and most especially the Bhagavad-Gita.475   However, like Renan, 
Hauer never lost his admiration for Jesus as a man, although that admiration was 
always on Hauer’s own terms.  Thus after forming the German Faith Movement, 
he could write to a pastor that “Jesus is a brother and comrade in the fight for a 
free faith. . .but in the form of a German Faith. . .I am a free man.  I am also free 
to decide against [Christ’s] word and commands when they do not mesh with my 
sense of inner necessity.”476  Writing publicly in 1935, however, Hauer was more 
blunt:  “in reality I have never been a Christian.”477  This became apparent in his 
German Faith.    
 In January 1934 Hauer described the “concrete content” of the German 
Faith in the inaugural issue of the movement’s flagship journal, Deutscher 
Glaube.   At the center of the German Faith was what Hauer called the “Volk’s 
                                                          
473Poewe, New Religions, 102; 137-139.      
474Poewe, New Religions, 97.    
475Poewe, New Religions, 28, 32, 65.    
476Quoted in Poewe, New Religions, 122, with my emphasis.    
477Quoted in Poewe, New Religions, 122.    
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religious Urwille”—the primal will of the pre-Christian German Volk that 
revealed itself mysteriously through “inner prompting(s),” or through the thoughts 
of Germany’s great philosophers.  The Urwille was the “only Führer who works 
within our own soul” and whom adherents to the German Faith were 
“unconditionally bound.”478   The faith in the Urwille was connected to a 
völkisch, neo-Pagan worship of German land and German people:  “For us there is 
no higher revelation of the eternal reality than that found within German space 
and coming from the German soul.”479  In the same issue Hauer radically echoed 
Renan’s distinction between Semitic and Aryan races and religions:   
 . . .one can safely talk about an Indo-Germanic Faith and contrast it with 
 the Israelite-Jewish-Christian one that was born and formed in the Near-
 Asian-Semitic space. . .[it is not saying too much] when we claim that the 
 battle between these two faith-worlds, the Near-Asian-Semitic-Christian 
 and the Indo-Germanic ones, is the real topic of religious world history.480 
For those with ears to hear, these were prophetic words.  Hauer himself was 
convinced that the German Faith Movement was “a phase of a several centuries-
old battle between the Near-Eastern-Semitic and the Indo-Germanic world.  Only 
in terms of this relationship can the historical meaning of the German Faith 
movement be clearly understood.”481  He was also convinced that  
 German Faith of necessity demands the National Socialistic worldview, 
 that therefore every German Faithler [sic] must be a National Socialist
 . . .Likewise, I am convinced that the National Socialistic worldview, 
 when it is understood and lived in depth, leads to German Faith.482 
 Poewe emphasizes that Hauer was able to construct his new faith based on 
his practice of liberal theology, beginning with his clandestine reading while at 
the Basel Mission of  Adolf Harnack’s What is Christianity—a book which the 
                                                          
478Poewe, New Religions, 75-76.    
479Quoted in Poewe, New Religions, 76.    
480Poewe, New Religions, 72, emphasis mine.   
481Quoted in Poewe, New Religions, 92.    
482Quoted in Poewe, New Religions, 23.    
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Nazis praised as a “freer and livelier conception of theology,” but which the 
mission regarded as heretical for its denial of the Godhead of Christ and its 
hostility to theology itself.483  The attraction of liberal academic theology for 
Hauer was its ability to open up new horizons of thought, belief, and practice—
and to free the world from the constraints of outworn Christian orthodoxy and its 
basis in Jewish orthodoxy.484   And like Renan before him, Hauer through his 
scientific study of religion came to reject Jesus’ Jewish origins.  Describing the 
place of Jesus within his German Faith, Hauer wrote, “‘. . .we can affirm the 
primal force in Jesus.  The religious culture within which Jesus is wrapped and 
that especially weighs down the history of his church, we have to, or at least I 
have to, reject.’”485  Poewe helpfully clarifies what Hauer meant by Jesus’ and the 
church’s “religious culture”—the Jewish theological concepts of salvation and 
guilt.  She also plainly states why Hauer rejected these:  they went against the 
social Darwinism and anti-Semitism of the German Faith.486  Salvation and guilt 
also posed a fundamental challenge to Modern Liberalism’s faith in autonomy.  
Jesus as the Crucified, Resurrected, and Returning Messiah was a constant 
reminder of the radicality of Genesis 3, and the autonomy destroying implications 
of  ex nihilo creation as alluded to in Genesis 1:1:  “In the beginning, God created 
the heavens and the earth” (NET). 
 More so than Renan, Hauer merged his academic and political praxis.  
Hauer was an early member of the Nazi party, and around 1933 joined the SS for 
roughly three years.487  He noted to his immediate superior in the SS, Werner 
Best, that as early as 1929 he had tried to prevent a “baptized Christian” of Jewish 
descent from obtaining a post at Tübingen University.  “Unfortunately,” he wrote, 
                                                          
483Poewe, New Religions, 29.    
484Poewe, New Religions, 12, 21.  
485Quoted in Poewe, New Religions, 69, with my emphasis.  
486Poewe, New Religions, 69.    
487Poewe notes that Hauer did not get along well with the SS leadership—particularly Himmler, 
Heydrich and Wüst.  By 1936 they demanded his resignation.  See ibid., Chapter 9.    
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“I did not succeed then.  The documentary evidence of my battle can be found in 
the files of the philosophical faculty.”488  Hauer did not go far as to support the 
murder of Jews, but he did believe that some radical solution was needed in order 
to rid Germany of all Jews.  (This was the rationale behind his rather 
paradoxical/ironic support of Zionism).489  However, at least one of his students, 
Paul Zapp, did participate directly in Nazi atrocities.  At his trial for the murder of 
13,499 people in the Ukraine during the war, Zapp argued in his defense that he 
had committed the crimes as a result of carrying out what he had learned from 
Hauer.490   It is a sobering reminder of the real-world importance of “higher 
education” in the modern age. 
3.6.  The Aryan Jesus Controversy:  Ernest Renan,  Walter Grundmann, and 
Christian Anti-Semitism 
In The Aryan Jesus:  Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany 
Susannah Heschel notes that it was Renan’s philological and historical studies of 
Judaism and Christianity that provided the “indispensible” vocabulary necessary 
to subsequent racializations of Jesus.491  Heschel points out that as early as 1855 
Renan had written that he was the first to recognize “that the Semitic race 
compared to the Indo-European race represents in reality an inferior composition 
of human nature.”492  More specifically, she argues that it was Renan’s Vie that 
“brought race to the heart of Christian theology and the figure of Jesus”493 and 
that Renan had constructed a Jesus which had overcome his Jewishness.494  
Heschel here quotes Renan’s remarkable statement in the Vie that, after visiting 
                                                          
488Quoted in Poewe, New Religions, 137-138.    
489Poewe, New Religions, 137-139.   
490Poewe, New Religions, 33.    
491Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 33.    
492Quoted in Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 35.    
493Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 34.    
494Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 35, 38.    
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Jerusalem, Jesus “‘appears no more as Jewish reformer, but as a destroyer of 
Judaism. . .Jesus was no longer a Jew.’”495   
 However, Heschel also notes that by the 1920s and 1930s, there were 
problems with Renan’s non-Jewish Jesus among German academics who were 
constructing an Aryan Jesus based on the foundations laid by Renan.  Particularly, 
Renan’s use of the “language of German romanticism that allowed him to 
appropriate feminine images to signal Jesus’ masculinity”—(e.g., Jesus as Le 
charmant docteur, as having a “ravishing face” [une de ces ravissantes figures qui 
apparaissent quelquefois dans la race juive]496)—was no longer appropriate for 
post-World War I German culture.  In the stinging shadows of the Versailles 
Treaty, of the perceived impotency of Weimar democracy, and in the emerging 
flame of German National Socialism, a new, “tough, hard-hearted Jesus” was 
needed.497  This was provided, Heschel contends, by Walter Grundmann, who 
was Professor of the New Testament at Jena University, and, from 1939 to 1945, 
was academic director of The Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish 
Influence on German Church Life.  At the opening ceremony for the Institute, 
Grundmann delivered the keynote lecture entitled, “The Dejudaization of the 
Religious Life as the Task of German Theology and Church.”  In the lecture 
Grundmann noted that even as Luther had once overcome Catholicism, German 
Christians (a pro-Nazi faction within the Protestant church in Germany), must 
now overcome Judaism.498  In this battle the Institute would continue the avant-
garde New Testament scholarship which “had made apparent the ‘deformation of 
New Testament ideas into Old Testament preconceptions’” and thus eliminate the 
Jewish obstruction(s) which denied German Christians access to the Bible.499  The 
                                                          
495Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 35.    
496Renan, Vie (1863), 219 and 80, respectively.    
497Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 52-53.    
498Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 2.    
499Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 2.    
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Bible would have to be cleansed in order to reveal the historical truth about Jesus 
and his wish to see the destruction of Judaism.  Heschel notes that for Grundmann 
this task was dire:  following Nazi propaganda, he believed that the Jews had 
destroyed Germans’ völkisch thinking, and through Bolshevism, threatened world 
domination.  Thus for Grundmann, the battle against the Jews was both military 
and spiritual:  “Jewish influence on all areas of German life, including on 
religious-church life, must be exposed and broken.”500    
 According to Heschel, during its six-year existence Grundmann’s Institute 
was widely successful in achieving support “from a host of church officials and 
theology professors” for its radical attempt to de-Judaize Christianity and form a 
Germanic, Aryan Christianity.501  She argues that one reason for the success of 
the Institute was that it tapped into an already established well-spring of Christian 
and Nazi anti-Semitism.  Heschel writes: 
 . . .while seeking to undermine the political power and moral authority of  
 the churches, Nazism simultaneously appropriated key elements of   
 Christian theology into its own ideology both for winning adherents used  
 to Christian arguments [of anti-Semitism] and also to give its own   
 message a coherence and resonance with the age-old Christian teachings  
 that had shaped European culture.  Conversely, German Christians   
 appropriated Nazi rhetoric and symbols into the church to give its   
 Christianity a contemporary resonance.502  
Both Heschel’s claims of the widespread influence of the Institute and her 
assertion of the Christian origins of Nazi anti-Semitism have been debated, and 
there is no need here for a recapitulation of Peter Head and Robert Morgan’s 
lengthy critiques and rebuttals to The Aryan Jesus in the Journal for the Study of 
the New Testament.503  However I would like to question what Heschel means by 
                                                          
500Quoted in Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 2.    
501Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 1.    
502Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 8-9, with my emphasis.    
503See Peter Head, “Susannah Heschel’s The Aryan Jesus:  A Response,”  Journal for the Study of 
the New Testament 32, no. 4 (2010): 421-430, and Robert Morgan, “Susannah Heschel’s Aryan 
Grundmann,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 32, no. 4 (2010): 431-494.  
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her frequent use of “Christian theologian,” “Christian theology,” and the “key 
teachings” of Christianity in connection to anti-Semitism in general, and Nazism 
in particular.504  Very questionable also is her assertion that Renan was a 
“Catholic scholar.”505  In sum, I am not convinced that Heschel’s approach to the 
problem of the “Fascist-Aryan Jesus” has sufficiently gone beyond the same 
Enlightenment epistemological and ontological mathēsis that helped to produce 
scholars like Renan, Hauer, and Grundmann; for her the problem of Nazi theology 
still seems to be one of only a gross misapprehension of the facts about Jesus and 
his roots.  Not once does she entertain the possibility that the cataclysmic 
intellectual failure of academic theology in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
was the result of a profound spiritual deprivation.  Thus in the conclusion to this 
dissertation, I shall attempt to answer the questions I have raised with Heschel’s 
theses and Renan’s Vie as a means of calling for a radical return within academic 
theology to what I have termed mystical Christo-Ecclesiology.  For it is in this 
return that the non-loving Sophistry of the Modern Academy and the danger of 
producing academic “desk murderers” 506 may be overcome.
                                                          
504See Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 63, 8, and 23, respectively, and passim.    
505Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 30, and see 36.    
506Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 16-17.    
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      Conclusion:                                                                                  
 Overcoming “Desk Murder”:  Mystagogy and The Good Teacher 
 
In this dissertation I have sought to demonstrate that the connection between 
Renan’s “historical Jesus” and the later “Fascist-Academic Jesus” of the early 20th 
century runs through three systematically linked problems associated with the rise 
of  modern secular rationality:  first, the rejection of pre-modern mystical 
ontology and epistemology (as represented in the Phaedrus) in general, and 
specifically the mystical Christo-Ecclesiology of orthodoxy; second, a radical 
abstraction of Jesus from his Jewish and ecclesiological contexts which further 
amplified the dialectical conflict between Judaism and Christianity; and third, 
(perhaps the essence of the first two instances), the attempt to re-present and 
supplant pre-Modern orthodoxy’s understanding of Jesus of Nazareth and the 
social body he founded, the Church, through the positing of a “secular” messiah 
and de-mystified ekklesia.   In sum I have argued, using Renan’s de-mystified 
portrayal of Jesus, that the more scientific and rational the approach to 
understanding Jesus’ historical life became, the more susceptible he became to 
being co-opted and manipulated by the emerging anti-Judaic and anti-Semitic 
political theologies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  It was precisely the 
mystical imprecision practiced in the Pre-Modern Church—(what Nicholas of 
Cusa called the “cloud of unknowing” in his “historical Jesus” writing, On the 
Vision of God)507—which connected Jesus to Abraham in the past, the Church in 
the present, and all who would come into the “Israel of God” in the future, 
whether “Jew or Greek” (cf.  John 8:31-58; Matt. 22:31-32; Romans 4-11; 
Galatians 6:16, 3:28; Hebrews 11-12:2).  By contrast, it was the supposed 
precision of the Modern scientific gaze, un-clouded by love, which objectified 
Jesus and set him in dialectical opposition to the Jews and Judaism. 
                                                          
507See Nicholas of Cusa, “On the Vision of God,” 6.21 in Nicholas of Cusa:  Selected Spiritual 
Writings, The Classics of Western Spirituality, trans. H. Lawrence Bond (New York and Mahwah:  
Paulist Press, 1997), 244-245.    
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 In this way my research supports Karla Poewe’s theses that liberal 
theology,508 and, in Renan’s case, his liberal, Enlightenment Jesus, opened the 
path for the heretical, neo-pagan “Aryan Jesus” of the Nazis.  Renan’s liberal 
theology produced a remarkable fiction:  a Jesus who supported an autonomous 
state whose guarantee of “human rights” is based on nothing more than contract, 
human will, and ultimately, force.  From my reading of the Phaedrus, I have 
argued that this liberal conception of Jesus was also sophistic, that is, it was based 
on a philosophy which radically separated loving from knowing, and knowing 
from mystical participation in the Divine.  For indeed, the master key to Renan’s 
liberation of Jesus was his faith in science and his Lysian amour désintéressé for 
“the pure idea.”509  I argue (controversially to be sure) that Renan’s participation 
in the fiction of an objective, non-loving rationality led to his construction of 
fictions about Jesus, for instance that his god and the god of the Jews was 
different.510   Hauer, Grundmann, Hitler—each, in their own fashion, men 
devoted to a non-loving, non-participatory rationality—at least in regards to the 
Jesus of orthodoxy—but not to the gods of Science, Force, and War—later 
participated in and magnified these fictions about Jesus, as Hitler sophistically 
propounded in his Munich speech in  1932:    
 . . .my feeling as a Christian points me to my Lord and Savior as fighter.   
 It points me to the man who once in loneliness, surrounded only by a few  
 followers, recognized these Jews for what they were and summoned men  
 to the fight against them and who, God’s truth! was greatest not as sufferer 
 but as fighter.511 
Long ago Socrates warned of the danger to the polis sophistic “disinterested love-
as-knowledge” could take.  Speaking of Lysias’ type of non-loving “objective” 
speech, Socrates asks Phaedrus:   
                                                          
508See Karla Poewe, New Religions and the Nazis (New York and London:  Routledge, 2006).    
509Ernest Renan, Vie de Jésus, neuvième edition, Histoire des origines du christianisme, livre 
premier (Paris:  Michel Lévy Frères, 1863), 451.      
510See Renan, Vie, 69-70.    
511Quoted in Rainer Bucher, Hitler’s Theology:  A Study in Political Religion, trans. Rebecca Pohl, 
ed. Michael Hoelzl (London and New York:  Continuum, 2011), 77, with Bucher’s emphasis.  
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 . . .when the orator who does not know what good and evil are undertakes  
 to persuade a state which is equally ignorant, not by praising the ‘shadow  
 of an ass’ under the name of a horse, but by praising evil under the name  
 of good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them  
 to do evil instead of good, what harvest do you suppose his oratory will  
 reap thereafter from the seed he has sown?512 
Phaedrus correctly responds, “No very good harvest.”513  How true this was of the 
seeds sown by Renan, Hauer, Grundmann and that generation of non-loving, 
rational academics from the death of Schleiermacher to the birth of Bonhoeffer. 
 Again in line with Poewe and Rainer Bucher’s works, but against 
Susannah Heschel,514 I have argued that Renan’s (and consequently later Nazi 
historians and theologians such as Hauer and Grundmann) anti-Judaism and anti-
Semitism in no way stems from orthodox Christianity, but rather from their 
resurrection of Pagan sophism combined with Marcionite heterodoxy.  As noted 
in my conclusion to Chapter 3, I find Heschel’s frequent use of “Christian 
theologian” and “Christian theology” problematic when referring to the theology 
and history produced by Renan and Grundmann.   For instance, she makes a point 
of referring to Renan as a “Catholic” and to “many members” of Grundmann’s 
Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church 
Life as being “Protestants,” and implies an ecumenical link between the two 
groups based on an “anti-Semitism [that] was able to function as the common 
ground for Christians of different varieties and cultural contexts.”515  While she 
does mention that Renan was “repudiated by the Roman Catholic Church for his 
writings and in doubt over his own faith,”516 she does not mention that Renan first 
                                                          
512Plato,  Phaedrus, Greek, 260, C, English, 515, 517, in  Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, 
Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library, trans. Harold North Fowler (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1966), with my emphasis.    
513Plato,  Phaedrus, Greek, 260, D, English, 517.    
514Susannah Heschel, The Aryan Jesus:  Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany 
(Princeton and Oxford:  Princeton University Press, 2008).  
515Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 36.    
516Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 36.    
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rejected the Church and its sacraments.517  Thus in her presentation, Renan’s anti-
Judaism and anti-Semitism appear to stem from his supposedly Christian roots as 
a scholar.   
 But Heschel is wrong in presenting Renan is this way.  This can be seen in 
her problematic quoting and editing of one of Renan’s more remarkable anti-
Judaic statements from the Vie.  She writes: 
 For Renan. . .the fact that Jesus was born into a Jewish milieu and   
 practiced Judaism proved his greatness:  his ability to overcome his  
 Jewishness.  After visiting Jerusalem, Jesus [now quoting an  
 English translation of the Vie518] ‘appears no more as a Jewish  
 reformer, but as a destroyer of Judaism. . .Jesus was no longer a Jew.’519 
Yet contrary to Heschel’s presentation of Renan in general—that he was in some 
way a Christian and that that produced such anti-Judaic remarks in the Vie—the 
passage Heschel quotes actually points to Renan’s worship of Enlightenment 
ideals as the basis of his anti-Judaism.  The problem is with Heschel’s quotation 
of Renan out of context when he states that “Jesus was no longer a Jew.”  After 
discussing Jesus’ antipathy for the Jewish Temple system of worship, Renan 
states: 
 This narrow Law, hard, without charity, is only made for the children of  
 Abraham.  Jesus claimed that every man of good will, every man who  
 received and loved him, is [a] son of Abraham.  The pride of blood 
 appeared to him the capital enemy which he must combat.  Jesus, in other 
 terms, is no longer Jewish [Jésus, en d’autres terms, n’est plus juif].520 
As is so often the case with Renan, his heterodoxy (the Law is only made for 
Jews—a contradiction of orthodoxy—see Matt. 5:17-18; Lk. 16:16-17; 24:44-47; 
                                                          
517See Ernest Renan, Souvenirs d’enfance et de jeunesse, 28e éd. (Paris:  Calmann Levy, 1897), 
312.  
518Heschel quotes here Charles E. Wilbour’s 1864 translation of the Vie, citing pages 206-207; see 
her bibliography, pg. 317.   
519Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 35.    
520Renan, Vie, 222-223.    
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Rom. 13:8-10; Gal. 5:13-14521) is mixed with orthodoxy—“every man who 
received and loved [Jesus], is a son of Abraham” (Renan correctly cites Lk. 19:9 
here).   Renan’s assertion that Jesus denied the importance of “the pride of blood” 
is correct and affirms the pre-Modern, pre-racist522 orthodox belief that there is 
only one race—the human race (cf. Acts 17:26—“From one man he made every 
nation of the human race to inhabit the earth. . .” [epoiēsen te ex henos pan ethnos 
anthrōpōn], NET, with my emphasis).   Yet his denial of Jesus’ Jewishness—
(against the orthodoxy of John 4:21-22, NET—“Jesus said to her. . .salvation is 
from the Jews”)—his wish to make Jesus “white”—“beyond race”523—is 
completely heterodox and stems from his attachment to a post-Enlightenment 
conception of race.  It was quite revolutionary, and, indeed, Renan continues by 
asserting that Jesus himself was revolutionary:   
 . . .Jesus, in other terms, is no longer Jewish.  He is revolutionary to the  
 highest degree; he calls all men to a religion founded on their single  
 quality as children of God.  He proclaims the rights of man, not the rights  
 of the Jew [Il proclame les droits de l’homme, non les droits du juif]; the  
 religion of man, not the religion of the Jew [la religion de l’homme, non la 
 religion du juif]; the deliverance of man, not the deliverance of the Jew [la 
 déliverance de l’homme, non la deliverance du juif].  Ah!  We are far from 
 a Judas the Galilean, from a Mathias Margaloth, preaching revolution in  
 the name of the Law!  The religion of humanity, established not on blood,  
 but on the heart, is founded.  Moses is surpassed; the temple has no more  
 reason for being and is irrevocably condemned.524   
                                                          
521The relationship between Christian praxis and “the Law” is, I realize, complex theologically and 
historically.  Part of the problem is what is meant by “Law”—does it refer to the 600 plus laws 
found in the Tanakh by the Pharisees? to the “10 Commandments”? or, as Paul indicates in 
Romans 13:8-10 and Galatians 5:13-14—love? (On the latter point, cf. Deut. 6:4-5; 10:12; 11:1; 
Matt. 22:34-40; Mk. 12:28-34; Lk. 10:25-28).   
522The concept of “race” and “races” was not invented by Western natural philosophers until 
around the 17th century.  See George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution:  A History of 
European Racism (New York:  Howard Fertig, 1978).    
523See Halvor Moxnes in Jesus and the Rise of Nationalism:  A New Quest for the Nineteenth-
Century Historical Jesus (London and New York:  I. B. Tauris, 2012), 145-147.   
524Renan, Vie, 223, with my emphasis.    
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Heschel’s failure to consider and quote the entirety of this passage obscures the 
fact that the basis of Renan’s anti-Judaism was his adherence to an Enlightenment 
and Romantic conception of religion and humanity.   
 In sum, Heschel’s understanding of what it means to be “Christian” or 
practice “Christian theology”—(which St. Augustine famously defined as “faith 
seeking understanding”)—is obscure.  She never, in fact, defines what she means 
when she applies these terms to scholars like Renan or Grundmann.   Certainly 
Augustine’s definition of theology could not be applied to either Renan or 
Grundmann, for neither had, by their own admission, an orthodox Christian faith.  
Concerning the term “Christian,” there is some hint that Heschel conceives of 
Christianity in an orthodox Enlightenment fashion as simply one other 
sociological phenomenon that can be rationally calculated and tabulated through 
tax records, census data, or other methods of State based pouvoir-savoir.   She 
uses state records to point out the numbers of “German Christians”525—some 
600,000 out of the nearly 40,000 million Protestant Christians in Germany.526  
Poewe’s analysis of the disputed figures of how many SS members were 
“Christian” or “Gottgläubig” (“God believers,” i.e. believers in any of a number 
of “new religions” created during the Nazi regime) shows the problems with this.  
At least one study cited by Poewe claims that 76 percent of SS members were 
Gottgläubig; another study argues that 75 percent were Christian.527  Poewe 
argues that her archival research supports the findings that the majority of the SS 
were Gottgläubig.  She also points out that part of the problem of relying on state 
records to determine how many SS members were “Christian” or not is that 
because the Christian churches in Germany received state funding, many SS 
members who expressed their hatred of Christianity in private letters publicly 
                                                          
525My friend and fellow researcher Naomi Thurston rightly points out that Deutsche Christen was 
a “hijacked term,” another wicked sophism perpetrated by the Nazis.  I am thankful for all of her 
many insights and help with the German terms in this dissertation.  All infelicities are mine.   
526Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 3.    
527Poewe, New Religions, 22.    
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maintained their “Christian status” for the most cynical and base of reasons:  to 
avoid higher taxes.528   
 This points to the fundamental inability of Enlightenment methods of 
rationality to rationally master orthodoxy’s understanding of the mystical, hidden 
essence of what it means to be “Christian”—to participate in the mystery of 
Christ Himself.  According to Matt. 24, Jesus expressed this mystery to his 
disciples when discussing the coming eschatological age:     
But as for that day and hour no one knows it—not even the angels in 
heaven—except the Father alone.  For just like the days of Noah were, so 
the coming of the Son of Man will be. . .Then there will be two men in the 
field; one will be taken and one left.  There will be two women grinding 
grain with a mill; one will be taken and one left.  (Matt. 24:36-41, NET) 
Jesus’ point here is that to the eyes of “objective observers,” the exterior signs of 
who may rightly be called “Christian” will be a mystery that will ultimately only 
be revealed with Jesus’ return.  Again, Matthew’s Gospel reports Jesus saying, 
“Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter into the kingdom of 
heaven—only the one who does the will of my Father in heaven” (Matt. 7:21, 
NET).  Hence Augustine’s observation that  
 . . .while she is a pilgrim in this world, the City of God has with her,  
 bound to her by the communion of the sacraments, some who will not  
 be with her to share eternally in the bliss of the saints.  Some of these are  
 concealed.  Some of them, however, join openly with our enemies, and do  
 not hesitate to murmur against the God Whose sacrament they bear.   
 (City of God I.35)529 
But then again, there are external signs of who is a Christian, for “a tree is known 
by its fruit” (Matt. 12:33, NET):   
 Now the works of the flesh are obvious:  sexual immorality, impurity,  
 depravity, idolatry, sorcery, hostilities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of anger,  
                                                          
528Poewe, New Religions, 23, 28.    
529St. Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson, Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
48.  
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 selfish rivalries, dissensions, factions, envying, murder, drunkenness,  
 carousing, and similar things.  I am warning you, as I had warned you  
 before:  Those who practice such things will not inherit the kingdom of  
 God!            
  But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness,  
 goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control.  Against such things  
 there is no law.  Now those who belong to Christ have crucified the flesh  
 with its passions and desires. . . (Gal. 5:19-24, NET).   
Surely this is not what Heschel means when she writes that Nazism incorporated 
the “key teachings” of Christianity into “its own, more elevated political ideology, 
exploiting its language and ideational framework rather than trying to destroy 
it”?530   Still, it is—or would be—a great and terrible mystery as to how 
“Christians” as understood by the New Testament, and orthodoxy could 
perpetrate the satanic works of the Holocaust and in so doing remain Christian.  
Even Adolf Eichmann intuited this.  While in custody awaiting his trial in Israel 
for his role in sending millions of Jews to their deaths in Nazi concentration 
camps, Eichmann stated in his defense, “. . .I myself had no hatred for Jews, for 
my whole education through my mother and my father had been strictly 
Christian. . .”531  This was a sophistry on Eichmann’s part; two hours before 
being hanged he told the Protestant minister who had offered to read the Bible 
with him that he had no “‘time to waste’”—for he was a Gottgläubiger.532  Thus 
Adolf Eichmann, an accountant “desk murderer,”533 received justice.  
 Hannah Arendt explained what might be termed the “Eichmann 
phenomenon” through “the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of 
evil.”534  Heschel’s explanation for why so many learned scholars in Germany 
contributed to the construction of what 70 plus years later looks so ridiculous—an 
                                                          
530Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 23, with my emphasis.      
531Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem:  A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York:  The 
Viking Press, 1964), 30.    
532Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 27, 252.    
533Cf. Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 16. 
534Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 252, emphasis in the original.      
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“Aryan” Jesus—is on the one hand largely based on what Poewe calls “an article 
of faith, ferociously held against all evidence to the contrary, that anti-Semitism 
has its source in Christianity.”535  On the other hand, Heschel seems at a loss to 
explain why and how scientifically trained scholars could be so wrong in their 
judgments:  “Regardless of their training and the high standards of historical 
scholarship for which German universities were so respected, a remarkable 
number of academics in a range of fields came to stand behind claims that Jesus 
was a Buddhist or that Galilee was Gentile.”536  Heschel’s study points out the 
problem of the impotency of modern scientific rationality in preventing the 
monstrosities of Nazi theology, but offers no answer as to its causation.  
Answering this question is critical; Heschel’s work shows that in the early 20th 
century, academics had life and death consequences.  And they still do, as recent   
events involving Renan, the one-time Nazi philosopher Martin Heidegger, and the 
right-wing French historian and supposed “Catholic traditionalist”537 Dominique 
Venner demonstrate.   
 In May 2013 the French Republic legalized gay marriage.  In his blog post 
of 21 May, Venner linked the issue of liberalized marriage laws to increased 
Muslim immigration to France.  The latter was by far of much greater concern, 
and Venner quoted an Algerian blogger who predicted that in fifteen years there 
would be enough Islamists in France to suppress the law and institute Islamic 
Shari’a law in France.538  Alarmed, Venner invoked Renan in a call for radical 
cultural and political reform to stem the slide into decadence:    
                                                          
535Poewe, New Religions, 8.    
536Heschel, Aryan Jesus, 64, and see also 282, 284.    
537This according to The Independent; see 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/farright-french-historian-78yearold-dominique-
venner-commits-suicide-in-notre-dame-in-protest-against-gay-marriage-8625877.html#  (accessed 
26 June 2013).  I wish to thank my friend and colleague Dr. Michael Behrent for calling this event 
to my attention, and to Venner’s last blog as cited below.   
538See http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/05/la-manif-du-26-mai-et-heidegger/  
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It will not suffice to organize some pretty protests in the street in order to 
stop them.  What is needed first is, as Renan said, a true ‘intellectual and 
moral reform.’  They must allow for a re-conquest of the memory of 
French and European identity, the need of which is still not clearly 
perceived.539   
But this was not all.  New and “spectacular” gestures, symbols, and words would 
need to be accompanied by authentic acts.  In other words, Venner called for a 
new liturgy to save Modern Europe.  Here Venner turned to Being and Time, 
Heidegger’s magnum-opus:   
It will be necessary for us to remember, as Heidegger has genially put it, 
that the essence of man is his existence [now] and not in ‘another world.’  
It is here and now that our destiny plays itself out until the last second.  
And this final second has as much importance as the rest of one’s life.  
This is why it is necessary to be oneself until the last instant.  It is in 
deciding oneself, in truly willing one’s destiny that one is the conqueror of 
nothingness.  And there is no escaping this exigency because we have 
nothing but this life in which we decide to be entirely ourselves or 
nothing.540   
It was Venner’s last blog.  That same day, he went to Notre Dame Cathedral, and 
beside the altar where the Eucharist is celebrated, offered up his own sacrifice by 
shooting himself in the head.  This time “desk murder” became self-murder.  Here 
de Lubac’s words of Corpus Mysticum written in 1944 seem especially 
appropriate: 
It seems that it would. . .be of great interest, we might even say of pressing 
urgency, given the present state of what remains of ‘Christendom’, to 
return to the sacramental origins of the ‘mystical body’ in order to steep 
ourselves in it.541 
Would that Venner could have embraced this invisible and real body as a means 
of hopeful living in the world.  Would too that he had been able to experience at 
                                                          
539See http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/05/la-manif-du-26-mai-et-heidegger/    
540See http://www.dominiquevenner.fr/2013/05/la-manif-du-26-mai-et-heidegger/    
541Henri Cardinal de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum:  The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, 
trans. Gemma Simmonds (Notre Dame, Indiana:  University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 260.  
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the altar of Notre Dame the words of the Psalmist:  “Taste and see how good the 
LORD is; happy the man who takes refuge in Him!” (Psalm 34:9, JPS).   
 It has been the purpose of my dissertation to argue “beyond the secular 
reason”542 of the Academy that in regards to “the historical Jesus,” the only path 
to gaining an accurate and true vision of his life is through a participation in his 
life.  This is the mystery which Renan, Hauer, Grundmann, Heschel, and the 
majority of the Modern Academy have missed.  In sum, I have been arguing for a 
return to a broader conception of what Reason is, and how it is practiced.543  With 
Socrates, Plato, and the Jesus of the Gospels I have argued that there is no 
knowing without loving, no loving without participation.  Of course, this path of 
knowledge to the “historical Jesus” is mysterious; but long ago Plato in the Meno 
and St. Augustine in The Teacher demonstrated that the path to all knowledge is 
mysterious.544  And each in their own way—according to the light given to them, 
showed that the path of mystagogy is the path to The Good Teacher (cf. Luke 
18:18)—“Christ—that is, the unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of 
God”—who gives true knowledge and the path to “the happy life which all 
proclaim they seek.”545   To the consternation of the post-Enlightenment 
Academy, this is not something that can be necessarily “proven.”  However, to be 
objective, because “wisdom is vindicated by her deeds” (Matt. 11:19, NET), it 
                                                          
542See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory:  Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed.  (Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell, 2006).  
543I am making the same argument as Pope Benedict XVI in his controversial Regensburg lecture 
on “Faith, Reason and the University:  Memories and Reflections” in 2006.  See  
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html (accessed 6 Jan 2014). 
544See Peter King’s introduction to St. Augustine, Against the Academicians and The Teacher, 
trans. Peter King (Indianapolis/Cambridge:  Hackett Publishing Co., 1995), vi-xx.    
545St. Augustine, The Teacher, 11.38.45, with emphasis in the original; 13.46.20-25.  
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might be asked:  which Nazarene still lives and brings life—Renan’s, or the 
Gospels’?546   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
546Cf.  Étienne Nodet, —“. . .the Gospels valiantly bury their commentators.”  See his The 
Historical Jesus?  Necessity and Limits of an Inquiry trans. J. Edward Crowley (New York:  T & 
T Clark International, 2008), 20.  
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